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PREFACE
An economic crisis is confronting many state and local govern­
ments within the United States today. The politics of scarcity hit 
many urban centers in the late 1960's with the onslaught of a major 
economic downturn. During and after the 1969-70 and 1974-75 recessions, 
some state governments also faced rising budget deficits which rivaled 
those of the troubled cities. In an effort to deal with their fiscal 
problems, many state and local governments found themselves in the 
unpalatable position of having to increase taxes, reduce expenditures, 
lay off employees, or cancel capital construction projects (see 
Schlosstein, 1975: 47). Several factors portend a continuation of state 
and local fiscal crises, including declining population and revenues in 
the larger, older cities of the Northeast and in those states not for­
tunate enough to be located within the "Sun Belt"; chronically high 
inflation and unemployment throughout much of the country; and what 
appears to be a retreat by the federal government from the financial 
morass of the cities (see llaides, 1976: 178; Schlosstein, 1975: 47).
As state and local government expenditures for public employees 
have expanded sharply, sometimes at the expense of much needed capital 
improvements, some have alleged that public employee unionism may be a 
major culprit in the economic crisis. Certainly there is at least some 
truth in the allegation in the case of New York City, whose high public
employee pay, pensions, and other fringe benefits have played a 
noticeable role In the city's continual flirtation with bankruptcy.
While the fact goes unchallenged that employee compensation constitutes 
by far the single largest expenditure In state and local government 
operating budgets, systematic empirical research on the impact of collec­
tive bargaining on public employee wages and benefits is scarce. The 
present study Is Intended to help alleviate the research lacuna In this 
vital area.
In the first chapter, a brief historical overview of organized 
labor In the United States will be presented. After a look at the 
legal environment of labor relations In the public and private sectors, 
the tremendous growth In public employee unionism will be traced with 
particular attention given to the leading state and local employee 
organizations. The first chapter will conclude with a summary and 
analysis of the theoretical and empirical work economists have contri­
buted to the general area of unions and employee compensation. It will 
concentrate on wage theory, the union Impact on wages and benefits In 
private sector employment, and the determinants of wages.
The setting of public sector labor relations differs from that 
found in the private sector. In Chapter Two, a description of the 
primary dissimilarities In legal, economic, and organizational environ­
ments Is offered. Reviews will follow of the theoretical and empirical 
work of economists concerned with public sector wage theory In general 
and the specific Impact of unions on wages and benefits In the public 
sector. It will be apparent that theoretical contributions are sparse 
In these areas, but that a great deal of empirical work has appeared 
on the Impact of unions on the compensation of public school teachers.
The relevant literature will be drawn from in presenting a model of 
the union impact on state and local employee compensation.
In Chapter Three, a variant of the model will be applied in order 
to assess the influence of unions on faculty compensation in higher edu­
cation within the United States. A cross-sectional, multivariate 
analysis will be performed using AAUP data on faculty compensation for 
matched pairs of union and nonunion institutions. The dependent variables 
will consist of 1969-70 and 1974-75 faculty compensation and a change 
measure spanning the years between the two time periods.
The analysis will proceed in Chapter Four with a similar testing 
of the model on the impact of unions on the compensation of state 
government employees. Multiple regression techniques will be employed 
to measure the effects of employee organizations on overall levels of 
employee compensation and on compensation in four functional categories. 
Aggregate data will be drawn from published sources for use in the 
analysis, which employ 1974 data for the 50 states.
In the fifth chapter, data gathered from a survey questionnaire 
mailed to local governments of 10,000 population and above in Oklahoma, 
Texas, New Mexico, Kansas, and Arkansas will serve as the basis for 
an examination of the impact of unions on the wages and benefits of 
policemen. Survey results will be supplemented in the multivariate 
analysis with data obtained from the regional office of the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and various government documents.
The final chapter will consist of a summary of the findings 
regarding the impact of unions on the compensation of state and local 
government employees. Preliminary conclusions will be stated, and 
the various policy implications of the findings will be discussed.
xi
The dissertation will focus on a limited effect of public employee 
unionism— its impact on the amount of wages and benefits paid to public 
workers. Although the various causes of public employee unionism will 
be discussed briefly in Chapter One, these causal factors will remain 
tangential to the bulk of the discussion which follows.
CHAPTER ONE 
UNIONS AND COMPENSATION: BACKGROUND
It is impossible to conceive of human culture without the 
existence of groups. The earliest oral histories and written words 
were concerned with the clan, the tribe, and the family, long before the 
appearance of any overtly political entity. The nature of the communal 
compulsion underwent change with the evolution of secondary groups, the 
polis, the feudal estate, the monarchy, and the nation state, but man 
remained primarily a social creature, joining together with other human 
beings in both permanent and temporary alliances.
Some of the first alliances developed around the workplace.
Tyler (1972: 98) relates that early labor-oriented organizations included 
the priesthood in ancient Sumaria, skilled temple workers in Mesopotamia, 
colegii of occupational groups in old Rome, and guilds in medieval Europe. 
It is to these early guilds that the roots of contemporary labor organi­
zations can be traced.
But guilds— associations of apprentices and their masters in 
various crafts— were not trade unions as we know them now, as no division 
between "owner" and "worker" existed (Nisbet, 1975: 26-27). In fact, 
the dichotomy did not occur in any substantial form until the Industrial 
Revolution in 19th century Europe. Nisbet (1976: 28) attributes the
1
2upsurge in labor organizations at that time to (1) social and legal 
atomism, "the kind of atomism that had been created by the new industrial 
system, with its large, impersonal factories, its rigid division between 
'owners' and 'workers,' and by the sudden loss of traditional, communal 
contexts of village, parish, and extended family by so many thousands 
of workers;" and (2) the decline of Western state power which commenced 
following the French Revolution.
Whatever the causes of trade unionism in I9th century Furopc, 
the phenomenon did not tarry long before crossing the Atlantic to 
establish a permanent residence in North America. In fact, precursors 
of modem trade unions were formed on a limited scale in the 
post-Revolutionary War period by local craftsmen. By the 1820's some 
of these local organizations joined into city-wide federations in the 
industrial centers of the Northeast, and in 1834 a National Trades Union 
was formed. These early organizations suffered a precarious existence. 
They had no legal basis, and under common law, were generally considered 
criminal conspiracies in restraint of trade. But by the late 1850's 
unionism was firmly established in the United States. Soon, the Knights 
of Labor arose to transcend the boundaries of craft unionism and unite 
all workers under a single banner. Samuel Gompers seized the wheel 
of the American Federation of Labor and doggedly steered the organization 
into the national political arena. The Industrial Workers of the World 
campaigned politically against the ravages of capitalism. Later, the 
Knights of Labor would be dissolved, and the other two organizations 
would he merged into the AFL-CIO. Although they would not reach the 
political and Ideological heights of the European trade union movement, 
American unions had become a significant social and political force.
3From Table 1, the growth in union membership in the United States 
may be observed both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total 
labor force for selected years from 1930 to 1972. It is evident that 
while the total number of union members has increased fairly steadily 
since 1930, union membership as a percentage of the overall work force 
attained its highest levels in the mid-1950's and has declined somewhat 
since then.^ The greatest periods of growth were during World War I, 
1935-1939, and 1940-1944. In general, a favorable organizing climate 
has existed for unions during periods of short labor supply, rising 
prices, and/or times of social and political unrest. More important, 
however, has been the legal environment surrounding labor.
2
The Legal Environment
Before the 1930's, while unions were not illegal pe_r they
3
had little legal ground to stand on. Collective bargaining was a rarity. 
Court injunctions and "yellow-dog" contracts were used by employers to 
limit and contain union organizing. Disregarding the ineffectual Clayton 
Act of 1914, the first significant legislation for union organizing came 
in 1932 with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (Bloom and Northrop, 
1973; 43) . For the first time, the right of American workers to bar­
gain collectively was endorsed legally. Furthermore, the use of federal 
injunctions in labor disputes was outlawed. Additional legislation 
followed in 1933 with the National Industrial Recovery Act, which also 
endorsed the right of workers in the private sector to organize and 
engage in collective bargaining while forbidding employer interference 
in Che selection of union representatives. However, neither the 1932 
nor the 1933 Act contained effective penalties to force employer conformity 
to its statutory purposes (Bloom and Northrop, 1973: 593).
TABLE 1. UNION MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1930-1972
Year
Total Union
Membership
(Thousands)
Union Membership 
As Percentage of 
Total Labor Force
1930 3,401 6.8
1935 3,584 6.7
1940 8,717 15.5
1945 14,322 21.9
1950 14,267 22.3
1953 16,948 25.5
1956 17,490 25.2
1958 17,029 24.2
1960 17,049 23.6
1963 16,524 22.2
1966 17,940 22.7
1968 18,916 23.0
1970 19,381 22.6
1972 19,435 21.8
Source : U.S. Department of Labor (1975) Handbook of 
Labor Statistics 1975— Reference Edition. 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
5The legally protected right for workers to organize came two 
years later with passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 
otherwise known as the Wagner Act. This legislation specified unfair 
labor practices on the part of the employers and prohibited them from 
refusing to engage in collective bargaining with their workers. The 
National Labor Relations Board was created as an enforcement agency.
As Davey (1972: 56) has noted, "It is difficult to exaggerate the impor­
tance of the Wagner Act and the Board as instrumentalities for facilitating 
the rapid growth of unionism."
Union activities came under regulation in the Taft-Hartley Act 
of 1947, which specified unfair labor practices on their part. This 
act also compelled unions to bargain in good faith and granted employees 
the right to refrain from joining unions.^ Further restrictions on 
unions were contained in the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act, which established 
a "bill of rights" for union members and imposed federal reporting 
requirements on the unions. Both the 1947 and 1959 Acts reaffirmed 
federal government support for the basic rights of organization and 
collective bargaining for employees in the private sector. In addition 
to the federal legislation mentioned above, almost all states have some 
legal provisions for the adjustment and settlement of private sector 
labor disputes within their geographic boundaries.
While legal steps have been made by the federal government to 
regulate and protect collective bargaining in the private sector, the 
rights of public employees have been neglected. For example, both the 
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts specifically excluded public workers from 
their jurisdiction, and prior to 1960 the courts almost without
6exception held that public employees did not possess any consli tiitional 
rights to organize. In addition, the courts generally held that legis­
lative bodies could forbid employees of their governmental units from 
ioining or forming unions (Shaw, 1972: 21). During the 1960's, however, 
courts began to affirm the First Amendment right of public employees to 
1oln and form unions and look more critically upon state prohibitions 
of public employee unionism.^
Meanwhile, a most significant public sector labor relations 
Initiative was promulgated by President Kennedy In 1962 through Executive 
Order 10988. For the first time, federal government employees were 
granted organizing and collective bargaining rights.^ Although the 
bargaining rights and scope of bargaining were not equal to those of 
private sector employees, this proved to be a substantial impetus for 
public employee unionism. In 1969, President Nixon issued Executive 
Order 11491 which modified the previous executive order. It provided 
for exclusive representation of federal employees, established the 
Federal Labor Relations Council to deal with policy matters, and formed 
the Federal Services Impasses Panel for dispute mediation and resolution. 
In 1970, postal employees were removed from the jursidiction of the two 
executive orders and placed under the Postal Reorganization Act, which 
resulted in a broader scope of bargaining approximating that enjoyed 
by private sector employees (Shaw, 1972: 24-26).
State legislation in the area of public employee labor relations 
dates back to 1959, when Wisconsin passed the first comprehensive state 
law regulating public sector labor-management relations. Since that time, 
over 100 different statutes have been enacted by the various states (U.S. 
Department of Labor, 1976) . A crazy-quilt pattern of regulations has
7ensued, abetted by a myriad of court decisions, executive orders, 
attorney general opinions, and civil service guidelines. Some states,
Iowa for example, have statutes which cover all public employees in a 
comprehensive fashion. Other states, such as Wyoming, concern themselves 
with a single occupational category— firefighters in this case. Still 
others, like Tennessee, specifically prohibit collective bargaining by 
public employees. In many instances, municipal ordinances in effect 
abrogate existing state policies or supplement them in dealing with local 
government employees. Confusion sometimes reigns between ^  jure and de 
facto interpretations of labor-management relations provisions at state 
and municipal levels because of various informal bargaining arrangements 
which may prevail.
The Growth of Public Employee Unionism 
The birth and growth of public employee unions in the United 
States lagged considerably behind the private sector union movement.
Public employee activism began in the 1830's during the Jacksonian period 
with the organization of workers in federal shipyards and municipal public 
works departments (Spero and Capozzola, 1973: 3). In a pattern similar 
to that experienced in the private sector, these first organized 
employees were the more highly skilled workers whose skills were in short 
supply. With the exception of the federal Post Office Department, organ­
ization proceeded at a slow pace until after World War I when policemen, 
firefighters, and teachers began to form self-help associations in 
large cities. The organizational activities of these local government 
employees were brought to a standstill by 1920, primarily as a result of 
the disastrous police strike of 1919 which generated adverse publicity 
with regard to public employee unionization.
8Other factors restraining the growth of public sector unionism 
during the early part of the 20th century included: (U the relatively
high degree of job security granted to public employees, (2) superior 
fringe benefits and working conditions in the public sector, (3) the 
absence of legal protection for the right to organize, and (4) public 
employer resistance to public unions (Juris and Feuille, 1973: 11).
Public employer resistance assumed various forms. For example, the legal 
status of public unions was questioned. The sovereignty doctrine was 
frequently invoked, along with the assertion that public services are 
a monopoly and the deprivation of these services through strikes consti­
tuted a threat to public health and safety. Some employers stressed the 
argument that civil service protection should be enough for public 
employees— unions would be superfluous.
Despite such obstructions, public employee organization began a 
new period of expansion after World War II, a time during which the 
private sector labor movement was approaching its zenith. Then, after 
the issuance of Executive Order 10988 in 1962, public employee unionism 
commenced a rather impressive period of growth, especially in state and 
local government. By the end of 1975, 51 percent of the 9.2 million 
state and local employees belonged to employee organizations in the 
United States (GERR, March 15, 1976: B-20).
A great many factors influenced the rapid growth of public 
employee unions during the 1960's. First, the heretofore superior 
fringe benefits, working conditions, and job security of public employment 
were equalled and then surpassed by firms in the private sector during 
and after World War 11. As Zagoria (1972: 1) has noted :
For years and years public workers accepted 
working terms and conditions offered by public manage­
ment with equanimity, and generally speaking, thev were 
good ones: merit hiring, broad fringe benefits, almost
absolute job security, and an assurred income (not 
dependent on vagaries of weather, availability of risk 
capital, or the ebb and flow of fads and fashions).
In truth, these were the trade-offs for the private 
sector unionism.
Today, public unions appear to have regained the lost ground in
pav and benefits. This will receive further discussion in Chapter Two.
A second factor influencing the growth of public employee organ­
izations was the general atmosphere of protest and social change which 
pervaded American public life during the 1960's (Shaw and Clark, 1972:
901). A growing sentiment began to develop among public employees that 
concerted, organized action was needed to orotect their rights. This 
view was reflected by the emergence of the civil rights movement as a 
force in public employee unionism during the 1968 garbage strike in 
Memphis. The rallying cry of the sanitation workers, 90 percent of whom 
were black, stressed the human rights issue: "I am a man."''
One measure of the increased public employee political and social 
activism can he observed in the incidence of work stoppages in public 
employment (Table 2).
From Table Two, the tremendous rise in the number of strikes by
public employees after 1965 can be seen, lending credence to the proposition
that state and local government employees were caught up in the general
feelings of societal discontent during the late 1960's. One might also 
note that after a slowdown in the incidence of work stoppages from 1969 
to 1974, the number of strikes rose sharply in 1975, the most recent 
year for which data are available. In fact, the percentage of state
10
TABLE 2. NUMBER OF WORK STOPPAGES 
IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Year State Gov't. Local Gov't.
1950 0 28
1955 1 16
1960 3 33
1962 2 21
1964 4 37
1965 0 42
1966 9 133
1967 12 169
1968 16 2 35
1969 37 372
1970 23 386
1971 23 304
1972 40 335
1978 29 357
1974 34 348
1975 32 446
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics (1976) Work
Stoppages in Government. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office; GERR (February 
2, 1977: 18).
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and local government workers striking in 1975 (2.2 percent) for the 
first time equalled that in private sector employment (OERR, Februarv 
2, 1977: 18).
A third influence in the rapid increase in public employee organ­
ization was the movement of private unions into the public sphere. As 
Table 1 illustrates, private sector union membership has failed to keep 
pace with the growth in the total labor force since the mid-1950's. This 
is largely the consequence of a shift in the American labor force from 
goods-producing industries to service industries, and the concomitant 
growth in white-collar employment and decline in blue-collar jobs (Bloom 
and Northrop, 1973: 23-25). During this period of relative membership 
loss, the unions could not avoid the realization that in order to grow 
they would have to change with the nature of the labor force and recog­
nize the public sector as a vast, untapped field for their organizational 
efforts. Movement into the public sector assumed two forms: (I) the
lending of expertise and financial resources to existing public employee 
groups, and (2) the direct organizing of unaffiliated individuals. In 
turn, the public employees began to see themselves as holding the same 
position as the private sector mass production workers in the 1930's" 
"numerous, needed, and neglected" (Tyler, 1972: 100). The techniques 
and results of private sector collective bargaining came to be appreciated 
and coveted.
Any discussion of the growth in public unionism must consider a 
fourth factor— the spillover effects of Executive Order 10988 on state 
and local government employees. For it was not until the 1962 directive 
was issued that the American states began to enact legislation governing
12
public employee unionism (with the exception of Wisconsin, which 
established the precedent in 1959). Such state legislation has been a 
major force in facilitating the spread of employee organization (Shaw 
and Clark, 1972: 901-04).
The final factor which was of major significance in the rapid 
increase in the organization of public employees in the 1960's was the 
sheer growth in the size of state and local government bureaucracies.
This bureaucratic growth, along with such accompanying factors as the 
decline of patronage and the rise of the reformed institutions of govern­
ment, has resulted in a depersonalization of public employment. Employee 
organizations have served as mouthpieces for individual and collective 
complaints related to the job, competing with and sometimes replacing 
relatively ineffectual civil service systems. One observer has even 
stated the belief that the public union is the successor, in many ways, 
to the old political machine (Nisbet, 1976: 30).
There is no doubt that a great expansion in state and local 
government employment has taken place.^ Table 3 reflects the increase 
in public employment from 1952 to 1975. It may be observed that the 
total number of full-time equivalent state and local employees has more 
than doubled since 1957. In 1947, about eight percent of the total 
American labor force was employed by state and local governments; in 1973, 
12.4 percent worked for non-federal public employers. By 1985, it is 
estimated that the figure will reach 14.9 percent (GERR, December 13,
1976: D-l).
The growth in state and local employment has enhanced the develop­
ment of public employee organizations which existed prior to the 1960's 
expansion period, and it has also helped increase the membership rolls
13
TABLE 3. OCTOBER EMPLOYMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS, 1952-1975 (FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT)
Year Employment (Thousands)
1952 4,012
1953 4,126
1954 4,309
1955 4,487
1956 4,687
1957* 4,793
1958 5,171
1959 5,342
1960 5,570
1961 5,845
1962 5,958
1963 6,282
1964 6,586
1965 6,937
1966 7,263
1967 7,455
1968 7,879
1969 8,160
1970 8,528
1971 8,806
1972 9.237
1973 9,578
1974 9,852
1975 10,111
*1957 data are for the month of April.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census(1976) Public Employment
in 1975. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office.
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of private sector unions which have moved to organize in the public 
sphere. For the purposes of this discussion it should prove useful at 
this juncture to examine briefly the nature and size of these public 
employee organizations.
Employee Organizations in the Public Sector
At the outset it is important to distinguish between public 
employee "unions" and "associations." Stieber (1973: 223) provides one 
of the clearest differentiations. The primary purpose of a union, he 
states, is to bargain collectively in order to improve the wages, hours, 
and working conditions of its members. The primary purpose of an 
employee association, on the other hand, is to provide social interaction 
among the members and to advance their professional concerns. More 
specifically, "If they engage in collective bargaining and devote a 
major portion of their resources to representing employees in negotiations 
and grievances, they are unions" regardless of what they call themselves. 
In recent years, Stieber notes, some associations have become unions 
(Stieber, 1973: 223).
Beyond the basic delimitation suggested by Stieber, the situa­
tion becomes more complicated. Questions of national affiliation, level 
of government operation, and nature of the organization's membership 
often cloud the issue. For example, some local affiliates of a national 
public employee union may not engage in collective bargaining while other 
locals will. Is the non-bargaining local a union, an association, or 
something in between? Such questions do not lend themselves to an easy 
solution.
Notwithstanding the murky issues involved in defining a union 
vs. an association, it is helpful to follow Stieber a bit further, for
15
he provides us with a useful taxonomy of public employee organizations 
which will be adhered to in the following discussion (Stleber, 1973: 1-12).
All-Public Union^ are those which are composed predominant 1v of 
public, workers. The prime example is the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). The AFSCME was organized in
9
Wisconsin by Arnold Zander in 1932. By 1970, it had become the seventh 
largest AFL-CIO affiliate. In 1976, it reported approximately 529,000 
members and a growth rate of 3,000 new members each month (Table 4). Its 
organizing jurisdiction is quite broad, encompassing, in essence, any 
employee not working in private industry, the commercial labor force, 
or federal government employment. About one-half of its members are state 
government employees. The basic operating unit of AFSCME is the "council." 
At least one council resides in each of the 50 states to coordinate acti­
vities and provide services to the more than 2,280 locals.
Mixed Unions, drawing most of their membership support from the 
private sector, are the most prevalent type of union in the public sector 
(Stieber, 1973: 3). Three of them are strong in public employment: The
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), the Laborer's International 
Union (LIU), and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America (IBT). Like AFSCME, these three 
mixed unions are also classified as "industrial unions" because their 
jurisdictions include all workers within a particular industry regardless 
of skill or occupational speciality. Only AFSCME, however, limits its 
jurisdiction to the public sector. SEIU has had its greatest success in 
organizing hospital, school, and social service employees in municipal 
government. In California, it is currently the largest state and local 
employees union (Crouch, 1975: 5). The LIU's public sector membership is
16
TABLE 4. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEE MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS, 1976
Organization Affiliation Membership LocaIs
NEA Ind. 1,165,617 9,404
AFSCME AFL-CIO 329,033 2,289
AFT AFL-CIO 248,521 1,032
Civil Svc. Emp. Assn. (NY) Ind. 202,000 288
I CPA Ind. 170,000* --
SEIU AFL-CIO 161,000 --
lAFF AFL-CIO 160,258 1,658
ANA Ind. 156,665 52
FOP Ind. 125,000 984
Cal. State Emp. Assn. Ind. 103,000 192
AAUP Ind. 85,614 1,329
IBT Ind. 73,000* --
LIU AFL-CIO 29,000* --
Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1976) Director of National
Unions and Employee Associations. Supp. 3. Washington, 
U.C.: Government Printing Office.
*Estlmate<l from 1970 data.
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composed mostly of semi-skilled and unskilled construction workers. The 
IBT, with the smallest public sector membership of the three mixed unions, 
has been most active in organizing blue-collar state and local employees. 
Although more than 35 other mixed unions have been active in varying 
degrees within the public sector, they have had only limited success 
(Stieber, 1973: 5).
Uniformed Protective Services include state police and local 
government police and firefighters. The p o 1 ice are predomi­
nantly represented by two national organizations, the Fraternal 
Order of Police (FOP) and the International Conference of Police Associa­
tions (ICPA), although AFSCME and several unions affiliated with SEIU 
and IBT have been active in organizing local police forces. Organized 
firefighters belong overwhelmingly to an AFL-CIO affiliate, the Inter­
national Association of Fire Fighters (lAFF). FOP, ICPA, and XAFF are 
considered to be all-public "craft unions" in that a single trade con­
stitutes the basis for organization. The lAFF is the only public 
employee union which enjoys a virtually uncontested jurisdiction, as few 
firefighters belong to other national employee organizations (Stieber,
1973: 112).
State and Local Employee Associations predate most other public 
employee organizations and constitute the most serious competition for 
nationally-affiliated unions. While stressing local autonomy for their 
members, many state associations are loosely linked through a weak 
national organization, the Assembly of Government Employees (AGE). Few 
state and local employee associations engage in collective bargaining, 
although there are exceptions such as the New York Civil Service
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Employees Association (Moskow, Loewenberg, and Koziara, 1970: 95). The 
largest state employee associations are located In New York and California.
Professional Associations, the final general category of public 
employee organizations, may be subdivided into three classifications.
There are those which exist primarily for promotion of a profession, such 
as the American Medical Association (AMA), and the American Bar Associa­
tion (ABA). Others concentrate primarily on promoting the economic 
well-being of their members, as illustrated by the American Federation of 
Teachers (AFT). A third group falls somewhere in the middle, continuing 
a concern for its members' professional interests while also serving as 
their representative in collective bargaining procedures. Examples of 
this type of organization include the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP), the National Education Association (NEA), and the 
American Nurses Association (ANA). The American Medical Association may 
be moving in the same direction as the third group, as it has recently 
gone on record as favoring collective bargaining for physicians, 
reversing an earlier stand that bargaining is incompatible with good 
patient care (Monthly Labor Review, 1976: 56).
Table 4 provides information on the largest state and local 
employee organizations, their membership totals, national affiliation, 
and number of local affiliates.
Now that the history and legal environment of organized labor in 
the United States in general has been reviewed along with the 
nature and growth of public employee unions in particular, it is necessary 
to move toward the maior thrust of this research— the impact of unions 
on the wages and benefits of their members. During recent years 
economists have made a number of attempts to construct an economic theory
19
of wage determination in private sector employment. One important 
element of most of these theoretical endeavors has been the role of 
unions in the wage-setting process. Before reviewing empirical results 
of the applications of "wage theory" to private sector wage determination, 
a summary treatment of the underlying elements of the theory as it has 
evolved throughout the past 200 years will be provided, with particular 
concern for the roles of unions.
Wage Theory and Collective Bargaining
Wage theory, as it has been developed over the past 200 years in 
Western Europe and the United States, has encompassed five general areas 
of inquiry: (1) the determination of the general level of wage rates,
(2) the impact of unions on wages, (3) the wage structure, (4) the nature 
of collective bargaining, and (5) the labor supply and the labor market 
(Dunlop, 1957: 17). Although the primary concern in this research lies 
within the realm of the second area— the impact of unions on wages— a brief 
outline of the evolution of wage theory in general should be helpful in 
placing this specific interest within its broader economic context.
Economists divide the history of wage theory into three periods: 
classical, neo-classical, and contemporary. The classical period extends 
from the origins of wage theory about 200 years ago to the 1870's. It 
is composed primarily of the works of David Ricardo, Karl Marx, and 
John Stuart Mill. Ricardo's contribution of the "subsistence theory of 
wages" is grounded on the Malthusian population principle, asserting 
that average wages, in the long run, conform to the subsistence level in 
the economy. According to Ricardo, an increase in the wage rate above 
subsistence would result in an increased birth rate and therefore, an
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expanded supply of labor. The large labor supply would, in turn, 
eventually bring the wage rate back to subsistence levels by operating 
in accordance with the law of supply and demand. On the other hand, if 
the wage rate decreased in the short term, starvation and rising mortality 
rates would reduce the supply of labor, pulling the wage rate back to 
the subsistence level (see Ricardo, 1911, for the complete exposition of 
the subsistence theory).
Marx's "exploitation theory of wages"^^ has never received much 
credence from conventional economists. More influential has been Mill's 
"wage-fund theory" which, like the subsistence theory of wages, is 
predicated on the free play of market forces in accordance with supply 
and demand. The wage fund, according to Mill, is the sum of the individual 
wages paid by all employers. If the average wage rate is set too high, 
unemployment will result; if set too low, the demand for labor will 
exceed the supply. In the long run, wages tend toward the subsistence 
level, as market forces keep wages and employment in equilibrium (see 
Miernyk, 1965: 345-46).
The second period in the history of wage theory, the neo-classical, 
is dominated by the "marginal productivity theory." Although it has 
received many modifications over the years, marginal productivity 
theory originally assumed perfect competition, perfect knowledge, and 
the other theoretical baggage of conventional economics (see Douglas,
1934: 68 for a listing of the 10 "implicit assumptions" of marginal pro­
ductivity theory). According to Cartter (1959: 19), the theory states, 
in essence, "that there is a direct functional relationship between the 
level of wages and the level of employment." The key concept of the 
theory is the "marginal value product"— the net value added to the product
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by using one more unit of labor. The theory asserts that the forces of 
labor "tend to be distributed among firms and industries in such a 
manner chat the value of labor's marginal product would be equal in all 
enterprises," with the wage rate the same for all workers of a given 
skill class. Thus, through the demand for and supply of labor, the labor- 
market would function in a state of equilibrium (Chamberlain and Kuhn, 
1965: 312-13).
Neither the original marginal productivity theory nor its pre­
decessors in wage theory adequately account for "imperfections” in the 
marketplace. The initial effort to treat a major imperfection— the trade 
union— marks the inception of the contemporary period of wage theory. In 
his 1932 restatement of marginal productivity theory, J.R. Hicks intro­
duces a concept of bargaining power to account for trade union influence 
in setting wages. According to Hicks, there exists a functional relation­
ship between the wage rate that either employer or employee will accept 
and the length of a strike that would be necessary to establish that 
wage. He illustrates this relationship through an "employer's concession 
curve" showing trade-offs for the employer of the anticipated costs of 
potential wage concessions versus the anticipated costs of a strike, 
and a "union's resistance curve" indicating the length of time the union 
would strike for various wage gains (see Chamberlain and Kuhn, 1965: 167).
Despite efforts such as Hicks' to deal with the assorted problems 
which detract from the efficacy of the marginal productivity theory, 
these modifications "have either failed to meet basic objections or have 
robbed the theory of much of its significance ..." (Chamberlain and Kuhn, 
1965: 321). As a consequence, two more recent approaches to a theory of 
wages have been developed.
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TIu' first, Renerically known as "bargaining power," roiorts 
market forces as being dominant in determining wages and argues instead 
that it is the orocess of bargaining itself which predominates in setting 
wage rates (Miernyk, 1965: 350). Beyond an upper and a lower limit of 
wage rates, the price of wages is theoretically indeterminant, Pigou 
(1932) attempts to explain the range of these upper and lower limits.
Others (Pen, 1952; Chamberlain, 1965; Bierman and others, 1965; Schelling, 
1956; Stevens, 1963) undertake the tasks of defining bargaining power and 
applying the concept in order to analyze the outcomes of various bargaining 
tactics. Walton and McKersie (1965), in an influential study of bargaining 
theory, stress the importance of interpersonal and intergroup behavior 
rather than economic variables. They identify four separate bargaining 
processes, each with a different goal: (1) distributive bargaining, in
which the goal is the maximization of one party's share of the benefits 
of collective bargaining; (2) integrative bargaining, where both parties 
seek to resolve problems and mutually benefit from the process; (3) atti- 
tudinal structuring, with each party seeking to achieve and maintain a 
desired working relationship with the other party; and (4) intraorganiza- 
tional bargaining, where each party tries to influence its own 
constituents to accept necessary bargaining compromises. Peterson and 
Tracy (1977) subject Walton and McKersie's theory to empirical testing 
and generally confirm it, finding that "overall, bargaining behavior 
and conditions seem to have as much effect on bargaining as do the economic 
variables." In another effort, Atherton (1973) also builds on the work 
of Walton and McKersie in an attempt to discover how different union 
bargaining objectives are determined. Although bargaining theory as it 
has developed in the works above has had some influence on wage theory
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in general, it has suffered a great deal because its basic concepts
are difficult or impossible to operationalize satisfactorily (see Johnson,
1975: 24).
The second movement in contemporary wage theory is often called 
the "institutional approach." This approach widens the traditional theo­
retical confines of economics to include a concern for and emphasis upon 
the political factors influencing wage determination. Ross (1956) and 
Kerr (1964) are leading proponents of this school, which holds that a 
trade union is a political entity operating in an economic environment. 
While economic factors underlie the bargaining process, political forces 
are the major determinants of the bargaining outcome (Ross, 1956: 12).
Ross (1956: 30) rejects the heretofore sacrosanct wage-employment relation­
ship (e.g., other things being equal, if wages go up, employment goes 
down) and, in an argument drawn in part from the earlier work of Michels 
(1949), states that the primary goals of union leadership are to main­
tain their own leadership positions and insure the survival of the 
organization itself. In short, Ross challenges the relevance of the 
traditional economic model and its assumptions in determining the outcome 
of wage bargaining.
The institutionalists' view has not itself gone unchallenged.
Dunlop (1950) in particular has rejected their argument, insisting on 
the importance of market forces in determining wage rates. To support 
his position he constructs economic models of the trade union which 
operate under the conventional economic assumptions of a free market.
The union is seen as an economic decision-making unit with the primary 
objective of maximizing wages and the conditions of employment for its 
members (Dunlop, 1944).
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As one might presume from the preceding discussion, economists 
are not of one mind with regard to the factors determining wages or the 
specific role of unions in setting wages. Probably, the truth lies some­
where in between the opposing viewpoints and also somewhere within each 
point of view. Certainly, the economic environment surrounding a firm 
establishes boundaries for wage determination. Competition, profit levels, 
geographical location, consumer product demand, quality of the labor force, 
factors in the larger economy, and many other economic variables affect 
the wage-setting outcome. But where unions are present to create a bi­
lateral wage determination situation, the politics of decision-making 
also forces itself into the picture with employers and union representa­
tives maneuvering as political actors on the bargaining stage. The 
Ross-Dunlop debate has served to focus attention on the basic issue of 
the relative importance of economic variables as opposed to political 
variables in determining wage changes under collective bargaining. 
Resolution of the issue will require careful, empirical study of diverse 
bargaining outcomes occuring in different time periods.
The question at issue in the present study, however, is what 
difference (if any) unions make in the compensation received by their 
membership compared to the compensation of nonrepresented employees.
As Davey (1972: 250) has stated:
the unions demand for upward wage or salary 
adjustments continues to be the paramount issue 
at the bargaining table. Other issues may take 
the spotlight on occasion, in particular negotia­
tions, but the principal business of the American 
trade union remains that of improving the economic 
position of the employees it represents.
Has the American trade union been successful, and if so, to 
what extent?
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The Impact of Unions on 
Employee Compensation in the Private Sector
Although the term "compensation" refers to the monetary value of 
wages or salaries and fringe benefits (e.g., retirement plans, medical 
plans), studies in the private sector have focused almost exclusively on 
the impact of unions on employee wages. The treatment of fringe benefits 
is a rarity.
Typically, unions are viewed as operating within the context of 
one or more of the variants of wage theory. Their impact on wage levels 
and/or wage structure is then determined empirically through the use of 
various econometric techniques. Research findings with regard to the 
union influence on overall wage levels within the economy are often con­
tradictory; there seems to be very little agreement among economists 
(see Miernyk, 1965: 370). The concern here is with the union impact on 
wage structures, particularly variations in wages between union and 
nonunion industries, firms, and occupations. Although there is general 
agreement on the union effects on intra-industry and intra-occupational 
wage structures (they tend to eliminate or narrow wage differentials 
within Industries and job categories), there is much less agreement on 
the degree of union influence when comparisons are made between different 
industries and occupations.
Dunlop, for instance, is a leading proponent of the view that 
unions exercise no distinctive impact on wage variations between indus­
tries. He states that inter-industry differentials are, instead, due 
to changes in productivity, output, labor cost ratios, changing skills, 
and other economic factors (Dunlop, 1957). Ross, to the contrary, shows 
that unions have had an impact on the wage structure by widening
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inter-industry differentials (Ross, 1956), in general, the Ross 
proposition has come to prevail in the literature. The remainder of this 
section will review the empirical findings of economists regarding the 
monetary impact of unions on wages in the private sector. Then, an 
accounting will be taken in an effort to glean findings and conclusions 
which could prove helpful in this study of the union influence on compen­
sation in public sector employment.
The pioneering efforts in the private sector are those of Douglas 
(1930), Ross (1948), Garbarino (1950), Ross and Goldner (1950), Levinson 
(1951), and Sobotka (1953). Douglas (1930: 562), in his groundbreaking 
study of six unionized and eight nonunionized industries finds that
During (the 1890's) and the early years of the 
present century, the unionists were able to secure 
for themselves appreciably higher wages and shorter 
hours than the mass of the workers .... Since 1914, 
however, the wages in the manufacturing industries have 
risen at least as rapidly as have those in the union 
manufacturing trades. The evidence (indicates) that 
when labor organization becomes effective, it yields 
very appreciable results in its early stages, but 
that thereafter the rate of gain enjoyed by its mem­
bers tends to slow (to about that of non-union industries).
Ross, however, re-examines Douglas' statistics and argues that a 
serious methodological error is present in Douglas' interpretation of 
the data. When properly interpreted, the data show unionism was a con­
tinuing source of wage advantage from 1890-1926, not just an initial 
source of wage gains (Ross, 1948: 114). This finding holds true in an 
examination of similar data for 1933-1945, in which Ross (1948: 114) 
finds "real hourly earnings in highly organized industries are not only 
higher, but also have risen more sharply than in less organized industries."
Ross' conclusions, in turn, are called into question by Garbarino, 
who finds a much smaller union effect than did Ross when examining similar
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data for 1923-1940 with a different statistical technique (Garbarino,
1950: 289). Retreating somewhat in a follow-up study, Ross and Goldner 
(1950: 267) conclude that "new (unionization) has been a source of rela­
tive wage advantage during the 1933-1946 period whereas continuing 
(unionization) has not." This conclusion is supported by Levinson (1951), 
who determines that the largest wage increases occurred during the 
1930's— a period of new unionism— within industries undergoing the greatest 
increases in unionization. The relationship did not hold for 1942-1946, 
but this was a rather atypical period during which the War Labor Board 
administered wage controls. Levinson (1951: 215) offers the additional 
insight that unions may hold up the wage levels in an organized industry 
during a depression, a time when wages in unorganized industries usually 
fall.
Generalizing from the evidence presented in these early studies, 
it would appear that new, growing unions have been a source of some wage 
advantage to their workers since 1890 with the exception of the World 
War II period. However, continuing unionism does not appear to generate 
wage differentials except during periods of economic depression.
Following these initial efforts has been a substantial number of 
studies which have examined the impact of unions on private sector wages. 
The most ambitious undertaking within this subject area to date has been
H.G. Lewis' Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States (1963), 
which provides a useful summary of the relevant literature through 1962 
and includes original research by the author himself.
Lewis' concern is with the intra-industry relative wage effects 
of unionism, in terms of the ratio of the wages per hour of union labor 
to the average hourly wage of nonunion labor. After reviewing what he
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calls the "economy-wide" studies of Ross, Ross and Goldner, and Levinson, 
he modifies their data in order to estimate the average relative wage 
effect of unions among the industries c o n c e r n e d . L e w i s  determines that 
the wage effect of unions was 15-20 percent in the late 1930's and early 
1940's, 7-10 percent from 1944-45, and less than five percent for 1946-47. 
The data, notes Lewis, indicate the tendency for the relative wages of 
unionized workers to increase during periods of rapid deflation (recessions) 
and decrease during periods of rapid inflation (Lewis, 1963: 155).
In examining earlier studies focusing on the union impact within 
a single industry, Lewis again, where necessary, calculates relative per­
centage differences for the wages of unionized and nonunionized workers.
He shows that Rees' (1962) data indicate that for 1945-58 in the steel 
and coal industries the relative wages of production workers were about 
the same regardless of the presence of unions, but that in 1939 there 
was a positive, perhaps substantial, impact of unionism on the relative 
wages of these workers. Lewis reports that Scherer determined in his 
1951 dissertation that hotel employees in union-dominated cities enjoyed 
a 10 percent higher relative wage than their counterparts in nonunion 
cities during 1939 and 1948. Modifying Sobel's data on the rubber tire 
industry, Lewis (1963: 61) estimates that the union effect on relative 
wages of tire production workers was roughly 10-18 percent in 1936-38 
and about half that large during 1945-48. A reinterpretation of Sobotka's 
data suggests the conclusion that unionization forced relative wages 25 
percent higher for skilled tradesmen and five percent higher for unskilled 
workers in the construction industry during 1939 (Lewis, 1963: 63).
From Maher's 1956 article, Lewis (1963: 80-86) obtains un ion/nonunion 
wage differentials for various industries as follows:
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paints and varnishes 0% hosiery 4%
wooden furniture 6Z auto parts 12%
footwear -3% women's dresses 7%
cotton textiles 2%
Finally, Lewis considers the findings of Rayack (1958), in which 
the union effect on wages in the men's clothing industry is found to be 
less than five percent, and the results of Lurie's 1961 article on the 
transit industry. The latter effort reveals that unions increased the 
relative wage rate of transit motormen by 15-20 percent during the 1920's, 
20-25 percent in the Great Depression, less than six percent in 1938, and 
less than 10 percent for 1948.
Lewis acknowledges many possible sources of bias in the estimates 
reported above, resulting primarily from (1) incomplete controls over 
factors other than unionism which affect wages, and (2) errors in esti­
mation. He concludes, however, that all things considered, the average 
relative effect of unionism on wages of American workers has been greatest 
during periods when rapid inflation did not prevail, equalling at least 
10 percent during these periods (Lewis, 1963: 191). The union effort 
ranged from 25 percent in the raid-1930's to less than five percent from 
1945-49, and 10-15 percent in the late 1950's. It appears that the union 
impact is greatest during economic recessions and least in strongly 
inflationary periods. Thus, the degree of union influence on wages varies 
directly with the state of the overall economy. Lewis speculates that 
the reasons for this phenomenon are that (1) collective bargaining con­
tracts frequently are in effect for more than one year, thus causing 
wage increases to lag behind inflationary price increases, (2) union
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employers are reluctant to permit large wage increases during such 
periods, and (3) unions are resistant to wage cuts even during recessionary 
periods (Lewis, 1963: 5).
Following the comprehensive study by Lewis, other economists have 
used different data and techniques to estimate the difference between the 
earnings of union and nonunion workers. Using multiple regression analysis, 
some have not attempted to calculate an absolute percentage differential 
but have, instead,simply indicated whether or not a statistically signi­
ficant relationship was found between unionism and higher wage rates.
Using a union/nonunion dummy variable, Eckstein and Wilson (1962) dis­
covered a significant association for three out of five time periods in 
the rubber, primary metals, and transportation equipment industries.
However, two economic variables— profit rate and unemployment rate— were 
sufficient to explain most of the variation in the increase in industry 
wage rates. Kaun (1964: 406) controls for size of the work establishment, 
city size, occupation, and other variables, finding "overwhelming evidence 
that union rates are higher than nonunion rates." Kaun's findings are 
corroborated by more recent research conducted by Bailey and Schwenk 
(1971). Controlling for similar variables in 1968, these authors con­
clude that the earnings differentials associated with unions are 
significant in both aboslute and relative statistical terms. Similar 
results are obtained by Mason (1971), although she finds that the 
union/nonunion wage gap was narrowing during the last half of the I960's.
Following in the tradition of Lewis, other economists have com­
puted percentage differentials for union and nonunion workers in both 
cross-sectional and time-series regression analysis. Throop (1967) 
estimates the average hourly earnings differential for private, nonfarm
31
production and nonsupervisory workers to be 26 percent, when controlling 
for quality of the work force and other factors. Weiss (1966) calculates 
that 1959 earnings differentials favored union craftsmen and operatives 
by about 30 percent, while Stafford (1968) finds the 1965 differences to 
be 24 percent for craftsmen, 26 percent for operatives, 52 percent for 
laborers, and 18 percent for clerical and sales workers. In a study of 
31 manufacturing industries from 1960-1965, Clover (1968) reveals an 18 
percent earnings differential between union and nonunion plants. Fuchs
(1968), however, finds the union/nonunion gap varying between 18 and 35 
percent, lore recently, Rosen (1970) and Boskin (1972) report a range 
of union/nonunion wage differentials of 15 to 25 percent, and Hammermesh 
(1971) finds the difference to vary from five percent for clerical workers 
to 20 percent for blue-collar employees. Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972) 
estimate a union/nonunion wage differential of 0 to 20 percent for 19 
manufacturing industries. Finally, Ryscavage (1974) uses the 1973 Current 
Population Survey in determining that the hourly earnings of organized 
craft workers exceed those of unorganized craftsmen by 20 to 25 percent.
One conclusion readily emerges from this large number of studies: 
the union/nonunion earnings differencials during the years since Lewis' 
work generally exceeded those of the 1950's. Whereas Lewis calculated 
a differential of 10-15 percent for the 1950's, more recent studies have 
shown the range to be quite a bit higher— closer to 20-25 percent. The 
reason for the larger, more recent differentials (which approximate those 
computed by Lewis for the 1930's) is probably multifaceted. In part, 
they may be the product of improved data and statistical techniques. On 
the other hand, unions today simply may be more successful in gaining 
economic rewards for their members. Whatever the cause for the larger
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differentials computed since Lewis' study, it is important that such 
studies as those mentioned above be examined in order to ascertain which 
variables and techniques might prove helpful in an effort to determine 
the influence that unions might exercise on compensation in the public 
sector. In the chapter which follows on wage theory in public employ­
ment, hypotheses related to the reasons for union/nonunion compensation 
differentials will be considered. Now, however, the study will turn to 
nonunion factors which influence wages.
The Determinants of Wages 
Although most economists are in agreement that unions do have a 
positive impact on employee earnings, there has been a great deal of dis­
cussion surrounding the other variables which may influence wages. It 
is important that these variables be examined, for in order to isolate 
the impact of unionism one must hold constant or otherwise account for 
as many other factors which affect wages as possible.
Within the literature one may discover a broad consensus among 
economists on the salience of certain variables in determining the wage 
rates paid various private sector employees. These variables are geo­
graphic region, size of establishment, profit levels, quality of the 
labor force, cost-of-living, comparative wage standards, and the wider 
economy. Each will be discussed below. In Chapter Two, the rele­
vance of these and other variables to wage determination in the public 
sector will be considered.
Geographic wage differentials have long been recognized to exist. 
In general, wages are highest in the mid-Atlantic, Great Lakes, and 
Pacific states; average in New England and parts of the Midwest; and
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lowest in the South. Within regions, wages tend to be lowest in small 
communities and highest in metropolitan areas (Mierncyk, 1965: 378). Scully
(1969) associates these geographical differentials with five variables:
(1) variations in the capital/labor ratio, (2) differences in education 
of work force, (3) variations in the percentage of nonwhite and (4) female 
production workers, and (3) union activity. With regard to this last 
influence, however, Reynolds (1974: 565) disagrees, stating that "most 
unions in the majority of industries have probably had little effect on 
geographical differentials, either because of the local-market character 
of the industry, or because of union weaknesses in one or more regions, 
or because the union has not found it expedient to aim at geographic 
equality." Still, geographic location must be taken into consideration 
in any wage-related research which is not confined to a single locale.
A second effect on the wage rates is the size of the establish­
ment (firm) itself. Wages normally are higher in larger plants for 
several reasons: (1) large firms are more likely to be located in densely
populated communities; (2) large firms are expected to take the lead in 
wages paid; (3) the quality of labor is higher in larger plants; and 
(4) large plants simply have a greater capacity to pay higher wages to 
their workers (Lester, 1967: 62-64). It is important to hold constant 
the size of the firm because of the above reasons, and also because 
larger firms are more susceptible to unionization (Reynolds, 1974: 199). 
Thus, larger firms, which tend to pay superior wages, are also more likely 
to be unionized. If size of establishment is not held constant, there 
may be a bias in the favor of wages in larger firms of 20 to 25 percent 
on a national basis for most industries (Lester, 1967: 66-67).
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Furthermore, the dollar value of benefits granted to employees of large 
establishments are frequently twice those awarded to workers in small 
firms (Lester, 1967: 67).
Profit levels represent a very important consideration on the part 
of both unions and management in determining the amount of wages offered 
to or demanded by workers. Disregarding increases in worker productivity 
or reductions in the number of workers employed, a firm must pay for 
wage increases out of its annual profits. We should expect that highly 
profitable firms and industries will, oeteris pavibus, pay their employees 
higher wages than less profitable concerns. Indeed, Howard and Tolies 
(1974) find that wage changes from 1950-1970 in major manufacturing 
industries are strongly associated with the profit rates of these indus­
tries two to five years prior to each wage adjustment. Others (for 
example, Levinson, 1967; Foran, 1973) have also asserted that the size 
of wage increases has been strongly correlated with profit levels. Thus, 
if those firms and industries which are highly profitable typically pay 
their employees above average, and if those same firms and industries 
also happen to be the most highly unionized, then unless one holds con­
stant the influence of profits, the statistically arrived at effect of 
unions on wage rates will be unduly strong. Therefore, firm or industry 
rates of profit should be taken into account when estimating the impact 
of unions on wage rates.
The quality of the labor force is a fourth factor which economists
agree plays an important part in wage determination. Primarily because
of the lack of adequate data, most of the earlier wage studies did not
12
attempt to hold constant worker "quality," which can be measured by 
education, race, age, sex, or training. More recent studies have
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controlled for some worker characteristics and confirmed them to be 
statistically significant determinants of wage rates (see Boskin, 1972; 
Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1972; Ryscavage, 1974). The reason for this 
concern with labor force characteristics, of course, is that a wage com­
parison of union and nonunion workers would be likely to offer spurious 
results if worker quality were not held constant. For example, other 
things being equal, whites generally earn higher wages than blacks, men 
earn more than women, and well-educated persons make more money than the 
less-educated. In comparing a union firm whose employees are mostly 
white, male, and college-educated with a nonunion company whose workers 
are predominantly black, female,and high school graduates, it would be 
highly probable that the former organization would pay its employees more 
than the latter regardless of whether unions were present or not. Thus, 
such a comparison would be meaningless unless the relevant worker char­
acteristics were held constant. As for what difference it makes with 
respect to the degree of influence unions exert on wages when nature of 
labor force is held constant, the evidence is conflicting. Boskin (1972), 
for example, when quality of work force is considered, obtains a differ­
ential in favor of union workers of 15 percent for craft workers and 25 
percent for laborers, and almost no difference for service, sales, and 
managerial personnel. Ryscavage (1974), on the other hand, calculates 
an earnings advantage of 20 to 25 percent for union craft workers and 16 
percent For union service workers. Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972) find 
the wage advantage varies from 0 to 10 percent for all union workers in 
19 manufacturing industries when they control for quality of the labor 
force.
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A fifth factor generally believed to influence wage rates is the 
prevailing cost-of-living. As previously noted, this may vary in accor­
dance with region of the country and urban or rural locale, since wages 
tend to be higher in certain geographical regions and within large metro­
politan areas. Therefore, empirical estimates of union wage effects which 
do not limit their area of investigation to a single locale may suffer 
from this bias. If the cost-of-living is higher for employees in "union 
cities" or "union firms" due to their urban location, for instance, 
failure to standardize for cost-of-living variations will impart an up­
ward bias to estimates of union wage effects. Unfortunately, this bias 
cannot be directly eliminated from most studies since cost-of-living 
estimates are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for only a 
relatively small number of cities (see Hammermesh, I97I: 160).
Perhaps even more important in establishing wage rates than 
cost-of-living variations are comparative wage standards. Both employers 
and employees look to wage rates prevailing in neighboring occupations, 
industries, cities, etc., in determining their own wage offers and 
demands. As Bloom and Northrup (1973: 322) have noted, manv firms 
consciously keep their employees' wage rates in line with those paid by 
certain key firms within the same industry, called "wage leaders." Or, 
they may be kept competitive with wages paid by key firms in other in­
dustries. Dunlop (1957: 17) has referred to those firms which exhibit 
similar product markets as falling within various "wage contours." Ross
(1956) has labelled the process as one of setting "standards of equitable
13
comparison." Whatever terminology is used, some economists have 
attempted to capture the comparative wage standard variable through the 
use of a surrogate measure called the "opportunity wage" (the wage that
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would be available co Che same individual for work in a similar occupation 
in another firm, industry or geographical location). As long as the 
opportunity wage indicator reasonably can be presumed to vary directly 
with the actual wage standard used by labor and management negotiations, 
this would appear to be a good course of action on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds.
A final influence which economists generally agree to be of 
salience in determining the wage rates paid various workers is the condi­
tion of the wider economy. This is what Lewis (1963) attributed to be of 
major consequence in accounting for the changing union/nonunion wage 
differentials during the first half of this century. Of course, in a 
cross-sectional analysis the condition of the economy is a constant, but 
when using time-series, such factors as unemployment and the inflation 
rate must be taken into account. As noted by Lewis, the length of a 
union contract is a variable wliich can affect the response of employee 
earnings to changes in the economy. Union wages frequently are adjusted 
every one to three years in accordance with a contract, while nonunion 
workers usually receive wage adjustments less often. As a result, 
"nonunion workers, when their wages are changed, typically receive 
somewhat larger percentage raises than do unionized workers (but) the 
fact that their pay is adjusted less frequently ... results in their 
receiving somewhat smaller total adjustments over a period of years"
(Davis and David, 1968: 40). However, nonunion firms respond more 
sharply to fluctuations in the economic, climate than dc, union firms 
(Davis and David, 1968: 43). Time-series analyses dealing with wage 
changes over a period of years should take into consideration such 
variables as the prevailing rates of inflation and unemployment
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because of Che varying impact of such broad economic factors on union 
and nonunion firms.
Whereas most economists are in accord with regard to the prominence 
of geography, size of establishment, profit levels, nature of labor force, 
cost-of-living, comparative wage standards and the wider economy in deter­
mining wage rates, less uniformity exists when other variables are 
considered. Nonetheless, it may prove helpful to briefly identify and 
discuss two further variables which may be relevant to a public sector 
analysis: degree of monopoly in the product market and noneconomic factors.
The issue of a presumed relationship between the competitive 
character of a firm's product market and the ability of a union to gain 
wage increases is marked bv differences of opinion among economists.
Several empirical studies have determined a strong relationship over 
time between tlie degree of monopoly in the product market (as measured 
by the degree of product market concentration), inter-industry wage 
increases, and the extent of unionization (see Ross and Goldner, 1950;
Segal, 1964; Weiss, 1966). This is supported theoretically by the 
argument that highly concentrated product markets (1) protect existing 
unions from nonunion competition by restricting the freedom of entry of 
nonunion competitors; and (2) place unions in a favorable position to 
make aggressive wage demands since there is a lack of downward price 
pressures (Levinson, 1967: 200). Furthermore, unions are more likely to 
enter firms operating within monopolistic product markets due to (1) 
lower organizational costs per union member; and (2) their ability to 
more easily retain workers in concentrated industries once they are 
brought into the union (Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1972: 498).
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Other studies (Rees, 1962; Lewis, 1963) question the existence 
of the product market monopoly-wage increase-unionization triad on both 
empirical and theoretical grounds, asserting that for various reasons, 
a union's ability to achieve wage increases may actually be hindered by 
the presence of greater concentration in the product market. Levinson 
(1967) attempts to reconcile these opposing positions by demonstrating 
that highly concentrated industries are characterized by entry barriers 
to new firms because of high capital requirements, brand names, and other 
factors, thereby enabling these large firms to resist union pressure 
more effectively. Also, wages are normally high in such firms and unions 
may not add much to the payroll. On the other hand, once a union has 
established itself within the industry, it is better able to control its 
membership jurisdiction as no new firms will enter the market (see 
Levinson. 1966: 265-66). This high degree of organizational strength 
helps the union exert greater pressure for wage increases. Thus,
Levinson (1967: 205) sees a high degree of product market concentration 
as having a two-edged effect. In his words, "It can provide the union 
with greater protection against the entry of non-union competitors, and 
thus help to maintain the union's jurisdictional strength within the 
industry. Yet at the same time, it is also associated with fewer firms 
of larger size and greater financial reserves which are able more effec­
tively to resist union pressures." (A leading example of this type of 
concentration effect would be in the highly oligopolistic automotive 
industry) . Whether the unionlsm-wages-concentration relationship is 
positive, negative, or mixed, it would appear useful to attempt to con­
front the relationship in statistical terms in any empirical investigation 
concerning unions and wages.
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The relevance of noneconomic considerations to the outcome of 
the wage-setting process has been a leading concern of economists, as 
exemplified by the Ross-Dunlop debate outlined earlier. Levinson (1966:
17) has divided these noneconomic factors into two groups: "political"
variables and "pure power" variables. Illustrations of political variables 
are inter-union competition and leader prestige. The power concept may 
be represented by the ability of a union to initiate and maintain a strike 
and the countervailing capability of an employer to resist such action.
The dynamics of the power process can be measured by qualitative judgments 
of internal un?.on strength, union militancy, and member cohesiveness 
(Levinson, 1966: 272-73). According to Levinson, who assigns quantitative 
values tn the political and power variables, these noneconomic factors are 
limited by the basic economic environment within which they operate 
(Levinson, 1966: 270),
Other economists have provided a somewhat different explanation 
of the noneconomic factors impinging on the wage-setting process. For 
example, Atherton (1973: 137) and Davey (1973: 257) perceive union leaders 
to be political agents acting as representatives of groups of employees.
As elected political agents, they cannot always act as economic men, 
but they must instead concern themselves with issues of union survival 
and their own personal survival as political leaders. In a recent 
article, Tracy (1974) attempts to identify certain noneconomic factors 
which influence union and management negotiators. He concludes that a 
negotiator's acceptance of a contract depends on several significant 
noneconomic considerations: perceived equity of the new contract, 
perceived achievement, interpersonal relations between the parties, the 
nature of the work itself, favorable recognition, and team policy and
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administration. However, these variables accounted for less than half 
of the variance in the attitudes of neROtiators toward settlement, pointinp, 
to the inherent difficulty involved in any effort to quantify sub ject ivu 
attitudes. It would appear that while the salience of noneconomic factors 
in the wage-setting process goes uncontested, the feasibility of building 
them into statistical research designs must be questioned, with the excep­
tion, perhaps, of a case study context.
Summary
This chapter has discussed many factors which economists have 
observed to be of importance in determining wages in industry. All of 
these elements should, if possible, be taken into account in any attempt 
to isolate the impact of unions on wages. If not, they may exercise con­
founding effects which are likely to confuse the effect of unions with 
other forces which operate whether unions are present or not. The best 
way to remove these effects from the data is through the use of statis­
tical procedures. This problem as it relates to unions within the 
public sector will be confronted in the latter portion of the next chapter. 
But prior to embarking on this task it is necessary to distinguish 
between the nature and environment of collective bargaining within the 
public and private sectors, in order that one may discern whether or not 
the determinants of employee compensation are similar. The private sector 
experience may or may not be relevant to an assessment of the union im­
pact of wages and benefits of public employees. The nett chapter will 
consider this issue in detail.
NOTES
1. Bloom and Northrop (1973: 724-26) speculate that declininfi union 
membership may be attributed to union leadership, which has 
responded slowly to the shift in the labor force from blue-collar to 
white-collar employment and which has been unable or unwilling to 
develop a new union ideology to appeal to new members of the labor 
force.
2. Much of this discussion is taken from Juris and Feuille (1973: 6-9) 
and Bloom and Northrup (1973: 33-69), For detailed descriptions of 
the provisions and results of the various labor legislation, see 
Bloom and Northrup (1973: Part VI).
3. The term "collective bargaining” was coined in 1891 by the Fabian 
writer and historian of the British Labor Movement, Mrs. Beatrice 
Webb. .See Bok and Dunlop (1970: 207).
A useful and comprehensive definition of collective bargaining is 
provided by Davey (1972: 2), who states that it is:
a continuing institutional relationship between an 
employer entity (government or private) and a labor 
organization (union or association) representing exclu­
sively a defined group of employees of said employer 
concerned with the negotiation, administration, inter­
pretation and enforcement of written agreements covering 
joint understandings as to wages or salaries, rates of 
pay, hours of work and other conditions of employment.
The relationship is "collective” in that two groups are represented
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by collective entities: the employees by their defined bargaining
unit and the employer, or management, by a similar unit.
4. This is the famous, or infamous. Section 14(b), the "right to work" 
clause.
5. For example, see Atkins et al. and lAFF vs. City of Charlotte, 296F. 
Supp. 1068 (1969) which voided a North Carolina law prohibiting mem­
bership of firefighters and police in labor organizations.
6. During 1975 and 1976, Congress considered a number of bills aimed at 
federal regulation of state and local employee relations. Two of 
these bills (11.R. 9730 and S. 3294) would have amended the National 
Labor Relations Act to cover state and local employees. Others 
(H.R. 8677 and S. 3295) would have established r. separate National 
Public Employment Relations Commission to implement a National Public 
Employment Relations Act. All bills would have granted state and 
local employees as a whole the right to organize and bargain collec­
tively. All would have superceded existing state and local 
legislation and any other statutes or ordinances inconsistent with 
the new law. Piifal ic Management (1975: 10-12) provides n lengthy 
description of these proposed bills. Although there has been some 
discussion on the Introduction of similar bills in the 95th Congress, 
a recent Supreme Court decision has cast some doubt on the constitu­
tionality of such legislation (National League of Cities vs. Usery,
44 U.S.L.W. 4974 (June 24, 1976). For the general public employee 
union position in urging a "Wagner Act for public employment," see 
Flynn (1975).
7. For a detailed description of the 1968 garbage strike in Memphis and 
its ramifications see Killings and Greenya (1974: 171-219). This
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episode marked the entry of national civil rights leaders into the 
public employee organizational struggle. National figures such as 
Bayard Rustin, Roy Wilkins, and Martin Luther King, Jr. (who was 
assassinated during the strike) helped the sanitation workers fight 
for union recognition.
8. This is in marked contrast to the situation in federal government 
employment. Federal civilian employment reached its peak of 3.4 
million workers during World War II, then was reduced to 2.0 million 
by 1947. It increased to 3.0 million in 1967 and has since decreased 
by about 0.1 million (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1976).
9. For a history of the AFSCME, including the fascinating power struggle 
between Zander and current president Jerry Wurf, see Billings and 
Greenya (19 74).
10. This is primarily because of the value-laden nature of Marx's theory.
11. Lewis' estimating effect for the relative wage advantage of the ith 
worker, industry, or occupation is determined through the equation
log wi = (3Ui + Yxi + li
where wi is the wage, Ui is a 0,1 dummy representing union mem­
bership (or the average percent union membership for aggregate data),
and xi is all other variables which influence wages. Hi is a
random error term. The estimated value of S is the effect of 
unionism on relative wages.
12. In this research, "quality" of the labor force will be referred to
as "nature" of the labor force. Considering male, white, highly-edu­
cated workers as being of higher quality than other emplovees tends 
to suggest a questionable bias.
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I'i. A rc-l;iL(.‘cl phenomenon is uliat has become known as the "threat elTect." 
This term refers tn the influence that the threat of future unioniza­
tion presents to nonunion employers. It is possible that an employer's 
fear of the consequences of unionism could lead him to increase the 
wages of his workers in order to prevent them from unionizing. If 
the threat effect does influence nonunion wages, then the measured 
effect of unions on wages would be understated, unless a satisfactory 
means of operationalizing the effect is included. This issue will be 
dealt with to some extent in later chapters.
CHAPTER TWO
UNIONS AND COMPENSATION IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
In the abstract, the process of collective bargaining between 
employer and employee may be thought of as being similar in the public 
and private sectors. Within both spheres (1) the employer must reward 
his workers with adequate pay and benefits in order to attract and keep 
qualified personnel; (2) employer and employees must agree upon certain 
conditions and limitations of employment; and (3) individual and collec­
tive needs for recognition, security, progress, a sense of belonging, and 
other concerns must be met (Stanley, 1972; 19). Public and private sec­
tor labor relations also hold in common some specific areas of interest 
including matters of union jurisdiction and representation, election 
procedures, grievance arbitration, the scope of bargaining, the strike 
issue and, most important, the determination of wages ani benefits. 
Nonetheless, there exist substantial differences in the structure and 
process of collective bargaining between the two spheres which hold 
important implications for the determination of employee compensation 
levels. In this section the nature of collective bargaining in the public 
sector will be viewed as diverging from that in the private sector in 
(1) legal environment; (2) economic euvironineit; (3) organizational 
relationships; and (4) political nctivitv.
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The legal environment of private sector labor relations has been 
standardized and rationalized since the Norris-I.afhiardia Act of 1932, 
while public labor relations have evolved in the patchwork fashion out­
lined briefly in Chapter One. Federal government labor relations and 
collective bargaining are presently regulated through Executive Orders 
10988 and 11491, the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, and the Federal 
Pay Comparability Act of 1970. But the legal environment of state and 
local government labor relations is highly variable. Where some states 
have passed comprehensive and coherent legislation regulating 
employer-employee relations, other remain silent on the issue. Local 
governments, of course, must conform to the laws of their respective states. 
This presents no problem in those states which have taken the initiative 
in governing public sector labor-management relations. In the absence of 
such statutory guidelines, local governments and their employees must work 
out their own recognition and collective bargaining procedures through 
mayoral executive orders, city attorney opinions, city council resolu­
tions, or other actions. The legality of public employers thus entering 
into collective bargaining agreements with their employees in the absence 
of enabling legislation has been upheld by several state courts (see 
UCI.A Law Review, 1972: 1023). Recently, however, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia voided all local government bargaining agreements within that 
state as being illegal owing to the absence of express state enabling 
legislation. Only Texas statutorily prohibits collective bargaining by 
public employees, and this law can be circumvented through local referenda 
for police and firefighters (see GERR, No. 695, Feb. 14, 1977: 10-12).
As a consequence of the dearth of state enabling legislation, some muni­
cipalities such as Philadelphia have developed highly sophisticated and
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stable labor relations systems on their own initiative. A more common 
occurrence, however, has been the evolution of vague and confusing bar­
gaining patterns in local government which have tended to result in 
uncertain and sometimes undesirable outcomes (UCLA Law Review, 1972: 1025).
Even where state and local collective bargaining is formalized, 
other legal questions draw lines of distinction between the public and 
private sectors. There are conflicts between state civil service laws 
and collective bargaining agreements within the public sector, particularly 
with regard to hiring, promotion, and grievance procedures (see Taylor, 
1969). There are also disparities with regard to the scope of bargaining, 
which in the private sector is determined uniformly through Nl.RB and 
court decisions distinguishing between mandatory and permissive subjects 
for all bargaining agreements. In the public sector, the scope of bar­
gaining varies in subject matter for virtually every occupational category 
and governmental jurisdiction. The same situation generally holds true 
for grievance procedures, which have been standardized throughout much 
of the private sector, but which take many diverse forms in state and 
local employment. Perhaps the most controversial question arising from 
the differences between the legal environments of the public and private 
sectors, however, has been the strike issue.
With the exception of a handful of states which have provided 
some of their employees with a limited right to strike, federal, state, 
and local government workers are forbidden from engaging in this type of 
job action. The justifications for the exclusion of public employees from 
a right their private sector counterparts enjoy are several, but they are 
predicated primarily on the notions of sovereignty and essential services.
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According to the sovereignty doctrine, whose roots are embedded 
in the English common law principles that the king could do no wrong and 
that no individual could sue the state without its consent, the government 
represents the sovereign power so it alone can set the terms and conditions 
of employment for its workers. Therefore, the basic conditions of public 
employment are exercised by the American people through federal and state 
laws; as a consequence, these conditions are not subject to collective 
bargaining (see Nigro, 1969: 26-27). This form of logic was employed 
during the early I960's by those who desired to avoid tne recognition of 
public employee organizations. Today, the sovereignty argument is becoming 
increasingly irrelevant, as many government and public agencies in effect 
have waived their sovereignty through entering into collective bargaining 
agreements with employees.^
More germane in the strike controversy is the position that public 
workers provide "essential services" to a community which, if interrupted, 
pose a threat to the public safety and health. While this argument seems 
valid for police, firefighters, and prison guards, one quickly finds 
oneself in a quandry in attempting to decide which other public services 
are "essential," a situation which is complicated by the question of 
whether or not similarly "essential" workers in private industry have the 
right to strike (see Stieber, 1969: 31-32). Notwithstanding the legal 
penalties which may be imposed on those public workers who participate 
in unlawful work stoppages, the strike weapon has been an often used and 
successful tactic in state and local government employment. The statu­
tory prohibition of strikes, like the sovereignty argument, has had 
little impact on the incidence of work stoppages (see Burton and Krider,
1975). No-strike policies are rarely enforced by either public authorities 
2
or unions.
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Substantial differences between collective bargaining in the 
public and private spheres also are found as a consequence of the different 
economic environments surrounding the two sectors. A major justification
3
for collective bargaining in the private sector is the monopsony argument 
which states, in essence, that the wages of individual workers will be 
less under monopsonistic conditions than under perfect market conditions. 
Therefore, collective bargaining is needed to help strengthen the position 
of the individual workers in the wage-setting process (Wellington and 
Winter, 1971: 13). The strike is generally viewed as a necessary element 
in the bargaining process. Market constraints are believed to operate 
within the private sector to limit the amount of employee gains from 
collective bargaining. Thus, increased wage or benefit payments to a 
firm's employees must be offset by increased productivity, lower profits, 
a reduction in employment, or higher product prices to consumers if that 
firm is to remain in a viable financial position. Otherwise, the firm 
may be undersold by nonunion companies or consumers may substitute for 
the higher priced union product. As a consequence, the firm may be forced 
to go out of business or relocate to a new plant site. Thus, union demands 
and tactics in the private sector are checked by the forces of competi­
tion and other market pressures. The ultimate union bargaining tactic, 
the strike, is also constrained somewhat by market forces. For instance, 
if a prolonged strike results in a permanent loss of a firm's market 
position, the workers will suffer along with their employer.
Similar economic constraints are much weaker or nonexistent in 
the public sector. Most services provided by governments are monopolistic 
in that there exist no other sellers or sources of the product. As a 
result, demand for these services is usually inelastic. Police services
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constitute a leading example of a monopoly government service for which 
there is usually no adequate substitute in the private marketplace.
Because most public services such as police, fire, and garbage are monopo­
lies, and since adequate substitutes for these services are not readily 
available, no competitors act as constraining factors. Furthermore, no 
consumer choice exists, as voters are required by law to buy government 
services through taxes regardless of their degree of usage of the services. 
A price increase means higher taxes without the fear of losing customers 
that exists in the private sector. Of course, some market constraints 
do function within the public sector. Budget considerations and corres­
ponding tax levies check employee compensation increases to some extent, 
but, as Bok and Dunlop (1970: 334-35) state,"the connection is remote and 
scarcely applicable to particular ... groups of strategically located 
public employees."
Other economic differences are evident among public and private 
sector employers. First, it is difficult to offset higher labor prices 
in the public sector through increased productivity because of the 
service-providing nature of almost all public employment. Also, profits 
and prices are not readily available as criteria for measuring the public 
costs and benefits, and it is extremely unlikely that the government, as 
employer, will relocate or "go out of business." Finally, though high 
wage settlements may force a reduction in the state or local labor force 
or a decline in the quality of the service provided, political considera­
tions militate against these actions (Wellington and Winter, 1971; 19). 
Because of these and other differences between the economic environments 
of public and private sector employment, Wellington and Winter (1971) 
argue strongly that the strike should not be a part of public sector
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collective bargaining.^ They fear that in the public sector, "in the long 
run strikes may become too effective a means for redistributing income; so 
effective, indeed, that one might see them as an institutionalized means 
of obtaining and maintaining a subsidy for union members." (Wellington and 
Winter, 1971: 26) .
Organizational relationships which prevail in state and local 
governments constitute the third major area of divergence between public 
and private sector collective bargaining structures and processes. In the 
private sector, collective bargaining consists of a bilateral relationship 
with a clear-cut distinction between employee and management organizations. 
The bilateralism can be compromised by government intervention through 
the NLRB, the courts, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, nr 
other channels, but this is a very rare phenomenon. Private sector 
management has a strong grip on organizational power and authority, 
except to the extent that these functions may be shared with the party 
representing labor. Management authority is vertical, flowing from the 
chief executive down to the line workers.
In the public sector, collective bargaining departs from the con­
ventional bilateral model, becoming a multilateral relationship which 
reflects the American political principle of separation of powers. 
Managerial power and authority are divided between the executive, legis­
lative, and bureaucratic functions within a single level of government, 
and between separate levels of government throughout the country. This 
diffusion of power and authority results in a blurring of the lines dis­
tinguishing management and unions and creates confusion over who represents 
the management bargaining unit in the collective bargaining process. A 
prime illustration of this latter point would be the role conflict
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frequently experienced by the "Head" or chairperson of nn academic 
department in a college or university. If Che faculty engages in collec­
tive bargaining, does a chairperson represent the faculty, of which he is 
a member, or is he part of the university administration?
Managerial authority may also appear confused in American cities, 
which may exhibit several patterns of organizational structure, including 
city manager, strong mayor, weak mayor, and commission forms of government. 
Budgetary authority may he divided equally between the executive and legis­
lative branches or dominated by one of the parties in a single level of 
government. In some cities, semiautonomous agencies exercise independent 
authority over their employees' compensation through their own taxing 
power or grant support. Los Angeles, for example, has six local authorities 
which can set employee salaries independently (Reynolds, 1974: 679). In 
many areas the state legislature further complicates the diffusion of 
managerial power through imposing constraints on the fiscal authority of 
local officials, such as by regulating local government fringe benefits. 
Another actor who frequently enters the picture is the public, represented 
by various interest groups favoring either the employee or management 
position.
Ihe diffusion of managerial power and authority in public sector 
labor relations has important implications for the motivation of public 
managers. In the private sector, a manager's motivation issues from the 
profit motive and the knowledge that his future promotion and salary are 
contingent on how effectively he deals with the firm's unions. The pri­
vate manager is likely to be well-versed in labor relations, and he is 
unaffected by any threat of retribution for his actions by unions (see 
Shaw, 1972: B74). The public manager, on the other hand, is not motivated
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by profits, is usually ill-trained in labor relations, and, if he is an 
elected official, must fear the possibility of union opposition to him 
in the next election.
Unions tend to exploit these elements of multilateralism in state 
and local government through political activity  ^ designed to circumvent 
the bargaining table. Lobbying may be directed at any or all of the 
three prominent public sector collective bargaining actors. The chief 
executive, whether governor or mayor, is in some respects the public 
employer. However, he frequently has an adversary relationship with his 
legislative body and he may be able to exert little control over state or 
local agencies. His limited power is subject to the divided loyalties of 
public employees, the legislature, the bureaucracy, and the electorate.
Any decision he makes must be a political one. Thus, his position is 
c|uite vulnerable to the actions of public employee unions. For instance, 
in Mew York City, municipal employees usually make large financial con­
tributions to the mayor's election campaign and even ring doorbells for 
him in efforts to gain his allegiance (Hirsch, 1973; 435).
The legislature offers a second target for public employee union 
lobbying, and an important one, since legislative bodies as collective 
representatives of the people, constitute the ultimate source of decisions 
relating to public employees. Lobbying efforts may consist of direct, 
face-to-face confrontations between lobbyist and legislator (sometimes 
known as the legislative end-run), to indirect lobbying techniques such as 
television advertising or letter-writing campaigns. The purpose of these 
lobbying techniques is, of course, to gain legislative understanding and 
sympathy for union problems and to apply political pressure where it is 
deemed necessary (Shaw and Clark, 1972: 921-29).
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The third collective bargaining actor in the public sector, the 
public itself, may consist of a bewildering array of political participants. 
The general voting public's sympathy and support is sought both by elected 
officials and labor organizations. "Special publics," such as the local 
Chamber of Commerce or Parent-Teacher Association are also subject to 
lobbying efforts. Furthermore, the union membership itself functions as 
a special public through its great potential voting power. Given the 
traditionally low rate of voter turnout in local electoral contests, "the 
votes of union members, families and friends, could be determinative in 
relatively close contests" (UCLA law Review, 1972; 1039).
In addition to the executive, the legislature, and the general 
public, other political actors are involved in public sector collective 
bargaining. A large number of administrative agencies within the state 
and local bureaucracies, such as civil service commissions, budget depart­
ments, and personnel departments conduct activities which affect labor 
relations and are, in turn, the recipients of union attention. The 
state judiciary also plays a key role, especially in labor-management con­
troversies during which it may serve as a powerful informal mediator.^ 
Finally, the mass media may assume an important role through raising and 
discussing public labor relations conflicts and issues.
A good illustration of public employee union political activity 
is provided by Stieber (1973: 194-99) in his description of the AFSCME. 
Political action by AFSCME members is coordinated nationally through the 
Public Employees Organization to Promote Legislative Equality (PEOPLE), 
which was established at the 1968 AFSCME convention. Among other things, 
PEOPLE coordinates union activities at the international, council, and
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local levels; participates in the AFL-CIO Committee on Political 
Education (COPE) program; and lobbies in the Congress and state legisla­
tures. More recently, PEOPLE has adopted resolutions on various social 
and political issues, including civil rights, consumer protection, and 
national health insurance. Most of the AFSCME political activity, however, 
takes place through "councils" composed of state and local government 
employees. The councils mobilize their members in support of political 
candidates and various issues of union interest and provide electoral 
support to selected candidates by raising campaign funds and donating man­
power for electoral work. As a result of its political activities, AFSCME 
has claimed credit for the outcome of a number of elections, including 
the 1969 victory of Mayor Lindsey in New York City.
It seems apparent that public sector multilateral collective bar­
gaining departs substantially from the bilateral model of the private 
sector primarily because of the infusion of politics in public employment.
Of course, multilateral bargaining and concomitant political activity 
occur more frequently and to a stronger degree in some states and locali­
ties than others. Based on a survey questionnaire, Kochan (1974: 542) finds 
that the nature of the local government collective bargaining process is, 
indeed, "a natural outgrowth of the political context in which it operates." 
The extent of multilateral bargaining, he determines, varies directly with 
(1) the extent of conflict between city officials in making bargaining 
decisions; (2) the extent of the union's political activities; and (3) 
the use by unions of such strike substitutes as slowdowns and picketing.
The important question here, however, is what difference the dissimilarity 
between public .and private sector labor relations makes with regard to 
the compensation of workers. Some, like Wellington and Winter (1970: 808),
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uri'ue that thu nonmarket, political settin* of the public sector, if not 
effectively regulated, will place public employee unions in a competitive 
advantage vis-a-vis other interest groups and "the political process will 
be distorted." Others, such as Lewin (1973), believe that market forces 
in the public sector are sufficiently strong to constrain union power.
Perhaps the best measure of union bargaining power is the outcome, 
in dollar and cents, of the collective bargaining process for the compen­
sation level of the individual employee. If the union is successful, its 
strength should be reflected in the amount of wages and benefits its 
members receive relative to similarly situated nonunion workers in both 
public and private employment. In the next section, a review will be pre­
sented of the literature pertaining to wage theory and determination in 
the public sector. In subsequent chapters, analyses will be offered in 
order to help resolve the question of what difference unions make in the 
amount of pay and benefits received by their members.
Wage Theory and Wage Determination 
in the Public Sector
Because of the many dissimilarities in the determination of 
employee compensation within the public and private sectors, economists 
generally have recognized the inapplicability of traditional wage theory 
to public employment. Gerwin (1959) states that technical considerations 
render private sector wage theory inappropriate, especially the absence 
of a product price or a satisfactory measure of the marginal physical 
product of labor (i.e., profits). This may be attributable, he continues, 
to diverse institutional and political factors found within public employ­
ment. Others (Carlsson and Robinson, 1969) say that it is the conceptual 
framework and underlying assumptions of traditional wage theory which
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make it inappropriate. Probably it is both. Neither the underlying 
assumptions nor the technical elements of private sector wage theory 
appear to have much relevance when applied to the public sector.^
Despite increased scholarly interest during the past decade, very 
little progress has been made in developing theoretical constructs per­
taining tn public employee unionism in general or, more specifically, its 
impact on compensation. Levine and Perry (1975) attribute the failure in 
theory building to three factors; (1) the tendency for students of the
field to use conventional, nontechnical language; (2) the idiographic 
approach to the subject; and (3) the dominance of the field by those 
holding prescriptive orientations to the problems found within public 
employee relations at the expense of theoretical concerns. Perry and 
Levine (1976) seek to remedy this theoretical lacuna by placing public 
sector collective bargaining within the framework of incerorganizational 
theory. Organizations .are viewed as interacting with other autonomous 
organizations in joint decision-making which affects both parties along 
with "the larger system." Research hypotheses are formulated using five 
interorganizational variables and tested on data gathered on public employee 
collective bargaining in New York City. While Perry and Levine's work 
appears to offer some contribution to the field of organizational theory, 
its implications are somewhat abstruse and of little or no relevance to 
public sector wage theory.
Of greater interest in this study is Wellington and Winter's 
The Unions and the Cities (1971). This book has generated a great deal 
of controversy within the field of public sector labor relations, some 
specifics of which were pointed out in Che preceding section. According 
to the authors' major thesis, if a full transfer of collective bargaining
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as it is constituted in the private sector were made to the public sector, 
"such a transplant, would, in many cases, institutionalize the power of 
public employee unions in a way that would leave competing groups in the 
political process at a permanent and substantial disadvantage" (Wellington 
and Winter, 1971: 30-31). There are three reasons for this: (1) some
municipal services are of such a nature that prolonged interruption, 
resulting from a strike, would result in a real danger to public health 
and safety; (2) the relatively inelastic demand for governmental services 
is mostly insensitive to price changes, the governmental services lack 
close substitutes, and competitive nonunion service-providers rarely 
exist; and (3) the disruption of a government service inconveniences 
municipal voters who may choose to "punish" the political leadership in 
the next election. Thus, the authors argue, unions in government inher­
ently have greater power than those in the private sector. Wellington 
and Winter illustrate their thesis by presenting a model of public sector 
collective bargaining. The model develops a structural bargaining paradigm 
of a municipality governed by a city council and an elected mayor, in 
which the mayor conducts negotiations with the unions which represent the 
city employees (Wellington and Winter, 1970: 17). If Wellington and 
Winter are correct, then we would expect that municipal government union 
employees would be more highly compensated than both their union counter­
parts in private employment and their nonunion counterparts in the public 
sphere, at least in the short run. However, as Levine and Perry (1975:
211) note.
The Wellington-Winter framework is for the most part, 
undefined and unaccompanied by indicators or constructs 
for its operationalizations. Also, the framework is of 
limited generality due to the assumptions about the 
structure of government and forms of political pressure.
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Finally, since no attempt is made to test the model, 
the hypotheses remain neither confirmed nor discon- 
firmed.
Hammerraesh (1975) attempts to rectify the latter point by subjecting 
the Wellington-Winter thesis to direct empirical testing in order to deter­
mine whether or not public workers belonging to unions receive higher 
wages than private sector union members engaged in the same occupation.
Three occupational categories are examined, each in a separate data set: 
bus drivers, construction workers, and a cross-section of union workers 
from many occupations. For the first two categories, statistical con­
trols are used to account for such variables as the level of education of 
municipal workers, the percentage of nonwhites, population size, popula­
tion density, city employment rate, average hourly earnings of manufacturing 
production workers and the percentage of such workers who are union mem­
bers. Results indicate that the union bus drivers who worked for a city 
government earned between nine and 12 percent more in wages than union 
drivers who worked for a private employer (Hammermesh, 1975: 238), 
tending to support the Wellington-Winter thesis. Hammermesh's second 
analysis, however, suggests that "there is no difference in earnings 
between public and private construction workers" (Hammermesh, 1975:
248), which appears to contradict the Wellington-Winter position. Hammer- 
mesh's third analysis employs the 1968 Survey of Consumer's Finances data 
in an effort to measure the relative wage effects of unions on various 
occupational categories within both the public and private sectors, and 
the differentials in union relative wage effects between the two sectors.
He determines that the union relative wage effects ranges from three to 
nine percent for government medical and educational service empioyees, and 
from -4 to 4 percent for other government services employees. The
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relative wage effects of unions for workers in similar private sector 
employment, on the other hand, varies from four to 16 percent (Hammermesh,
1975: 248-53). It therefore appears that the relative wage effects 
of unions in government are slightly lower than in the private sector.
On the basis of his three analyses, Hammermesh (1975: 254) appears to 
offer the rather unsatisfying conclusion that unions in the public sector 
do as well or only slightly better than their private sector counterparts—  
nn definite confirmation or disconfirmation of the Wellington-Winter 
hypothesis has emerged from his data. It is also unfortunate that Hammer­
mesh' s study is subject to serious theoretical and statistical deficiencies. 
For example, he ignores the union impact on employee benefits, choosing 
to focus on wages alone. Furthermore, only a small amount of the total 
variance in the several dependent variables is accounted for with the 
regression procedure he employs (the largest multiple correlation coeffi­
cient is = .42).
Other tests of the Wellington-Winter hypothesis have been equally 
unsatisfying. Freund's (1974) study of market and union influences on 
municipal employees' wages in a large number of cities indicates that 
market forces are tlie major determinants of employee wage increases, with 
union power variables exerting only a weak effect on wage changes. In a 
direct test of the Wellington-Winter hypothesis, the 1965-1971 change in 
the proportion of each city's expenditures given to employee wages was 
regressed on several measures of unionism. In observing that only two 
of the union variables were significant, Freund (1974: 403) concludes 
that his study "provides no support to Wellington and Winter's proposi­
tion that local public sector unions affect their member's wages by 
political activities aimed at garnering a 'disproportionate' share of
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local government budgets." IVhat Freund neglects to mention is that one 
of the union variables he found to be significant can be considered a 
direct measure of union power: percent of workers unionized. Also, his
data show that a city in which 60 percent of the employees are unionized 
would devote approximately three percent more of its budget to employee 
wages than a city in which no municipal employees belong to unions.
Freund (1974: 403, fn. 20) does admit that "There is, therefore, some weak 
evidence that public sector unions can affect the composition of a city's 
budget, but the equation could only explain five percent of such shifts 
in the wage share of municipal budgets." "Only" a five percent increase 
in the portion of a city's operating budget dedicated to employee wages 
would result in a $250,000 adjustment for a city whose operating budget 
was $5 million. Furthermore, Freund, like Hammermesh, fails to include 
the dollar value of municipal employee benefits in his analysis— an 
omission which seriously calls into question his findings.
Other than the rather unsatisfying tests of the Wellington-Winter 
thesis, public sector wage theory generally has assumed two approaches. 
The traditional economic approach has been to specify labor supply and 
demand e(|uations in order to solve for the wage rate of public employees. 
Separate influences on the demand for and supply of government workers 
are specified and included in the wage equations. This approach is 
illustrated in the studies by Reder (1975) and Ehrenberg (1973). A second 
avenue in public sector wage theory has been the bargaining approach, which 
focuses on the institutional factors involved in the wage-setting process. 
Here, wage determination is sees as resulting from a bargaining relation­
ship between the government and the unions representing its employees. 
Emphasis is placed on such variables as union tactics, the degree of
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multilateral bargaining, and other factors influencing the relative 
bargaining power of the two parties. Examples of this approach are found 
in the works of Kochan (1975), Love and Sulzner (1972), and Gerhart (1976). 
Others (Kochan and IJheeler, 1975; Freund, 1974) have attempted to combine 
the supply/demand and bargaining approaches in developing models of public 
sector wage determination.
While some attention has been focused on the Wellington-Winter 
thesis and the development of supply/demand and bargaining power models, 
many of the residual attempts to develop public sector wage theory have 
concentrated on identifying those aspects of private sector wage deter­
mination which may be applicable to public wage determination. In the 
section on private sector wage determination which was presented in 
Chapter One, nine factors were identified (others than unionism) which 
economists have been concerned with in focusing on private sector wage 
rates: geography, size of establishment, profit levels, oualitv of
labor force, cost-of-living, comparative wage standards, the wider economy, 
nature of the product market, and noneconomic variables. Some of these 
factors are directly transferable to public sector wage determination, 
particularly geographic location, nature of the labor force, cost-of-living, 
and the wider economy. These variables appear Co be of considerable im­
portance in determining employee wages regardless of whether or not the 
employer is a government or a firm. The issue is not so clear-cut, how­
ever, with regard to the remaining variables.
The salience of comparative wage standards or the "prevailing 
wage" in public sector wage determination has been a topic of special con­
cern to scholars in the field. Lewin (1974a; 1974b; Fogel and Lewin,
(1974) has addressed the issue on several occasions. In one instance
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(1974b) he notes the common practice of basing the wages of municipal 
employees on rates prevailing in the private sector which, he says, reflects 
a mixture of economic and political reasoning. Lewin then embarks on a 
lengthy discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the prevailing wage 
rule and some of the operational difficulties encountered in implementing 
it. He concludes that operationalizing the principle
is a complex process in which considerable managerial 
judgment must be exercised with respect to the determin­
ation of prevailing market rates and the utilization of
market data to form governmental wage structures ... no
single operational definition of prevailing wages is 
uniformly applicable to a governmental occupational 
structure ... (and) prevailing wages are actually deter­
mined for relatively few of a government's job 
classifications ... (1974b: 482).
Still, "... the prevailing wage principle serves as a cornerstone of
government wage policy" (1974a: 150). Therefore, it would appear that
comparative wage standards at least are as important in setting public
employee wages as they are in private employment. The earlier findings
of Gerwin (1969) support this conclusion.
Gerwin's 1969 article presents a model of public compensation
determination predicated on three major hypotheses: the tendency in public
employment is for the employer to (1) grant all employees salary increases
at the same time; (2) grant salary increases when the relative position
of a key occupation's® salary has approached a critical level; (3) grant
fringe benefit increases in order to temporarily mitigate discontent in
the key occupation (Gerwin, 1969: 182). In general, salary and benefit
increases are based on two variables: wage comparisons and the ability
to pay (Gerwin, 1969: 178). Gerwin, like Lewin, notes that this pattern
resembles that found in the private sector, but neither author attempts
to test his hypothesis empirically.
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Empirical verification of a nearly identical concept— the oppor­
tunity wage— is undertaken by Gustely (1974) in his attempt to develop 
a "positive theory of local expenditure." Gustely (1974: 10) proposes 
that the most important determinant of public sector wages is the pay 
availability for similar work in the private sector. To explain interurban 
variations in the level of municipal government expenditures for police, 
fire, and common function employees for 1966 and 1971 in 39 cities, he 
utilizes six independent variables: fiscal capacity, extent of private
sector unionism, mobility of public employees, geographical region, the 
number of public employees per 1,000 population, and the public employee 
opportunity wage. Gustely finds that the opportunity wage, as measured 
by the average earnings of private sector service employees is the most 
important determinant of public employee wages for each employment func­
tion in each of the two base years. This holds true also when median 
family income is substituted as Che proxy for opportunity wage. All con­
sidered, it is apparent that the related concepts of "prevailing wage,” 
"opportunity wage," and "comparative wage standard" are important in 
public sector wage determination, and therefore should be taken into 
account in any related analysis.
Another important element in private sector wage determination 
which appears to be of some relevance to the public sector is profit levels. 
Although state and local governments do not really concern themselves with 
the notion of profits as it is recognized by private sector firms, there 
would seem to be an appropriate analogy. Profits, to a firm, result in 
the ability of that firm to grant its employees wage increases without a 
concomitant increase in product prices. Public employees can he awarded 
pay increases without a boost in the public sector version of product
66
price— tax assessments—  if the fiscal capacity of the state or local 
government is raised, for example, through a jump in revenue-sharing funds. 
Thus, the public sector analogy for profits might be some measure of fiscal 
capacity, or ability to pay. Gustely (1974: 14-18) suggests that a local 
government's fiscal capacity consists of an internal variable, which he 
operationalizes with median housing value and per capita assessed property 
valuation, and an external variable which he measures through per capita 
federal and state financial aid, Ehrenberg (1973: 38-39) distinguishes 
between a community's ability to pay, which he measures with median family 
income, and its "taste" for a certain service, as measured through such 
proxies as median value of housing and population density (for fire ser­
vices) . Kochan and Wheeler (1975) employ tax base, income, expenditure, 
and sales data in order to gauge a city's ability to pay, while Schmenner 
(1973) accounts for these characteristics by using real property tax 
assessments per capita and property tax rate change. Results of the 
aforementioned studies indicate that the assessed valuation and median 
familiy income measures are most strongly related, and the relationships 
are frequently statistically significant. If these variables constitute 
valid indicators of governmental fiscal capacity/ability to pay, and it 
would appear that they do, then one should consider them to be of theo­
retical and empirical interest in the determination of wages in public 
employment.
Like profit levels, size of establishment in the private sector 
appears to have a public sector analogy. Just as large firms are expected, 
oaterfs fiarihun, to pay their employees higher wages and benefits than 
smaller firms, we might expect the same pattern with large and small 
governments, when size is measured by jurisdictional population. The
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1973 study by Schmenner supports the importance of the population variable 
as a determinant of public employee wage rates.
In Chapter One, the on-going debate among economists on the impact 
of monopoly in the product market on the wage-setting process in private 
sector employment was outlined. The controversy over the nature of the 
product market monopoly-unionization-wage relationship was duly noted. A 
direct analogy does not emerge readily in the public sector for the concept 
of the degree of private sector monopoly in the product market or its 
usual surrogate, product market concentration. If a government "owns" a 
public "business," it usually is a monopolist. However, there does appear 
to be some indirect correspondence when the monopsony argument is considered.
According to conventional economic theory, monopsony in the labor 
market ran exercise an influence on wage levels. This occurs when a firm 
purchases a lar^e enough quantity of a particular class of labor so that 
it influences tne price (i.e., wages) of that labor, corresponding to a 
monopolist who sells such a large quantity of a product that his supply 
affects that commodity's price (see Bloom and Northrop, 1973: 303). The 
monopsony argument has been employed in one "public market"— the market 
for public school teachers. Tandon and Baird (1972: 966) address them­
selves to "the effect of monopsony power of local school districts on the 
determination of teachers' salaries. The basic hypothesis (being) that 
competition in the market for teachers should result in higher salary 
levels." Thus, Tandon and Baird expect that where two or more school 
districts exist in the same geographical area to compete for the services 
of public school teachers, the degree of competition is positively 
related to the level of teachers' wages. The hypothesis is confirmed by 
their data, and they conclude that teachers' salaries are lower where few
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school districts exist and higher where many small districts compete for 
the services of teaching personnel (Landon and Baird, 1972: 966). Recent 
findings of Holmes (1977) tend to support the conclusion of Landon and 
Baird. However, the applicability of the monopsony argument in the public 
sector appear to be limited to the case of special skill groups, such as 
teachers, for whom similar work is generally not available in the private 
sector. For example, Schmenner (1973) has determined that while monopsony, 
as measured by the ratio of city population to metropolitan area population, 
does tend to reduce teachers' wages, an inverse relationship exists when 
police, firefighters, and common function employees' salaries are con­
sidered. In sum, it would seem that the monopsony argument is of limited
utility in the public sector, except perhaps in the case of public school 
9
teachers.
Up to this point in the discussion the transferability to the public 
sector of various economic elements important to private sector wage deter­
mination has been considered. It has been concluded that many of the 
concepts are, indeed, appropriate to public sector wage determination. 
Geographic location, size of governmental jurisdiction, ability to pay, 
nature of the labor force, cost-of-living, comparative wage standards, 
and the wider economy all appear to be of some importance in public 
employee wage-setting. Other economic factors should also be considered 
in accordance with the nature of the particular public service being 
investigated. For example, police and firefighters' compensation might, 
in part, be a function of population density in their jurisdictional 
boundaries, and one might expect that the local crime rate would also 
affect salaries and benefits of protective service employees. Specific 
issues such as these will be taken into account in Chapters Three, Four,
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and Five. At this juncture in the discussion, however, the various 
noneconomic (i.e., political) factors which have been treated in public 
sector wage theory will be examined.
While noneconomic factors (other than unions) usually are not con­
sidered by economists in their empirical models of private sector wage 
determination, the inherently political nature of public sector labor 
relations makes them difficult to ignore in public employee wage determina­
tion. Three noneconomic factors— all interrelated— have received special 
attention in studies related to public employment: legal environment,
multilateral bargaining, and city government structure.
The portion of a state's legal environment pertaining to public 
employee labor relations generally reflects the favorableness with which 
public employee organizations are viewed within that state. Although six 
states still have not formalized their public sector labor relations, 44 
states have some type of coverage for at least one occupational category 
of public employment. Within this latter group there exists considerable 
variation with regard to procedural provisions and the comprehensiveness 
of individual state bargaining arrangements (see U.S. Department of Labor,
1976). Kochan and Wheeler (1975) attempt to determine the impact of 
various bargaining provisions (or their absence) on bargaining outcomes 
for firefighters in 121 cities, testing a model linking environmental, 
organizational, and bargaining process characteristics with wage and 
nonwage outcomes. They find that three characteristics of a state's legal 
environment exercise statistically significant effects: (1) the compre­
hensiveness of the state bargaining law; (2) the existence of fact finding 
as an impasse procedure; and (3) the existence of compulsory arbitration 
as an impasse p r o c e d u r e . T h e  authors note that an earlier study by
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Kochan (1973) determined that a state bargaining law's comprehensiveness 
is strongly correlated with several state environmental characteristics 
rather than legal characteristics. However, a test by Kochan and Wheeler 
(1975: 53) of three environmental elements important in the Kochan study 
(state per capita expenditures, state per capita income change 1960-1970, 
state legislative innovativeness) failed to support this supposition.
Some implications of a second noneconomic factor, the public sector 
miltilateral bargaining process, previously have been discussed within the 
context of organizational differences between the public and private 
sectors (Chapter Two: 51-53). Among the observations offered was that 
multilateral collective bargaining results in a diffusion of management 
power and authority and an increase in internal management conflict. The 
model offered by Kochan and Wheeler (1975) includes the correlates between 
both management characteristics and multilateral bargaining measures and 
the outcomes of bargaining. Their multiple regression results indicate 
that goal incompatibility between a city council and the mayor and the 
intervention of elected officials in the negotiations process are signi­
ficantly related to municipal bargaining outcomes. This tends to confirm 
the significance of the multiparty relationships in public sector bar­
gaining and suggests the salience of political conflict in public sector 
labor relations and bargaining outcomes. In an earlier study of lAFF 
locals in 228 cities, Kochan (1975) uncovered a great deal of dispersion 
in management power, with different management units representing diverse 
interest groups and goals. Kochan hypothesizes that such internal manage­
ment conflict is the most important determinant of multilateral bargaining, 
as management political conflicts which are not resolved internally get 
carried over into the bargaining process (Kochan, 1975: 99-100).
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A r Ln.'i 1 noneconomic, or nonmarket, variable which has been 
considered in public sector wage determination is the structure of muni­
cipal government. Over a decade ago, Banfield and Wilson (1967: 214) 
postulated that the political power of organized municipal employees 
"depends largely upon the nature of that city's political structure, and 
especially the degree to which influence is centralized." Specifically, 
they contend that the influence of city employees tends to be strongest 
in cities which have a council-manager form of government, nonpartisan 
elections, and at-large elections— otherwise known as "reformed" cities.
On the other hand, the influence of city employees would be least in 
cities evidencing a mayor-council form of government, partisan elections, 
and a ward system. Lineberry and Fowler (1967), however, appear to argue 
that an inverse relationship exists between reformed city governments and 
the extent of municipal employee influence. This is because reformed 
structures, they believe, tend to minimize the political access of interest 
groups through their depoliticized, bureaucratic process of decision-making.
Ehrenberg (1973) attempts to ascertain one effect of municipal 
government structure on the political influence of city workers by 
testing the hypothesis that city-manager cities tend to pay their employees 
relatively less than mayor-council cities (Lineberry and Fowler's thesis). 
Ehrenberg (1973: 40) speculates that the hypothesis may be valid because 
city managers, as professional labor negotiators: (1) may be more effi­
cient than mayors or commissions in the bargaining process; and (2) may 
also solicit greater productivity from municipal workers. In testing his 
hypothesis on a sample of 270 cities with firefighters as the test group, 
however, he finds that when the number of hours worked is taken into 
consideration, the hourly wages of firefighters in city-manager cities
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are not significantly lower than those in mayor-council cities (Ehrengberg, 
1973: 48). The opposite conclusion is reached in a recent study by Ger­
hart (1976), who determines from an analysis of 262 municipal government 
labor agreements that city employees do not gain as much, in terms of bar­
gaining outcome, in council-manager cities as they do with other forms of 
municipal government. A broader study by Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975) 
tests the same hypothesis using 1957 Census of Governments data on 10 cate­
gories of municipal workers in 478 cities. Government structure had a 
statistically significant impact on only two categories of employees.
Overall, the authors conclude, average municipal employee wages are 0-17 
percent higher in manager cities than in mayor-council cities. This finding, 
in casting doubt on the hypothesized direction of the government 
structure/employee influence relationship, tends also to negate the con­
clusions of Ehrenberg and Gerhart. Obviously, the question of the impact 
of municipal government structure on public employee bargaining outcomes 
has not been answered satisfactorily. This topic will he dealt with at 
some length in Chapter Five.
The following section will turn to another issue relevant to the 
study of the impact of unions on compensation in the public sector: the
relative position of public and private sector workers with regard to the 
wages and benefits they receive from their respective employers. A review 
of the literature will be undertaken in order to determine if public 
sector employees have overtaken or surpassed their counterparts in private 
sector employment, as the analysis of Wellington and Winter might lead 
one to believe.
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A Comparison of Employee Compensa i^jjp
in the Public and Private Sectors
In Chapter One It was mentioned that one of the paramount reasons 
for the rapid growth in public employee unionism was the fact that the 
wages and benefits of private sector employees generally had surpassed 
those of public workers during and shortly after the Second World War. 
Unionization appeared to offer one possible avenue for public workers to 
rectify this unpalatable situation. As it will soon become clear, the 
evidence to date seems to affirm the success of public employee organiza­
tions in regaining lost ground for their members vis-a-vis private sector 
workers. In fact, it appears likely that public employees, at least in 
some job categories and in some geographic locations, have forged ahead of 
their private sector counterparts in the area of compensation.
In a cross-sectional study of 11 large cities, Perloff (1971) dis­
covers that the average monthly salaries of municipal government employees
in several clerical occupations exceeded those of their private sector
counterparts in nine cities. Also, he reports, municipal employee 
salaries for maintenance and custodial occupations were higher than salaries 
for similar jobs in the private sector in seven cities, and data processing 
wages were higher for city employees in six locations. Field and Keller 
(1976) report similar findings for 24 large municipalities in a more 
recent year. In a study over time, Ehrenberg (1972: 4) finds that both 
state and local government employees improved their relative incomes com­
pared with private workers during the 1965-1970 period. The average 
monthly payroll per full-time equivalent employee increased 42 percent 
for state and local employees during these years, but only 31 percent for 
workers in the nonfarm private economy and 29 percent for those in private
74
manufacturing. Ehrenberg's findings are confirmed by Reder and Orr.
Reder (1975) draws from 1960 and 1970 census data in showing that while 
average 1959 hourly earnings of state and local government workers wore four 
percent below those of comparable workers in private employment, 1969 hourly 
earnings favored the government employees by about nine percent. Orr (1976) 
uses various government sources in comparing federal, state, local, and 
private industry compensation from 1950-1973. He determines that from 
1952-1966, the average compensation of government workers stayed roughly 
at parity with compensation for equivalent work in the nrivate sector, 
but that since 1966, government employee wages and benefits have risen each 
year through 1973 when compared to wages and benefits in private sector 
employment. During the 1973 period, the earnings gap reached about 10 
percent in favor of government workers.
From Orr's study it would appear that the relative wage advantage 
of public employees holds true for nonwage benefits as well. Harrison 
(1972: 66) reports that a 1970 survey conducted by the Middle Atlantic 
Bureau of Labor Statistics determined that the wages and benefits of public 
sector maintenance workers exceeded the private industry average by about 
51 percent in the state of New York that year. The evidence with regard 
to nonwage benefits also favored municipal public employees in 1970 and 
1973, according to two studies performed under the auspices of the 
International City Management Association (ICMA, 1970; ICMA, 1974). In 
addition, Tilove's (1976: 67) examination of state and local public employee 
retirement plans revealed that as of 1972, "benefit levels of the public 
plans were, for the most typical employees, approximately double those 
prevailing in private industry plans."
Whereas most public workers would appear to enjoy a relative 
benefits advantage when compared with their private sector counterparts.
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wage advantages accruing to public employees in recent years have not 
been evenly distributed among all government occupations. For example, 
Lewin (1974a) utilizes data gathered from the city of Los Angeles in dis­
covering that while public employees in lower-ranking jobs are paid higher 
than comparable workers in the private sector, high-level employees tend 
to be paid less. Lewin asserts that the reason for this differentia] in 
the wage structure of government workers is, basically, chat there are more 
lower-level government employees. Political actors who make compensation 
decisions are guided by the perceived voting behavior of relevant interest 
groups— the larger and more cohesive a particular group is, the more 
likely public officials are to respond to it. Since blue-collar and 
lower-level white-collar public workers outnumber higher-level professional 
and managerial employees, and since they are better organized as a voting 
bloc, they do relatively better than higher-level public employees when 
compared to their counterparts in the private sector (see Lewin, 1974a: 
152-53; Lewin, 1977: 141). Fogel and Lewin (1974) expand this argument 
further by taking into account the politicization of the public 
wage-setting process in general, the particular role ol unions, and the 
role of the prevailing wage principle in public employment. They present 
evidence showing that for most lower-level occupations, a government pays 
more in wages and benefits than a private sector employer (Fogel and 
Lewin, 1974: 418). The authors (Fogel and Lewin, 1974: 430) conclude 
that this can be explained by
... a combination of two factors: the discretion that
public employers must exercise in implementing the pre­
vailing wage rule adopted by most cities and larger 
government units and the nature of the political forces 
that affect governmental wage decisions. The result is 
an occupational pay structure that is more 'eeualitarian' 
in the public sector than that in private industry ....
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Thus, It appears that workers in public employment have recently 
achieved a relative compensation advantage over their private sector 
counterparts, with the exception of professional and managerial personnel. 
Concomitant with these compensation gains has been a tremendous upsurge in 
public employee unionism, especially among those very blue-collar and 
lower-level white-collar employees who have enjoyed the greatest relative 
increase in wages and benefits. While it is incontestable that public 
employee compensation gains have varied directly with a rise in unionization, 
no cause and effect relationship has been established between the two.
Indeed, the positive identification of a causal relationship between public 
employee unionism in general and overall pay and benefit gains may well be 
impossible. Nonetheless, it should be possible through the use of advanced 
statistical techniques to identify and isolate the impact of various 
unions on public employee compensation within certain occupational cate­
gories in the United States. In Chapter One, the theoretical underpinnings 
and empirical findings of economists concerned with the influence of unions 
on employee pay within the private sector were discussed. Earlier in 
this chapter the attempts by economists to apply what theory they have 
gleaned from the private sector to wage determination within the public 
sector were related. In the next section, the empirical literature con­
cerned with Che impact of unions on the compensation of state and local 
government employees will be reviewed.
The Impact of Unions on Employee 
Compensation in the Public Sector
Unlike the myriad empirical studies by economists over the past 40 
years on the impact of unions on wages in the private sector, the investi­
gation of union influence in public employment has been of more recent
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origin and much more limited in scope. The first such study, which 
appeared as late as 1970, was concerned with the public employee occupa­
tional category which has received the greatest attention during the 
1970's— public school t e a c h e r s . A s  it will become evident, the findings 
regarding the influence of unions on the compensation of school teachers 
and other public employees have been diverse and sometimes contradictory.
Most of the studies on the effects of union activity on teachers' 
salaries have employed a market approach, where the effects on teachers' 
salaries of their economic environment and teacher labor force characteris­
tics are accounted for through multiple regression techniques, and the 
residual variance, generally represented by a union/nonunion dummy 
variable, is attributed to union influence. Teacher labor force charac­
teristics constitute the "quality of labor," usually operationalized in 
terms of age, sex, education, and years of teaching experience of the 
individuals composing the teacher group being studied. Typical market, 
or economic, variables included in these studies are; (1) ability of the 
school district (or state) to pay, usually operationalized by per capita 
property tax valuation, per capita personal income, or per capita revenue 
figures; (2) urbanization; (3) expenditures per pupil; (4) monopsony power 
of local school districts, as measured by the number of school districts 
in the county; (5) region; (6) pupil/teacher ratio; (7) extent of 
unionization in the private labor force; and (8) the opportunity wage for 
teachers.
Hesults of the studies have been almost startling in their incon­
sistency. The initial effort by Kasper (1970), though seriously flawed 
(see Landon .and Baird, 1972), employs multiple regression with the 50 
states as units of analysis in order to determine the union influence on
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fill- ,ivu r;i);(.‘ te.-ichor salary in each state. No sij>ti i firanl. relationship 
is found between unionization and teacher salary for the 1967-1968 school 
year. In a similar study for 1969-1970, Thornton (1971) reaches the oppo­
site conclusion, finding that unionization is associated with salaries 
2.3 to 28.8 percent higher in school districts in cities of 100,000 popu­
lation or larger throughout the United States, depending on the educational 
degree held by teachers. Landon and Baird (1972) attempt to account for 
these divergent results. They discount the findings of Kasper on metho­
dological and statistical grounds; namely, the state level of data 
aggregation and the inappropriate use of two-stage least squares regression 
equations (Landon and Baird, 1972: 410-13). In examining the Thornton 
study, Landon and Baird find that it is superior to the earlier effort 
of Kasper, but that it is still somewhat limited because it is restricted 
to large urban areas, and it ignores monopsony in the teacher labor market 
(Landon and Baird, 1972: 414). They expand Kasper's data to encompass 
smaller school districts and add a variable to measure the influence of 
monopsony on teacher salaries. Results indicate chat salaries in school 
districts where collective bargaining is conducted tend to be higher 
by $261— or 4.9 percent— a difference which is statistically significant.
Hall and Carroll (1973) also find that teacher unionization 
significantly affects salary levels. Their analysis of 118 elementary 
school districts in Cook County, Illinois for the 1968-1969 school year 
reveals that unions add $165 per year, or about 1.8 percent, to teachers' 
salaries. Schmenner (1973) examines the beginning salary for teachers in 
II large cities and asserts that formal collective bargaining procedures 
result here in a 12-14 percent increase in the wages of teachers. Lipsky 
and Drotning (1973) report variable findings in a study of teacher salary
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determination in New York state for the 1967-1968 school year. For the 
state as a whole (excluding New York City), the salary effect of teacher 
organizations was not significant. However, in small town districts the 
union influence was positive and significant; also, bargaining was found 
to be significant in its effects on changes in teacher salaries from 1967 
to 1958, adding about 15 percent. Frey (1975) evaluates the impact of 
teacher bargaining on 298 school districts in New Jersey during 1969-1970 
and, like Kasper, fails "to discover more than a trivial impact of bargaining 
on wages in the typical school district (Frey, 1975: 215). Frey's conclu­
sion is supported by Balfour (1974), who attempts to replicate Kasper's 
•study using more recent data (1969-1970) for the American states, hike 
Kasper, Balfour finds "that interstate differences in public school 
teachers' salaries in 1969-70 could not be attributed to unionization ...." 
(Balfour, 1974: 101). Brown (1975 ) takes a somewhat novel approach in 
his statewide analysis over the years 1961-1971 by comparing mean teachers' 
salaries in states with and without collective bargaining legislation.
He, too, finds no significant influence of collective bargaining on 
teachers' salaries. As with the effort by Kasper, the statewide studies 
of Balfour .and Brown have been criticized for the use cf state-level 
aggregate data (see Moore, 1975). In a recent article. Holmes (1976) 
takes a single-state approach to the unions/teachers' salary question, 
using data for 1974-1975 on 456 school districts in Oklahoma. In con­
trast to chose who have utilized the states as units of analysis. Holmes 
determines that the existence of union activity significantly increases 
teachers’ earnings by an annual amount of $818 (seven percent) in dis­
tricts evidencing substantial union activity-
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Table 5 presents a summary of the findings in the literature with 
regard to the impact of unions on teachers' salaries. Upon perusal of 
Table 5, it becomes apparent that those who have employed state-level data 
as their unit of observation have not found significant relationships 
between the salary and union variables. On the other hand, excluding the 
study by Frey, those who have utilized school district data have uncovered 
various significant associations between the two variables, resulting in 
a union advantage ranging from 1.8 to 28.8 percent. Common sense would 
dictate that more credence be given to these latter studies with the narrower 
degree of data aggregation. Unfortunately, however, all of the teacher 
studies suffer a serious flaw— none of them attempts to account for the 
nonsalary aspects of teachers' earnings. If unions do, in fact, affect 
the personal rewards received by public school teachers, then they should 
affect benefits as well as salaries. In order to gain a valid accounting 
of the union influence, one should take into account as many aspects of 
teacher compensation as possible.
Though research on public school teachers has dominated the 
nascent field of the union influence on public employee wages and benefits, 
related studies have treated other areas of public employee unionism. The 
literature pertaining to higher education faculty and municipal police 
protection employees will be reviewed in Chapters Three and Five, respec­
tively. In the latter part of this section, a survey will be offered of 
the remaining literature dealing with the impact of public employee unions 
on worker compensation. The studies are all of recent vintage, and all 
are concerned with various occupational categories of municipal employees.
Three studies have been made on municipal firefighter unioniza­
tion and compensation. The first, by Ashenfelter (1971), presents a
TABLE 5. A SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS ON THE IMPACT OF 
BARGAINING ON TEACHERS* SALARIES
COLLECTIVE
Author
Unit of 
Analysis
Years Dependent 
Examined Variable
Union
Variable
Union 
Ef feet
Kasper
Landon & Baird 
Hall & Carroll 
Lipsky & Drotning
Schmenner
Frey
Balfour
Brown
Mol"®*»
All state & D.C. 
N - 51
All U.S. school 
dlst. in cities 
100,000  
N » 83
School disc. In 
cities 25,000 to 
50,000. N * A4
Elem. school disc, 
in Cook County, IL 
N = 118
All school disc, in 
NY state (excl. NYC) 
N * 696
Large cities 
N » II
School disc, in 
NJ, N = 298
All states except 
Alaska, N » 49
All states, K 50
School_d|s|. in
1967-68 
1969-70
1969-70
1968-69 
1967-68
■ 1962-70
1969-70 
1969-71
1961-71
1974-/5
Av. State Salary
B.S. mln & max
A.M. min & max 
salary
Beg. salary for new 
teachers
Av. salary In dlst.
Av, salary in dlst. 
by teacher degree 
& exper., salary 
change 1967-68
% teachers rep. 
by org.; 7.
teachers covered 
by agreement
Collcc. barg. 
dummy
Collec. barg. 
dummy
Collec. barg. 
dummy
Collec. barg. 
dummy
Min. salary for beg. Collec. barg 
dummy
Collec. barg. 
duramv
teachers
Teachers base pay
Av. state salary
Av. state salary 
Av. salary in disc.
% teachers cover, 
by agreement
Collec. barg. 
Collec. barg.
0-4S:
(not sig.)
2.3-18.8%
(sig.)
4.9%(slg.)
],B%(slg.)
Not sig. for 
entire sample; 
sig. in small 
towns; 0-3% 
salary levels,
15% salary change
12-14%(sig.) 
1.4%(not sig.)
Not sig.
Up to 3.2% 
(not sig.) 
7-9%(sig.)
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cross-sectional analysis over each year in the 1960-1966 period for a 
sample of cities throughout the United States. His investigation of the 
effet ts of firefighter unionism on annual salaries and weekly hours worked 
reveals th.-ic while union hourly wages were 2-10 percent higher than nonunion 
wages throughout the seven-year period, most of the effect was due to 
length of work week differences between union and nonunion cities. However, 
Ashenfelter (1971: 201) determines that during the most recent voar of his 
analvsis (1966), "the unionization of firemen may have raised the average 
hourly wage of unionized firemen by somewhere between six and 16 percent 
above the average hourly wage of nonunion firemen." With some modifica­
tions, Ehrenberg (1973) extends Ashenfelter's study using 1969 data on 
270 cities. The union variable is dummied on the basis of whether or not 
a particular city's firefighters were covered by a formal union contract, 
rather than on the basis of whether or not an lAFF local was present in 
the city as in Ashenfelter's study. Also, Ehrenberg employs as the 
dependent variable, data on beginning and maximum salaries in place of 
average salaries. Independent measures used in Ehrenberg's analysis 
include population density, median value of housing, ability to pay (as 
measured by average hourly earnings of manufacturing production workers) , 
median education level, and structure of municipal government.- Results 
of the analysis lead Ehrenberg to conclude that unionism has a signifi­
cant effect on the wages of firefighters in the range of 2-18 percent, 
depending on the length of work week and size of city (Ehrenberg, 1973: 47).
In addition to the literature reviewed above, three other studies 
have been made of union impact on municipal government employee wages.
All of them encompass three or more groups of municipal workers. The
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portion of Schmenner's (1973) study related to teachers' wages was 
discussed earlier. The remainder of his article is devoted to the deter­
minants of police, fire, and various common function employee wage rates 
in 11 large cities over the period 1962-1970. Schmenner's time-series 
analysis regresses a proxy for opportunity wage, work stoppages per area 
employee, municipal tax rates, city population, assessed property valua­
tions, and two union variables against maximum police and fire salaries 
and the average monthly earnings for various common function employees. 
Police-fire results show a significant relationship for the percentage 
of union membership and salary variables, but common function employees' 
wages are not found to benefit from the union variables. Unfortunately, 
it appears that some of Schmenner's data are subject to rather severe 
limitations (Schmenner, 1973: 88-89), and findings based on such a small 
sample certainly are not generalizable to the overall population. Freund 
(1974) attempts to improve on Schmenner's work by examining market and 
union influences on the wages of all city employees from 1965 to 1971 in 
40-80 cities (sample size varies with different regression equations). 
Against 12 independent measures of legal, market, and union influences, 
Freund regresses the dependent variables of percent change in average 
municipal employees' earnings over the seven-year period. The "percentage 
of city work force unionized" variable was found to be statistically 
significant, indicating "that, from 1965 to 1971, a city in which 50 
percent of municipal employees were unionized provided increases in 
weekly earnings that were about seven dollars greater than increases in 
a city with no unions of municipal employees" (Freund, 1974: 398) .
The third study on the impact of unions on municipal government 
employee wages utilizes 1967 Census of Governments data for 478 cities
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with populations of 25,000 and above. In this effort, Ehrenberg and 
Goldstein (1975) employ a union representation dummy in a test of their 
wage determination model for average annual wages of 10 categories of 
nonuniformed, noneducation personnel. Accounting for median education, 
percent black population, population density, population level, median 
family income, median value of single-family housing, average weekly 
manufacturing earnings, and per capita grants received from other levels 
of government, regression analysis reveals that the average wage of 
municipal employees in union cities is 2-16 percent higher than in 
nonunion cities, depending on occupational category.
Like the studies described above which pertained to teachers and
firefighters, the three examinations of union influence on the wages of
municipal employees all are flawed by the omission of data on nonwage
2
benefits. Furthermore, the residual amount of variance (1 - R ) that 
remains unaccounted for is quite high in all of the public sector research 
described above, frequently approaching 60 percent. Nonetheless, if one 
attempts to generalize from the literature, several thoughts may tie rele­
vant. First, OS has been noted on several occasions, none of these 
studies attempts to account fully for the union influence on public 
employee compensation. Nonwage benefits uniformly are ignored or mentioned 
only in passing. A second methodological problem issues from the poor 
specification of nonunion determinants of public employee wages. The 
magnitude of unexplained variance is most unsatisfactory in these studies, 
leaving prominent a large error term which casts doubt on the validity 
of reported findings. Finally, in a noncritical vein, the mixed findings 
for different categories of public employees suggest that the union im­
pact on employee wages in the public sector is not of the same magnitude
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as that found in the private sector. In the case of public school teachers, 
the union differential appears to be on the order of 0-3 percent in most 
instances. However, the higher percentage figures obtained by Thornton 
(up to 28.8 percent), Schmenner (up to 14 percent), and Holmes (7-9 per­
cent) cannot be ignored. A relatively small union influence on the wages 
of various categories of municipal employees is apparent from the work of 
Schmenner, Freund, and Ehrenberg and Goldstein, who attribute the union 
impact to be from 0 to 16 percent, depending on the occupational category 
and city size under consideration. The largest relative union wage influ­
ence among public employees is that found within the ranks of municipal 
firefighters, varying from 2 to 18 percent. According to Ashenfelter 
(1971: 202), this may be attributed to the fact that local firefighters 
are generally a well-organized, relatively homogeneous lot of closely-knit 
workers engaged in a craft-type occupation, all of which enables them to 
gain relatively more at the bargaining table than other municipal employees.
The reason that public employees appear to benefit less from union 
membership than workers in the private sector may lie in the nature of 
public employment itself. A 1971 study by Hammermesh tests the effects 
of union influence on the wages of blue-collar and clerical workers in 
manufacturing in 70 metropolitan areas over several three-year periods. 
Pooled, time-series regression results reveal a union wage effect of 
about five percent for clerical workers as opposed to 20 percent for 
blue-collar employees, suggesting to Hammermesh (1971: 170) "that 
white-collar workers have different work aims." In other words, since 
public work is princiaplly white-collar in nature, the union wage effect 
may be different from that evidenced in the private sector, where most 
union members are blue-collar employees. Whatever cause is attributed
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to the divergent findings with regard to the magnitude of union influence 
on public and private sector employees' wages, it does appear that a dis­
parity on the order of 10 to 15 percent exists in favor of private sector 
workers.
The lesser impact of unions in public employment does not mean
that the union effect is unimportant. On the contrary, as it has been
shown earlier in this chapter (pp. 49-50), public employers are not able 
to absorb increased labor costs as readily as private sector employers.
As a result, a 10 percent salary increase may affect a local fire depart­
ment as adversely as a 20 or 25 percent salary increase affects General 
Motors. These and related matters will be explored in the final chapter. 
At this point, a general model of public sector wage determination will 
be developed. In subsequent chapters, the model will be applied to wage 
determination for higher education faculty, state government employees, 
and municipal police service employees in order to specify the impact 
that public sector unions exercise on employee compensation.
The Determinants of Employee Compensation 
in the Public Sector: A Model
In an earlier section in this chapter, it was stated that neither
the underlying assumptions nor the empirical elements of private sector 
wage theory have a great deal of relevance when applied to public employ­
ment. The various approaches to public sector wage theory were reviewed,
including the traditional economic approach, the bargaining approach, the 
Wellington-Winter thesis, and efforts to identify Chose aspects of pri­
vate sector wage determination applicable to public wage determination.
As the primary interest in this study is the impact of unions on the wages 
and benefits of public employees, it is this latter field of investiga­
tion which is of most concern here.
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I’rora the discussion on the transferability of the major elements 
of private sector wane determination to the public spheres, it was tenta­
tively concluded that four factors are directly relevant: geographic
location, quality of the labor force, cost-of-living, and conditions in 
the wider economy. Other variables deemed to be potentially salient in 
public sector wage determination were comparative wage standards or 
opportunity wage, the fiscal capacity of the public employer (analogous 
to profit levels of the firm), population (a surrogate for the size of 
establishment), and various noneconomic factors such as legal environment, 
the degree of multilateral bargaining, and government structure. It must 
be understood, however, that the above variables all cannot be adopted 
in any specific model of public sector wage determination. Whereas almost 
all private sector firms operate within the same basic environment in 
terms of legal factors and economic conditions, the federal system of 
government in the United States dictates that separate levels of govern­
ment function in diverse legal and socioeconomic contexts. Of relevance 
here is what Horton, Lewin, and Kuhn (1976) refer to as a "diversity 
thesis" in public employment, which envisions a multiplicity of bargaining 
outcomes reflecting differences in governmental structure, politics, 
organization, and union influence. Public sector labor relations are 
quite divergent within each city and state and between municipal and state 
governments. These differences must be accounted for as much as possible 
in attempting to construct a model of public sector wage determination. 
Therefore, the model presented below will undergo modifications, sometimes 
rather substantial, when it is applied to diverse governmental and func­
tional areas of public employment.
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The overall model of public sector wage determination may be 
specified as follows:
Environment
1- --
-----if
Public
Employee
Unionization ---- y Compensation
i  Outcome
Political/Legal
Environment
Thus, certain factors within the socioeconomic and political/legal 
environments determine the amount of wages and benefits received by public 
employees. Ifhen unionization is present, it operates as an additional 
influence on compensation. It must be noted that the linkage indicated 
between the environmental factors and unionization is rot necessarily 
causal in nature. Although, conceptually, unionization does issue from 
the socioeconomic and political/legal environments, the major thrust of 
this study is not to investigate the causal forces of unionization. Rather, 
the purpose is to isolate the impact of unionization on public employee 
compensation outcome. Therefore, the emphasis is placed on those socio­
economic and political/legal factors potentially related to the 
determination of public employee salaries and benefits. In the presence 
of unionization, the environmental elements will be "controlled" for, 
or held constant, in order to arrive at the union influence on compensa­
tion outcome.
It should further be noted that reciprocal relationships and 
feedback among the basic components of the model will not be a major con­
cern in the analysis. Certainly, all of the elements found in the model
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are potentially interrelated. However, the association which is of primary 
importance to this study is that which possibly exists between unionization 
and compensation outcome. Other linkages are relevant only insofar as they 
assist in isolating the unionization/compensation relationship.
Specific variables included within the principal model components,
and their hypothesized relationships with the dependent variable follow.
The dependent variable, public employee compensation outcome, is composed
of two factors: employee wages and employee benefits. The inclusion
within the model of both aspects of overall compensation constitutes a
distinct departure from the overwhelming majority of the literature and
an important improvement over all previous empirical approaches in the
12
field of public employee wage determination.
I. Factors within the socioeconomic environment and their 
hypothesized relationships with the dependent variable 
include:
A. Nature of the labor force, as measured by such variables 
as worker age, sex, education, is expected to vary 
positively with public employee compensation. Older 
workers, those highly-educated, and male workers
would be expected, ceteris paribus, to earn more than 
younger, less-educated, and female workers.
B. Cost-of-living, as measured by, for example, per capita 
personal income, is expected to vary positively with 
wages and benefits.
C. Comparative wage standards/opportunity wage, is 
hypothesized to vary positively with employee compen­
sation.
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D. Ability-to-pay of state and local governments, as 
measured by per capita revenue data, is expected to 
vary positively with employee compensation. This 
variable, which represents the short-term fiscal re­
sources available to a public employer, is an income 
measure representing a combination of capacity and 
effort.
E. Population level and population density, are both 
hypothesized to have a positive relationship with the 
amount of wages and benefits of public employees.
IX. Factors within the political/legal environment of state
and local governments and their hypothesized relationships
with the dependent variable include:
A. Geographical location. It is expected that state and 
local government workers will receive higher compensa­
tion In particular areas of the country, specifically 
the Northeast and West.
B. The legal structure of collective bargaining as embodied 
in state legislation or executive and judicial decisions 
is expected to exert an influence on bargaining out­
come, with public employees in those states which 
mandate collective bargaining receiving relatively 
greater compensation than their counterparts in other 
states.
C. State or local government structure, in terms of 
mayor-council, council-manager, or commission forms 
of government for municipalities, is expected to
91
influence employee wages and benefits in the 
following manner: the more professionalized the struc­
ture, the lower the wage impact of public employee 
unions. Thus, it would be expected that council-manager 
cities, regardless of the presence of unions, would not 
pay their employees as well as mayor-council cities.
It is also hypothesized that cities with commission 
forms of government will pay their workers less than 
mayor-council cities, regardless of the presence of 
unions. In the case of state governments, it is 
expected that the more "capable" a state legislature, 
the less it will pay its workers when compared with 
"less capable" legislatures.
D. Union political power, as measured by the percentage 
of private sector employees in nonagricultural employ­
ment belonging to unions, is expected to vary positively 
with the amount of pay and benefits gained by public 
employees. It would seem that strong private sector 
unions in a city or state would result in (1) wider 
acceptance— and perhaps support— of public union 
demands, and (2) increased political pressure on 
elected officials to grant these demands. This ele­
ment may be considered to be a proxy for the union 
"threat effect.
III. Finally, it is anticipated that the union variable, the
existence or degree of unionization, will vary positively 
with employee compensation. It is expected that the
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socioeconomic and political/legal factors listed above 
will exert the dominant influence on public employee com­
pensation outcome, whether unions are present or not.
However, the unionization component is that element of the 
model with which the analysis is most concerned and toward 
which a great deal of the remainder of this work will be 
directed.
In Chapter Three, the broad model of public sector wage determina­
tion which has been outlined above will be applied to a specific occupational 
category: faculty at institutions of higher education.
NOTES
1. In fact, reliance on the sovereignty issue has been unrealistic since
the Lloyd-LaFoIlette Act of 1912, in which the federal government
granted its employees the right to join unions and petition the 
government with their grievances.
2. Although union positions regarding public employee strikes vary, work 
stoppages are acceptable to AFSCME, lAFF, and most other AFL-CIO 
affiliates. Those unions retaining a no-strike policy rarely enforce 
it at the local level (see Stieber, 1973: 171-192).
3. A monopsony is a buyer's monopoly. For example, the auto industry
is the only "buyer" of auto worker labor. It enjoys a monopsony over
its labor supply.
4. The Wellington and Winter thesis is rejected by Lewin (1973; 1976) who 
asserts that the public sector is not immune from the forces of the 
market. In support of his argument, he cites the layoffs, wage cuts, 
and public resistance to compensation increases for public workers 
that arose during the 1974-1975 recession, and the new emphasis in 
some large American cities on productivity and developing alternatives 
to union labor. Lewin further observes that some governors and large 
city mayors have recently adopted policies designed to reduce or 
impede the political access of public employees. In some cases, he 
concludes, the strike may be a less costly alternative than other 
forms of impasse resolution.
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5. Political activities of federal employees are restrained by the 1939 
Hatch Act, which was extended by Congress in 1940 to state and local 
government employees who are paid with federal funds. The original 
Hatch Act and similar "little Hatch Acts" enacted by individual states 
have had little effect on the political activities of public employees 
(see Nigro, 1969: 55). Also, designated lobbyists are subject to 
registration and some regulation in 38 states (see UCLA Law Review, 
1972, Appendix A, pp. 961-62, for a table summarizing state lobbying 
regulations as of 1972). These regulatory schemes also are ineffective 
as (1) many public employees are not covered; (2) most of the regu­
lations were originally intended to protect public employees from 
political coercion— not limit their political power; (3) they prohibit 
only individual political activities— not union actions; and (4) the 
existing regulations are not strictly enforced. Thus, most "little 
Hatch Acts" and other regulations are ineffective in protecting the 
public collective bargaining process from political pressures (UCLA 
Law Review, 1972: 984-87).
6. For example, the judiciary can issue an injunction against a sanita­
tions workers' strike.
7. Reder (1975) disagrees with the validity of this proposition in "The 
Theory of Employment and Wages in the Public Sector," and advances 
the conventional economic assumption that all decision-makers act
as "utility maximizers." Politicians, for example, would consider 
vote tradeoffs resulting from various political actions; restrictions 
on public employee political activity would be viewed as "taxes" on 
the use of the public workers' time (pp. 3-15). In effect, Reder 
conceptually stretches public sector labor relations to fit a 
Procrustean bed of economic theory.
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8. Gerwin refers to a "controlling" occupation, meaning one which other 
employee groups tend to compare themselves with for salary purposes 
(e.g., protective services and teachers). He remarks that this con­
cept is analogous to Dunlop’s "key" occupation in private sector 
employment.
9. Monopsony conditions may also exist in the case of hospital nurses. 
Devine (1970) says this frequently is true for nurses in public employ­
ment, with the local hospital association exercising monopsony power.
10. Kochan and Wheeler's findings regarding the statistically significant 
effects of the comprehensiveness of a state's collective bargaining 
law on bargaining outcomes are confirmed by Gerhart (1976: 342-43).
11. About one-third of all government employees work in public education; 
a large majority of these workers are classroom teachers (Moskow, 
Loewenberg, and Koziara, 1970: 129). Their sheer numbers, along with 
the aggressive political and organizing activities of teachers, 
insure that these employees are frequently in the public eye. The 
intense rivalry between the two largest teacher organizations— the 
NEA and AFT— also fosters a great deal of media attention. The 
teacher union movement has had a substantial influence on the power 
structure of public education at both the state and local levels and 
has also exerted considerable pressure on the power structure of 
many state and local governments. Such factors perhaps have con­
tributed to the scholarly interest in the impact of teachers' unions 
on compensation. Examples of some of the general literature on 
teachers and collective bargaining include: C.W. Cheng (1976);
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M.H. Moskow (1966); E.B. Shils and C.T. Whittier (1968); C.R. Perry 
and W.A. Wildman (1970); S.M. Elam, et al. (1967); and T.M. Stinnet, 
et al. (1966).
12. One of the very few studies to consider nonwage benefits is that 
conducted by Lurie (1961) on the union impact on the wages and benefits 
of transit workers. He found that union employees enjoyed relatively 
more vacation time, higher overtime pay, and other fringe benefit 
advantages over their nonunion counterparts.
13. A fifth socioeconomic variable, conditions in the wider economy, would 
be included in a study over time. However, as the data in this study 
are limited to specific points in time, it is assumed that such fac­
tors as the rate of inflation are constant.
14. The nature of the multilateral bargaining relationship is not included 
in the model because of the lack of a satisfactory proxy for which data 
are available. Past studies have been forced to rely on attitudinal 
survey questionnaires for this type of information; such is beyond
the framework of this study.
CHAPTER THREE 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND FACULTY COMPENSATION^
During the "golden academic age" of the 1960's, the number of 
faculty at institutions of higher education in the United States doubled, 
enrollment increased b.y 125 percent, and the average faculty salary rose 
by about 75 percent (see Garbarino, 1975: 2-3). New colleges and univer­
sities were constructed to meet the rising demand for higher education, 
and new programs were created to take advantage of diverse areas of 
specilization sought by the growing student population. Then, by the 
1969-1970 academic year, the bullish economic market in academia suddenly 
was over. A new period of austerity set in, as institutions were forced 
to retrench in order to cope with declining enrollments and decreased 
federal and state government financial support. The golden academic age 
of the 1960's had suffered, for many, an untimely demise.
Meanwhile, important structural and functional changes had 
occurred in higher education concomitant with the economic peak and valley. 
Substantial alterations had been made with regard to the institutional 
nature of colleges and universities— the institutions had, in general, 
become larger and more bureaucratic. By 1974, 70 percent of all faculty 
in public institutions found themselves in multi-campus units (Garbarino, 
1975: 7-9). Functional relationships had also undergone change, as power 
shifted from the faculty to the administration.
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These changes in institutional structure and function were 
perceived adversely by many faculty. Along with lessened faculty 
input to the institutional decision-making process came feelings of de­
personalization and a loss of a sense of collegiality among faculty and 
administration (see Ladd and Lipset, 1973: 4); an adversary relationship 
began to develop. Compounding these subjective feelings were some 
serious blows to the pocketbook, as the rate of salary and benefit in­
creases was reduced, work loads were heightened, and faculty and staff 
reductions became widespread. Meanwhile, demands for faculty accounta­
bility were heard from state legislatures, alumni, and students. Higher 
education and its spokesmen on campus no longer were the darlings of 
American society.
Because of such changes as those mentioned above, combined
2
with a more favorable legal and social climate in the late 1960's. 
higher education faculties in the United States began to overcome their 
traditional aversion to collectivization. Professional autonomy and 
status were relegated to seats at the back of the classroom as the
3
drive for faculty unionization commenced in many institutions.
Unions first entered higher education in 1963, when faculty 
of The Milwaukee Technical Institute, a two-year college, began formal 
collective bargaining through a local faculty association. The 
first four-year Institution to unionize was the Merchant Marine 
Academy in 1966. Today, faculties in over 450 institutions of 
higher education have voted in formal bargaining agents— over 17 
percent of such institutions in the United States. In all, more than 
117,000 faculty were represented by unions at the end of 1976
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(Garbarino and Lawler, 1977: 106). Table 6 provides a look at the 
growth of faculty unionism from 1966 through 1976.
From the table, one may observe the tremendous increase in 
faculty unionism, particularly after 1967. The substantial spurts in 
the number of represented faculty in 1969 and 1971 are attributable in 
large part to the collectivization of the City University of New York 
(CUNY) and State University of New York (SUNY) systems, respectively.
The underlying reasons for the slowdown in organizing during 1973 
and 1974 remain unclear, but it would appear that this was only a 
temporary phenomenon.
About 58 percent of the union institutions are two-year 
community colleges, but about two-thirds of all unionized faculty members 
are employed in four-year institutions. Almost 90 percent of the 
unionized faculty are situated in public institutions of higher educa­
tion (Garbarino, 1974: 48). Three-fourths of all unionized faculty 
members are located within New York, Rhode Island, Hawaii, and 
Michigan.^ It would seem, therefore, that faculty collective bargaining 
is largely a phenomenon of public, four-year colleges and universities 
in the Northeastern section of the United States. However, faculty 
support of unionism appears to be widespread: a Carnegie Commission
Survey in 1969 showed 59 percent of all faculty favored unionism, 
and a followup American Council of Education study during 1972-1973 
revealed that the figure had then reached a support level of 66 percent 
(see Ladd and Lipset, 1973).
Despite broad faculty support for unionization throughout the 
United States, most of the union gains have been restricted to those
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TABLE 6. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
IN U.S. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 1966-1976
Year
Total No. 
Institutions
Total No. 
Faculty
Four Year 
Institutions
Four Year 
Faculty
1966 23 5,200 1 200
1967 37 7,000 2 300
1968 70 14,300 10 3,300
1969 138 36,100 26 16,100
1970 177 47,300 40 23,400
1971 245 72,400 84 45,400
1972 285 84,300 102 54,600
1973 310 87,700 121 57,400
1974 331 92,300 132 60,600
1975 398 102,300 162 67,300
1976 450 117,000 189 78,970
Source : Garbarino, 1975: 56; Garbarino and Lawler, 1977: 106.
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States (especially the four mentioned above) with permissive public 
employee collective bargaining legislation. Garbarino (1975: 66) 
demonstrates the strong relationship between the type of state public 
employee bargaining law and the degree of faculty unionism, asserting 
that, "It is impossible to escape the conclusion that, at least for pub­
lic institutions, the type of applicable collective bargaining legislation 
in the various states so dominates the situation that it is difficult to 
find other variables that have a significant independent effect."
It is quite another matter, however, to determine why public 
institutions have dominated the ranks of unionized faculties, while 98 
percent of the private colleges and universities remain unorganized. 
Although the labor relations of public institutions are governed by state 
laws, private colleges and universities have been vested with formal 
collective bargaining rights since 1970, the year in which the National 
Labor Relations Board extended its jurisdiction to include them under 
the National Labor Relations Act (Cornell University 183 NLRB 41, 1970 
ccit NLRB Para. 22,006).^ Following the 1970 NLRB decision, many pre­
dicted that faculty collective bargaining would spread rapidly 
throughout the private colleges and universities (for example, see 
Schramm, 1972). This did not occur, and no truly satisfactory explana­
tions have been forthcoming for the reluctance of private sector higher 
education faculties to organize.^
A related topic is the issue of institutional quality and the 
propensity for unionization. Aussieker and Garbarino (1973) tentatively 
conclude that faculty unionization has been concentrated in relatively 
low-quality institutions of higher education. This finding has
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generated a "great debate" among various scholars. Gold (1974) 
challenges the Aussieker and Garbarino conclusion, showing that while 
the number of organized faculties is concentrated among lower quality 
schools, there are also more institutions which fall into the lower 
quality category. When the proportion of institutions organized within 
each quality rating is examined. Gold finds no large differences based on 
the measure of quality and concludes that "the data do not support the 
hypothesis that the incidence of faculty unionism is greater the lower 
the quality level of institutions" (Gold, 1974: 326). In a reply to Gold, 
Aussieker and Garbarino (1974) attribute her divergent findings to measure­
ment differences. Updating his earlier data, Garbarino (1975: 75) again 
asserts that "there appears to be a clear-cut tendency for unionization 
to be concentrated in the institutions that are in the lower tiers of 
the quality distribution." He notes that only four top-quality institu­
tions have organized faculties: Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute and three
colleges within the CUNY system. Some support for Garbarino's position 
is found in the 1969 Carnegie Survey and the 1971 Stanford Survey, both 
of which indicate that faculty in the lower tier of academe favor collec­
tive bargaining more frequently than their counterparts in higher quality 
institutions (see Ladd and Lipset, 1973). Resolution of the 
institutional quality/unionization relationship awaits the availability 
of better data.
Prior to turning to the major thrust of this chapter— the analysis 
of the impact of collective bargaining on faculty salary and benefits —  
a brief description of the principal union actors in this sphere of 
labor relations will be offered.
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The Faculty Unions 
Although state civil service organizations and faculty governing 
bodies have participated in some elections as candidates for faculty bar­
gaining agents, the large proportion of faculty who engage in collective 
bargaining are represented by one of three organizations: the National
Education Association (NEA), the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), or 
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). The NEA is the 
oldest of the three organizations, having been founded in 1857. It served 
primarily as a professional organization for public school teachers until 
the 1960's, when it began to expand its membership base and become active 
politically as a bargaining agent. Today, the strength of the NEA in 
higher education lies at the community college level. By the early 1970's, 
the NEA had established itself as the largest faculty union in terms of 
the number of faculty represented in collective bargaining agreements.
Table 7 presents total faculty organization membership figures.
Like the NEA, the AFT has served primarily as a teacher's organi­
zation. However, the AFT was founded in 1916 as a union— not a professional
society. From the beginning it has been affiliated with the national 
labor movement. Although the AFT grew slowly until 1960, from that year
until 1974 its membership increased from 56,000 to 400,000, mostly public
school teachers. The AFT was the pioneer of faculty unionism, and it has 
always acted as a trade union, advocating work stoppages, formal contracts, 
and an adversary relationship with college administration.
Both the NEA and AFT have concentrated their organizing efforts 
at two-year colleges and lower tier, four-year institutions. During recent 
years there has been a great deal of discussion concerning a forthcoming 
merger between the two organizations— a merger which if, consummated,
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TABLE 7. MEMBERSHIP OF THE THREE LARGEST 
FACULTY UNIONS, 1976, ALL INSTITUTIONS
Union
Number of 
Local Chapters Membership*
Number of Local 
Chapters With 
Bargaining Rights
AFT 275 47,200 94
NEA 355 54,300 160
AAUP 1,365 83,300 38
^Membership figures represent all individuals belonging to an 
organization. Totals are not available for the number of members 
in chapters with bargaining rights.
Sources: GERR (March 9, 1976); J.W. Garbarino and J. Lawler, "Faculty
Union Activity in Higher Education— 1976," Industrial Relations 
16 (February): 105-06.
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would create the largest union in the United States.
There has also been a proposal to create a formal alliance between the 
NEA and a third faculty organization— the AAUP. So far, all national 
merger efforts have come to naught^ (see Academe, 1977; Sernas, 1977).
The AAUP evolved out of the ferment in higher education during 
the late 1800's and early 1900's as a professional association devoted 
to university professors (Strauss, 1967). Its major concerns, until 
quite recently, were with such professional issues as academic freedom, 
tenure, and due process. Until 1971, it successfully resisted trade 
union activities and collective bargaining, but growing pressures from 
the AFT and NEA, along with declining membership roles, have forced 
the AAUP into a more active political role. Today, its greatest 
success has been in organizing faculties in four-year institutions.
Other faculty are represented in bargaining sessions through 
independent bargaining agents which are not affiliated with any parent 
organization. As of 1974, nine, four-year faculties had selected 
independent agents.
bocal chapters of the NEA, AFT, and AAUP are quite décentrai i zed , 
as the national organizations exercise little formal control over their 
affiliates (Garbarino, 1975: 17). According to Kemerecand Baldridge 
(1975: 7), all of these organizations, including independent bargaining 
agents, act similarly at the bargaining table. As Ladd and Lipset 
(1973: 106) have stated, "it must be stressed that the policy differ­
ences separating the affiliates of the three national groups ... are 
striking by their absence." Therefore, the analysis which follows 
will not be concerned with the specific bargaining agent which serves 
as faculty representative.
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The Impact of Collective Bargaining 
on Faculty Compensation
The question to be addressed at this juncture is what effect 
collective bargaining has had on the amount of salary and benefits 
received by faculty members. Because of the recency of the phenomenon of 
collective bargaining in higher education, very few attempts have been 
made to investigate its consequences for colleges and universities in 
general or for faculty members employed at unionized institutions.
Indeed, much of the discussion in this area has been rather subjective 
and speculative in nature. For example, Bucklew (1971) addresses the 
potential fiscal implications of collective bargaining for institutions 
of higher education, while Angell (1973) attempts to draw general 
implications from an analysis of 23 community colleges in New York State. 
More comprehensive treatments of various impacts of faculty bargaining 
are offered by Garbarino (1975) and Kemererand Baldridge (1975). 
Garbarino (1975: 256, 121) states that one of the most important changes 
faculty unions have caused is the establishment of effective grievance 
procedures, and that in the future, "the most positive aspects of 
faculty unionism will be (1) to expand professional processes to those 
institutions where faculty essentially have been disenfranchised for 
years, and (2) to extend rights beyond the tenured faculty."
Kemerer and Baldridge concentrate their efforts on the impact 
of collective bargaining on the governance of the university. Based 
on extensive mail surveys of university presidents and heads of bar­
gaining units, and seven case studies of unionized institutions, the 
authors conclude that faculty unions have both positive and negative 
effects on personnel policies. For example, the unions help 
raise professional standards in some institutions but
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adversely affect the peer evaluation process in others, 
replacing it with an emphasis on job security (Kemerer and Baldridge, 
1975: 7-8). Kemerer and Baldridge (1975; 194) dwell at some length on 
the impact of bargaining on the power and authority structures in the 
academic setting, noting that while university and college presidents 
believe they have lost power to unionized faculties, this view is not 
substantiated by the case studies, which indicate that bargaining has 
encouraged a shift in power in favor of upper-level administrators.
The authors also assert that faculty unionism has reduced student 
influence through bypassing them as third parties in the bargaining pro­
cess (Kemerer and Baldridge, 1975: 201-206). In the future, Kemerer 
and Baldridge (1975: 10-11) foresee (1) a realignment of the major power 
blocs in the academic environment from senior professors to their more 
junior colleagues, (2) greater procedural protection and job security 
for faculty, and (3) a stronger faculty voice in institutional 
decision-making. The authors downplay the potential economic impact of 
faculty unionism, stating that "aside from the exception of a few 
community college faculty and nonteaching professional groups, dramaiic 
increases in economic benefits are not the main fruits of collective 
bargaining; rather, for most academicians, bargaining is the best means 
of securing job security" (Kemerer and Baldridge, 1975: 208).
The evidence would seem to contradict Kemerer and Baldridge, as 
some faculty (at both two and four-year schools) have reaped substan­
tial compensation increases as a result of collective bargaining. The 
most extreme example is that of the 1969 contract negotiated by the 
faculty at CUNY, which provided for annual increases reaching a peak 
of $31,375 for a full professor in 1971-72. Another illustration is
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the 1970 contract at St. John's University, which contained a 21 
percent across-the-board salary increase over two years for full-time 
faculty, along with sizable increases in fringe benefits. These are 
not isolated cases, for the essence of any union is, in large part, 
to advance and protect the economic interests of its members. As two 
observers have noted, "To a high degree (faculty) unions have contri­
buted substantially to the economic welfare of their constituencies ... 
economic gains more than any others fertilize unions and give them the 
strength with their constituency that is necessary for their organiza­
tional survival." (Fisk and Duryea, 1973: 213-14).
Yet, few empirical analyses have been conducted for the purpose 
of quantifying the relative amount of economic benefits faculty unions 
achieve for their members. With a few exceptions, those studies which 
are found in the literature are clearly inadequate. Bain (1976), for 
instance, attempts to isolate the importance of various economic and 
political variables in determining the wage levels of professors at 
CUNY over a period of years. While he finds faculty salaries did rise 
faster after a union contract was negotiated through the AFT/NEA bar­
gaining agent, Bain does not account for many possible nonunion influences 
on the increased salaries, and he chooses to ignore the salience of 
fringe benefits. In addition, it would take a long stretch of the 
imagination to generalize from conditions prevailing at CUNY to the rest 
of the American academic scene. Garbarino (1975: 203-08) is guilty of 
a similar individualistic fallacy in matching eight pairs of community 
colleges to determine compensation differences from 1965 to 1973.
With his very limited sample, Garbarino finds no significant union/nonunion 
salary differentials. This illustrates, he says, "the importance of
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broader economic, political, or public employee phenomena in salaries 
and compensation and the insidious nature of union and nonunion compari­
sons using the data available at present." Based on his "unsystematic 
mix of interviews, case studies, contract analysis, and intuition," 
Garbarino (1975: 170-71) advances two propositions: (1) faculty
salaries in public institutions have, in general, moved in line with 
overall state civil service salaries; and (2) while faculty unions ini­
tially may win larger salary increases than those granted to state civil 
service employees, these increases are temporary, soon declining to the 
equivalent of the civil service rate. In addition to the studies by 
Bain and Garbarino, others (Fisk and Duryea, 1973; Carr, 1973; Mortimer 
and Lozier, 1973) also have employed what is basically a case study 
approach in examining compensation packages resulting from contracts 
at unionized institutions.
Few studies have progressed beyond the case study level in 
focusing on how much collective bargaining affects the wages and bene­
fits of faculty members. In one of the rare efforts, Bimbaum (1974) 
matches 88 institutions operating under a collective bargaining contract 
with 88 comparable nonunion campuses in order to determine average 
faculty compensation differences between 1968 and 1972. Institutions 
are matched in accordance with control (public, independent, or 
church-related), level of program offerings, AAUP-determined compensa­
tion level, and, to a lesser extent, size and geographic location. The 
study compares the average compensation increase for the two groups 
over a four-year period, and finds that the annual compensation received 
by unionized academicians exceeded by $777 that realized by 
their nonunionized counterparts. The largest gains were made by
no
unionized faculties at public four-year colleges ($1,157) and public 
M.A. degree-granting universities ($883). These differences were 
determined by Bimbaum to be statistically significant at the .01 level.
In a followup study, Birnbaum (1976) updates his data through 1975 for 
70 of the original matched pairs. He finds "that while increases 
favoring unionized faculty continue in public four-year colleges and 
independent institutions, they may have stabilized at public universities 
and been reversed at public two-year institutions" (Birnbaum, 1976: 116).
For the entire sample, the compensation advantage of unionized institu­
tions continued to grow at a statistically significant level. 
Taken together, institutions with collective bargaining paid their faculties 
an average compensation of $19,803 in 1974-75, compared to $18,659 at 
nonunion institutions— a difference of $1,144. (The overall difference 
for 1972-73 was recalculated at $970 for the 70 matched pairs, replacing 
the earlier figure of $777). However, the rate of growth in compensa­
tion at the union and nonunion schools had stabilized somewhat during the 
1972-75 period. This leads Birnbaum to conclude that while increases 
favoring union institutions continue, they appear to be moderating 
somewhat after an initial, union-inspired jump in compensation.
Although Birnbaum's two studies constitute useful contributions 
to the literature by providing systematic treatments of compensation 
differences between union and nonunion institutions, some methodological 
problems exist- The primary difficulty lies in his failure to account 
for many factors other than unions which may affect changes in compen­
sation levels. By neglecting such factors, Birnbaum implicitly 
assumes (1) that all other influences on compensation affect union and
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nonunion institutions in the same manner, and (2) that all of the 
schools evidenced similar patterns of compensation growth before the 
base period.
Contrary to the findings of Bimbaum, Brown and Stone (1976) 
determine that compensation increases in union institutions did not 
differ significantly from those found in nonunion schools from 1970 to 
1976. Using a different statistical technique. Brown and Stone compare 
the six-year rate of compensation growth in 37 four-year union institutions 
with the annual national increase for all four-year campuses during the 
same time period. Their data indicate that net annual growth rates in 
compensation at unionized institutions "were not unusually high under 
collective bargaining .... In general, there appears to be no signifi­
cant impact on salary, compensation and promotions associated with the 
adoption of collective bargaining by college and university faculty"
(Brown and Stone, 1976: 14). While in some ways Brown and Stone's 
effort is an improvement over the Birnbaum studies (for instance, their 
data are broken down by Assistant, Associate, and Full Professor rankings), 
it, too, suffers from some methodological problems. Two things partic­
ularly stand out: (1) the neglect of nonunion influences on compensation 
rates and the accompanying assumption that these influences operate 
randomly on both union and nonunion institutions, and (2) the inclusion 
of data from union schools in the aggregate data for all four-year 
campuses. Other criticisms include Brown and Stone's use of the rather 
atypical data from the CUNY system^ and the restriction of their sample 
to institutions situated in the Northeastern and Midwestern sections of 
the United States.
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In order to overcome the limitations of the Birnbaum and Brown 
and Stone studies, it is necessary to consider those forces other than 
unionization which are potentially associated with faculty compensation 
levels. Although Birnbaum did attempt to hold constant 
certain institutional factors through his matching procedures, only 
one existing study has employed a cross-sectional multivariate analysis 
to account for variance among faculty compensation levels in institutions 
of higher education. In a 1973 article, Cohn uses 13 explanatory 
variables in a regression analysis to account for 70 percent of the 
variance among faculty compensation levels for 204 institutions of higher 
education. Public institutions evidence slightly higher compensation 
than private and church-related schools. Quality of an institution 
(measured by such variables as National Merit scholars, percent pursuing 
studies following graduation, and student/faculty ratio) is also shown 
to be quite important. Finally, state per capita income, a measure of 
the financial well-being of an institution’s environment, is positively 
related to compensation levels. Cohn did not include a unionization 
variable in his analysis. However, it is useful to incorporate some 
of his findings in the model of faculty compensation to follow.
The Determinants of Faculty 
Compensation: A Model
As previously noted, in order to achieve the major goal of this 
analysis— the determination of the impact of collective bargaining on 
the wages and benefits of public employees— it is necessary to account 
for those forces other than unionization which are associated with 
compensation levels. Therefore, in this section a model of faculty 
compensation will be specified. Later, the model will be tested in a 
multivariate analysis in order to isolate the impact of unionization.
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Following the general model of public employee compensation 
developed at the end of the previous chapter, these elements would seem 
to be of importance in determining the union influence on faculty salary 
and benefits:
I. Socioeconomic Environment
A. Nature of the professorial labor force.
B. Cost-of-living in the geographical area in which the 
institutions are located.
C. Comparative wage standards at nearby colleges or 
universities, or the wages which faculty members could 
obtain for similar employment elsewhere.
D. Financial situation of the institutions.
E. Institutional size.
II. Political/Legal Environment
A. Geographical location of the college or university.
B. Legal structure pertaining to collective bargaining 
within the state.
C. State government legislative capability or profession­
alism.
D. Union political power within the state.
III. Unionization
A. Whether or not the college or university faculty 
engages in formal collective bargaining with the 
administration.
The analysis to follow diverges somewhat from the general dis­
cussion, as data from both the public and private sectors are included.
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Owing to the unique nature of higher education and the role of faculty 
collective bargaining in American colleges and universities, it seems 
desirable to examine both public and private institutions. At a later 
point in the analysis, the institutions will be separated according to 
public or private control in order to obtain some insights into the different 
forces operating on faculty compensation within the two spheres. In a 
sense, by dealing with similar phenomena in both the public and private 
spheres, this chapter may be thought of as a bridge between the two sectors. 
Later, the discussion will focus solely on public employee unionism.
The Data
The Sample. The study reported herein generally follows the 
matching procedure initially developed by Birnbaum (1974) except that 
the present analysis is concerned only with four-year institutions and 
the time period is more current. Of the 74 four-year colleges, univer­
sities, and state-wide systems listed by Finkin, Goldstein, and Osborne 
(1975: i, ii) as having collectively represented faculty in 1974, matches 
were found for 46 of them based on the criteria of AAUP category and 
compensation scale, control (public or private), geographical proximity
9
or cultural similarity, and institutional size. Names of matched institu­
tions are found in the Appendix at the end of this chapter. Certain 
collectively-organized faculties were excluded either because of inade­
quate data or because of unique characteristics which might have biased 
the findings. For example, the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy was not 
included in the sample because it is a federal institution, and the entire 
City University of New York system was excluded due to its unusually high 
salary levels and location within the rather atypical confines of New 
York City.
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The total sample of 46 pairs is composed of 11 pairs of Category 
I institutions, defined by the AAUP as those offering at least 15 doctor­
ates in at least three nonrelated disciplines over the past three years;
27 pairs of Category IIA schools, which award degrees above the bacca­
laureate level, but are not included in Category I; and eight pairs of 
Category TIB institutions, which offer only the baccalaureate degree or 
an equivalent (AAUP Bulletin, 1975: 125). The AAUP compensation scale 
on which the matches were made was based on how well past faculty compen­
sation increases compare with the national growth in annual per capita 
personal income (AAUP Bulletin, 1970: 185). All of the matches are con­
gruent in terms of public or private control of the institutions. Where 
possible, those unionized schools that have a religious affiliation are 
matched with their counterparts. In all, there are 27 pairs of public 
schools and 19 pairs of private institutions.
With respect to geography, an effort was made to match union and 
nonunion institutions within the same state. Where this was not feasible, 
matches were found in states which closely resemble those states with 
the collectivized faculties in question by employing the cultural 
similarity classification of American states developed by Luttbeg 
(1971).  ^^ In order to control further for geographical location and at 
least partially control for cost-of-living, the institutions were also 
paired by the level of urbanization of the area in which they are 
located. Finally, an attempt was made to control for institutional size 
(analogous to size of establishment in private sector wage theory) by 
matching schools that had similar fall enrollments for the base year, 
1969-70.
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Thus, through the matching procedure it is possible to hold 
constant public or private institutional control, state geographical 
location, urban or rural location, and institutional size. In effect, 
the matching procedure at least partially accounts for the following 
elements in the model of faculty compensation: (1) cost-of-living
differences associated with population levels where the colleges and 
universities are located; (2) size of the institution; (3) state legal 
structure; (4) state government legislative capability/professionalism.
The remaining elements will be treated below in a discussion of the 
independent variables used in the multivariate analysis.
Special consideration was necessary for the State University of 
New York system and for the four states in which all state colleges bar­
gain as a single unit. Data for SUNY were aggregated at two levels: 
schools of Arts and Sciences (10 institutions) and Category I institutions 
(Albany, Binghamton, Buffalo, and Stony Brook campuses). Mean values 
were calculated for the variables characterizing these institutions at 
the two levels. Means for SUNY Arts and Sciences and Category I institu­
tions were matched with those calculated for the California State Colleges 
system and the University of California system, respectively. As for 
the states in which state college faculties bargain as a single unit—  
Nebraska, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Vermont— one institution was 
selected as representative of each state system and matched with a 
single noncollectivized counterpart.
The Dependent Variables. Three dependent variables are the 
subject of this analysis: average faculty compensation for 1969-70,
average compensation for 1974-75, and percentage increase in average
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faculty compensation, 1969-70 to 1974-75. The compensation data
account for annual faculty salaries and the dollar value of annual fringe
benefits. The academic year 1969-70 was selected as the base period for
two reasons. First, it was desirable to assess the impact of faculty
unionization over a five-year period, and the most recent AAUP data on
faculty compensation are for 1974-75. Second, since very few faculties
12
were unionized in 1969-70 (only four in the sample) , data collected from
that academic year were contrasted with data from the 1974-75 academic
year in order to examine the "before and after effect" of collectivization
on faculty compensation. All compensation data were collected from AAUP
Bulletins (June, 1970; August, 1975). One other point should be mentioned
with regard to the data for average faculty compensation. The data were
not divided by faculty rank. While recognizing that promotions certainly
influence average compensation levels, it is believed that this influence,
13
as far as the nature of the sample is concerned, is random.
The Independent Variables. Seven independent variables were 
selected on the basis of the model. Union and nonunion faculties were 
dichotomized through a dummy variable, indicating whether or not the 
faculty had been certified for collective bargaining through an elected 
agent. Institutional control (public/private) was also coded as a 
dummy variable, primarily for use as a statistical control. Nature 
of the faculty labor force was measured by the percentage of faculty 
members holding the doctorate degree or Its equivalent (Fumiss, 1973).,
In order to determine if faculty collectivization is a function of the 
labor environment within the state in which the institution is located, 
and to measure a possible threat effect, the percentage of state labor 
union membership in nonagricultural employment was included as a variable.
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Following Cohn (1973), state per capita personal income was 
added to the analysis to reflect the wealth of the institution's immediate 
environment and as a statistical means for dealing with cost-of-living.
Both percent labor union membership and per capita personal income were 
obtained from the 1972 Statistical Abstract. Institutional quality was 
operationalized by ratings provided in The Gourman Report (Gourman, 1967). 
(The interval level scores assigned by Gourman to higher education insti­
tutions throughout the United States take into consideration a great 
many variables thought to be surrogate measures of quality). The final 
independent variable used in this study was percentage average faculty 
compensation increase, 1964-69, obtained from AAUP sources (AAUP Bulletin, 
1965 and 1970). This variable was employed because of the "boom and bust" 
syndrome often observed with regard to faculty salaries, and because 
recent salary increases may be only an incremental continuation of an up­
ward trend that began much earlier. For example, it is possible that those 
institutions that granted large percentage increases to faculty in the 
early and mid-sixties might have been forced to slow down the rate of 
increase during the period observed in this study.
The inclusion of a measure representing comparative standards or 
opportunity wage for faculty did not seem appropriate to the analysis.
The matching of geographically proximate colleges and universities might 
account for this variable to some extent, but rather severe problems 
are involved in ascertaining a valid opportunity wage for 
college professors.
Originally, an eighth independent variable was utilized in the 
analysis— total institutional revenue per student— in order to account 
for the ability-to-pay of the individual schools. However, the
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revenue variable was found to be associated closely with the measure of 
institutional quality (r = .66) and subsequently was dropped from the study.
In sum, it was expected that all but two of the independent variables 
would vary positively with faculty compensation. Thus, upper-tier public 
institutions containing unionized, terminally-educated faculties, and 
located in highly unionized states with large per capita personal incomes, 
would award their faculties with greater salary and benefits than other 
schools. The two remaining independent measures— institutional control and 
1964-1969 average compensation increase— were used primarily as statistical 
controls, with the expectation that public control and high previous com­
pensation increases would be positively associated with faculty compensation.
Findings
Before examining the results of the multivariate analysis, it might 
be instructive to make some basic comparisons between the two groups of 
institutions— union and n o n u n i o n . T a b l e  8 reveals that in 1969-1970, 
schools which did not subsequently undergo collective bargaining were 
actually paying faculty about $200 more on the average than those who 
later unionized. By 1974-75, however, this had changed considerably.
Onion institutions surpassed their noncollectivized counterparts by an 
average of $625. This shows that organized faculties over the period of 
five years actually gained over $800 more than the unorganized group. 
Unionized faculties achieved a higher average increase in compensation be­
tween the two periods by seven percent (43 percent increase compared to 36 
percent). It might also be noted that of the 46 matched pairs, the union 
faculties received the larger percentage increase in 32 instances.
When the two groups are compared in light of the size or purpose
120
TABLE 8. AVERAGE COMPENSATION FOR UNION AND 
NONUNION INSTITUTIONS, 1969-70 AND 1974-75
Status, 1974-75
Average Compensation
1969-70 1974-75
Differ­
ence
%
Increase
Union (N = 46) $12,941 $18,503 $5,562 43.0
Nonunion (N = 46) $13,142 $17,878 $4,736 36.0
Difference $ - 201 $ 625 $ 826 7.0
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of the institution (the AAUP Categories I and II), the data in Table 9 
suggest that the real gains in compensation among collectivized campuses 
have come among faculties at the less comprehensive institutions as 
opposed to the major universities. Both types of institutions, however, 
reflect differentials in favor of those places that have embraced collec­
tive bargaining. The net difference over five years is almost $1,000 
for smaller campuses compared with a $328 difference for major schools. 
Among Category II schools the increase for collectivized faculties is 
almost 9 percent greater than for their nonunion counterparts; for major 
institutions the differential in favor of the organized campus is only 
2.4 percent.
When un ion/nonun ion institutions are divided by the nature of 
control, public or private, important distinctions are again noted (see 
Table 10). In this case, private school faculties that went union gain 
appreciably more (a net difference of $1,320) in contrast with their 
public school colleagues (net difference of $547). This means, of 
course, that there is a wider five-year percentage differential between 
public and private schools than between institutions categorized by 
basic purpose.
To summarize this preliminary descriptive analysis it seems safe 
to say that the unionized professoriate did achieve larger monetary 
gains over the past five years than their nonunionized counterparts. 
These gains are particularly notable for faculties at less comprehensive 
schools and for those who are at private institutions. When schools are 
further divided by institutional purpose and means of control, the 
following net differences between union and nonunion faculties in 
average compensation are found for the five-year period:
TABLE 9. AVERAGE COMPENSATION FOR UNION AND NONUNION INSTITUTIONS,
1969-70 AND 1974-75, BY AAUP CATEGORY
Average Compensation
1969-70 1974-75-
Union/
Nonunion
X Increase in Average 
Compensation, 1969-70 
To 1974-75
AAUP 
Category * N Union
Non- Dlffer-
Union
Dlffer- Net
Difference
Non-
Union union
Differ­
ence
X 22 $14,853 $14,924 $ -71 $20,773 $20,516 $257 $328 39.9 37.5 2.4
II (A,B) 70 12,340 12,582 -242 17,789 17,049 740 982 44.2 35.5 8.7
*CaCegory I includes institutions that conferred an annual average of fifteen or more carried doctorates in the most 
recent three years in a minimum of three nonrelated disciplines. Category XI Includes institutions awarding degrees 
above the baccalaureate but not included in Cateogry I and also those that award only the baccalaureate or equivalent 
degree.
TABLE 10. AVERAGE COMPENSATION FOR UNION AMD NONUNION INSTITUTIONS»
1969-70 AND 1974-75, BY CONTROL (PUBLIC OR PRIVATE)
Average Compensation
1969-70 1974-75
Union/
Nonunion
% Increase in Average 
Compensation, 1969-70 
To 1974-75
Control N Union
Non- Differ­
ence Union
Non- Dlffer- Net
Difference Union
Non­
union
Dlffer-
Public 54 513,363 513,476 5-113 518,768 518,334 5434 5547 40.4 36.0 4.4
Private 38 12,467 12^546 -79 18,266 17,025 1241 1320 46.5 35.7 10.8
N3
CO
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Private Category I (N = 6) $2,141
Private Category II (N = 32) 1,051
Public Category IT (N = 38) 926
Public Category I (N = 16) -352
The above division clearly shows that the big winners from the collective 
bargaining process have been those professors at major private schools; 
their colleagues at large public universities have actually lost ground 
financially to their nonunion brethren. The gains from bargaining at the 
lesser institutions have been somewhat comparable between public and pri­
vate faculties. It should be noted that the major orivate school 
category contains only three pairs of institutions. Thus, the extra­
ordinarily large gap between union and nonunion faculties in this group 
could be strongly affected by even one deviant institution.
While the matching procedure held constant some factors believed 
to influence faculty compensation, a more satisfactory method of assessing 
the impact of collective bargaining on faculty compensation is to systema­
tically account for the potential effects of other forces. The study will 
turn now to an analysis in which multiple regression techniques are 
employed to predict compensation levels for an initial period (1969-70) 
and for a period five years later (1974-75). A third equation using the 
same independent variables is also presented to predict the five-year per­
centage increase in average faculty compensation. Before these analyses 
are considered, certain zero-order relationships extant between some of 
the independent measures and the three dependent variables will be pointed 
out. Table 11 displays this information along with the means and 
standard deviations for all variables.
It might first be noted that the two average compensation figures 
(for 1970 and 1975) are closely associated (r = .81). Clearly, no major
TABLE 11. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR ALL VARIABLES
X S.D. %1 ^2 ^3 X4 *6 X7 >'8
=^ 1 Unlon/Nonunlon
.50 .301 -
Quality Rating (Gourman) 394.00 66.0 -.13 -
X Ph.D. 41.50 14.0 -.25 .44 -
X Union Members (State) 30.40 6.8 -.04 .28 .26 -
=^ 5 Per Capita Pers. Inc. (State) $4342 $445 -. 06
.14 ,18 .29 -
==6 % Coop. Inc. *64-'69 42.20 11.7 .13 -.09 .09 ,07 -.04 -
Public/Private .59 .49 .00 .04 .26 -.15 -.23 —.06 -
1975 Avg. Faculty Coop. $18,190 $2451 .12 .60 .52 .47 .48 .12 .18 -
^9 1970 Avg. Faculty Comp. $13,042 $1681 -. 06
.72 .60 .40 .35 .30 .27 .81
^10 % Comp. Incr. '70-'75 39.70 11.8 .32 -.14 -.06 .15 .26 -.28 -.13 .36
10
.24
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relative shifts in levels of compensation have occurred among the 
institutions under study. Several independent variables exhibit rather 
high simple relationships with both the 1970 and 1975 compensation 
variables, especially institutional quality (Gourman rating) and 
nature of the labor force (percentage of faculty with Ph.D. degrees).
For the earlier period, both percent union members within a state and per 
capita income are rather strongly associated with the dependent variable. 
These two measures are even more prominent in their effects on 1975 
compensation levels. It should also be mentioned that the average com­
pensation increase for the earlier time period (1964-1969) shows some 
covariation with 1969 faculty compensation (r = .30) but little associa­
tion with the dependent variable for the later period (r = .12). The 
union/nonunion dichotomous variable has little relationship to either of 
the two average compensation figures, but reflects the strongest simple 
correlation with the change measure (r = .32).
When the 1969-70 average faculty compensation variable is
regressed upon the seven independent variables for the 92 colleges and
universities, as shown in Table 12, a very high level of explained 
2
variance is achieved (R = .87). But for the purposes of this research 
it is interesting to observe that the union/nonunion variable is of little 
consequence. The Beta (standardized partial regression coefficient) 
of .03 is the smallest among the set of independent predictors. It is 
positive, however, and the h coefficient indicates that organized 
faculties should receive about $108 above the average compensation level 
for noncollectivized faculties, when other factors are taken into 
account. If one wants to consider the matched pairs as a type of sample 
for purposes of calculating tests of statistical significance, then all
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TABLE 12. partial REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND T-RATIOS FOR 
MEASURES OF AVERAGE FACUI.1T COMPENSATION, 1969-70 AND 1974-75, 
AND COMPENSATION CHANGE, 1969-70 TO 1974-75 
UNION AND NONUNION INSTITUTIONS
1969-70 1974-75 Percent Change
Variable b a
t-
ratio* b a
t-
ratto* b a
t-
ratio
Union/Nonunion 107.86 .03 .6 1240.40 .25 4.4 9.08 .39 4.2
Quality Rating 15.33 .60 13.2 16.10 .43 6.9 -.04 -.24 2-3
Z Ph.D. 16.59 .13 3.8 33.97 .19 2.8 .08 .10 .9
% Union Members .33 -14 3.1 .80 .22 3.7 .03 .16 1.6
Per Capita Pers. Inc. 1.10 .29 6.7 2.19 .40 6.7 .01 .22 2.2
Z Comp. Incr. *64-'69 5.13 .36 8.6 2.42 .12 2.0 -.04 --.37 4.1
Public/Private 1092.59 .32 7.3 1207.26 .24 4.0 -2.33 -.10 1.0
.87 .75 .35
F ratio 78..1 36..27 6.46
Standard Error 638.6 1272..0 98.97
*T-ratio of 2.01 would be significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test) for 46 
matched pairs.
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variables except the union/nonunion dichotomy are significant at least 
at the .05 level. The rating of quality, percentage compensation 
increase (1964-69), institutional control (public/private), and per 
capita personal income are all of considerable import in predicting 
1969-70 compensation, as revealed by the strength of their Beta weights.
A somewhat divergent picture emerges when the focus shifts to the 
multivariate equation using 1974-75 faculty compensation as the dependent 
variable. Explained variance drops somewhat to a still respectable .75 . 
The regression coefficients for union/nonunion, however, become much more 
influential.^^ The Beta for this variable (.25) is the third largest 
among the seven predictors, following institutional quality and state 
per capita income. The b value indicates that an increase of one 
unit in this measure (i.e., a unionized faculty) should make over $1,200 
difference in average compensation levels. Recalling the earlier des­
cription of union/nonunion differences, where only a $625 gap appeared, 
some additional explanation is called for here. It might be noted from 
Table 6 that the union/nonunion variable has a simple correlation of 
-.13 with the quality measure and -.25 with the percentage of Ph.D.'s 
on the faculty. Moreover, these two variables both have a strong posi­
tive Impact on compensation. Thus, when quality and professionalized 
faculty are accounted for along with other variables in the multiple 
regression analysis, the impact of the union/nonunion measure on compen­
sation becomes even more pronounced than the simple mean differences 
would lead us to expect. In sum, given the particular variables used 
in this analysis, with these 92 institutions, one would predict that 
unionized faculties, on the average, should receive over $1,200 more 
than those who remain unorganized.
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2
Table 12 also provides the regression coefficients and R
when the percentage change measure is subjected to multiple regression
analysis. Not altogether unexpectedly, the degree of explained variance
2
declines precipitously for this equation (R = .35). Many analyses of 
change in the social sciences employ an incremental model in which values 
for a given variable for an earlier time period are used to predict sub­
sequent values of that measure. Such incremental models ordinarily 
produce rather high levels of explained variance. However, when lagged 
variables are not employed, as in the case here, change is often difficult 
to account for (see Sharkansky, 1967; and Asher and Van Meter, 1973).
In any event, the change equation reveals that the union/nonunion variable 
is the most important single effect (B = .39) on changes in average com­
pensation levels. The b value also shows that faculties under 
collective bargaining agreements should have received about a 9 percent 
larger average Increase over the five-year period than was obtained by 
their unorganized counterparts. The much lower level cf explained 
variance for the change equation suggests that institutions do not 
generally provide faculty compensation increases that are consistent from 
one year to the next. Rather, growth seems to be in spurts, with a 
period of relative stability followed by a period of relative increase 
in compensation.
In order to treat the issue of differential compensation effects 
in union and nonunion colleges and universities, separate regressions 
were run on each of the two groups. The results are reported in Table 
13.
Rather striking is the substantially higher level of explained 
variance achieved in the regression equations for the union
TABLE 13. PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENT AND T-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF AVERAGE 
FACULTY COMPENSATION. 1969-70 AND 1974-75, AND 
COMPENSATION CHANGE. 1969-70 TO 1974-75
UNION INSTITUTIONS (N - 46, tj)
ratlû*
1974-75
ratio^
Percent Change.
t-
S ratio*
Quality Rating 14.72 .57 34.7 12.20 .33 6.1 -.69 -.37 3.7
X Ph.D. -14.00 -.10 5.4 27.26 . 14 2.2 3.64 .37 3.2
X Union Members 1.95 .08 4.8 12.16 .35 6.4 .78 .44 4.4
Per Capita Pers.Inc. 1.23 .31 19.9 2.06 .36 7.1 .03 .11 1.1
X Comp.Incr. *64-’69 8.96 .63 38.3 5.03 .25 4.6 -.65 -.64 6.4
Public/Private 1957.48 .56 32.5 1442.86 .29 5.1 -105.74 -.42 4.0
R
F ratio
Standard Error
.98
932.6
219.4
.84
73.8
1035.0
.45
11.5
95.9
*T-ratlo of 2.01 would be significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test) for 46 institutions
TABLE 13. PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND T-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF AVERAGE 
(conc.) FACULTY COMPENSATION. 1969-70 AND 1974-75. AND
COMPENSATION CHANGE, 1969-70 TO 1974-75
NONUNION INSTITUTIONS (N - -'.6. t^ )
1969-70 1974-75 Percent Change
Variable b B
t-
ratio * b 8
t-
ratlo* b 0
t-
ratlo*
Quality Rating 17.99 .71 15.9 17.97 .49 7.5 -.54 -.36 3.6
X Ph.D. 12.60 .11 2.2 37.98 .23 3.2 1.70 .26 2.3
% Union Members 3.97 .16 3.6 2.66 .07 1.2 -.20 -.13 1.4
Per Capita Pers.Inc. 1.20 .33 7.9 2.11 .40 6.5 .04 .19 2.0
% Comp.Incr. *64-'69 3.88 .26 6.5 -0.31 -.01 .2 -.42 —.48 5.3
Public/Private 809.30 .24 6.0 1185.30 .25 8.51 .04 .5
R: .87 .73 .35
F Ratio 95.0 37.5 7-7
Standard Error 611.5 1297.0 81.5
*T-ratio of 2.01 would be significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test) for 46 institutions
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schrKjls. This, along with the lower 1969-70 and 1974-75 standard errors 
for the union institutions would seem to indicate that these schools 
are affected by more similar determinants of the compensation they award 
their faculty members than the institutions found in the nonunion sample.
Another interesting observation concerns the variable influence 
of institutional quality and nature of the labor force on the two 
groups. From the 1969-70 and 1974-75 equations it would appear that 
these two measures are more important in determining the compensation of 
nonunion faculty. This may point to the non-professionalizing aspects 
of unionization in higher education. Once a faculty accepts collective 
bargaining, academic professionalism and institutional quality would 
seem to decline in importance as influences on compensation.
The figures presented in the 197 4-7 5 and percent change 
equations for the union power variable— the percentage of private sector 
union members in the state within which the schools are located— show that 
there may be a spillover effect from private sector unionization. The 
possibility of such a spillover effect is particularly evident in the 
change equation (S = .44). Turning to the nonunion 1974-75 and percent 
change regression results, one notes that the private sector union 
influence measure does not achieve statistical significance in either 
equation. In fact, there is a negative relationship between the 
unionism variable and 1969-70 to 1974-75 compensation change (S = -.13). 
This could he interpreted as showing that a union threat effect does 
not influence the compensation granted to faculty in nonunion institu­
tions.
A final issue which must be addressed in this analysis is
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the variable impact of unions on public and private institutions. Table 
14 presents regression results for the 1974-75 and c h a n i; e 
efpiations when the sample is divided into 27 pairs of public and 19 pairs 
of private schools.
Although the results may be somewhat spurious due to the small 
sample sizes, it is interesting to examine the regression outcomes. The 
most important item from the standpoint of this analysis is the impact 
of the union dummy. The union/nonunion variable is statistically signi­
ficant in both regressions for the public and private subsamples.
However, especially in the change equation, it appears that unions exert 
a slightly stronger effect in the compensation awarded faculty at private 
institutions. This would tend to refute the argument of Wellington and 
Winter described in the second chapter.
Other findings which emerge from the public/private dichotomy 
concern the direction of the quality variable relationship, the percent 
private sector unionization, and per capita personal income measures.
While institutional quality was of almost equal importance in determining 
1974-75 faculty compensation levels in both public and private schools, 
the variable shows a rather large negative association with private 
institution faculty compensation for the change measure (6 = -.42).
This would seem to indicate that lower-tier private college and universi­
ties began to award their faculties relatively greater compensation 
increases over the five-year period than the higher-quality schools.
As one might expect, the private sector union power variable is 
most important in the equations representing public institutions, especially 
during 1974-75 (B = .25). Evidently, the spillover effect of private 
sector unionization has its largest impact on public employees. Finally,
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TABLE 14. PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND T-RATIOS 
FOR MEASURES OF AVERAGE FACULTY COMPENSATION, 
1974-75 AND COMPENSATION CHANGE,
1969-70 TO 1974-75
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (N = 27 PAIRS)
Variable
1974-75
t-
ratio*
Percent Change
t-
ratio*
Union 1134.52 .24 4.0 5.82 .31 3.1
Quality Rating 17.IP .48 6.3 -.01 -.01 .1
% Ph.D. 25.94 .14 1.8 .62 .C9 .6
% Union Members 8.53 .25 3.9 .24 .17 1.6
Per Capita Pers.Inc. 1.78 .28 4.6 .02 .07 .7
% Comp.Incr. '64-'69 4.65 .18 2.8 -.36 -.34 3.2
r2 .71 .18
F Ratio 35.7 3.2
Standard Error 1315.0 88.5
*T-ratio of 2.06 would be significant at the .05 level (two-tailed
test) for 27 pairs of institutions
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TABLE 14. (cont.) PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND T-RATIOS 
FOR MEASURES OF AVERAGE FACULTY COMPENSATION,
1974-75 AND COMPENSATION CHANGE,
1969-70 TO 1974-75
PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS (N = 19 PAIRS)
1974-75 Percent Change
Variable b B
t-
ratio* b e
t-
ratio*
Union 1294.03 .26 5.0 14.31 .50 6.2
Quality Rating 15.35 .41 8.3 -.91 -.42 5.4
X Ph.D. 33.30 .16 3.5 1.13 .11 1.3
X Union Members 2.83 .08 1.2 -.07 -.03 .3
Per Capita Pers.Inc. 3.01 .62 9.3 .09 .33 3.1
% Comp.Incr. '64-'69 2.49 .15 2.7 -.39 -.40 4.7
r2 .82 .56
F Ratio 67.0 18.5
Standard Error 1085.0 98.2
*T-ratio of 2.10 would be significant at the .05 level (two-tailed
test) for 19 pairs of institutions
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Che wealth and cost-of-living measure— state per capita personal
income— shows its greatest strength for the private institutions (6 = .62,
= .33). It would appear that private schools must rely heavily on their 
surrounding economic environment for monetary support.
Conclusion
The evidence presented here clearly suggests that, thus far, 
collective bargaining in higher education is associated with increased 
salary and benefits for organized faculties. The matching of 46 pairs of 
union and nonunion schools reveals that, as of 1974-75, collectivized 
faculties have an average $625 differential over their unorganized 
counterparts. Regression analysis also indicates that unionized faculties 
should receive greater monetary benefits than their nonunionized colleagues. 
UTnen compensation change (from 1969-70 to 1974-75) is employed as the 
dependent variable, the union/nonunion variable is the strongest single 
influence in the equation. It appears also that faculty at private 
colleges and universities reap a relatively larger compensation gain 
from bargaining than their public institution counterparts. The question 
that naturally arises at this point is whether these gains are likely 
to be temporary or enduring.
In many ways, the phenomenon of collective bargaining in higher 
education today is similar to the situation which prevailed in the private 
sector during the 1930's. For example, the legality of the collective 
bargaining process itself is still subject to question in higher educa­
tion as it was in the private economy prior to the Second World War.
Also, the scope of bargaining has yet to be resolved in faculty bargaining. 
Finally, a great deal of union competition characterizes the collective
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bargaining scene in higher education today, as it did in the private sector 
during the I930's. Such issues have created a great deal of turmoil in 
those institutions where collective bargaining has been implemented.
IVhen a similar situation prevailed in the private sector, union wage gains 
were quite high, as shown by Lewis (see Chapter 1, p. 21). According to 
Ross and Goldner (1950), Levinson (1951), and others, new unionism 
has, since 1890, almost always been a source of wage advantage for union 
workers. But the question has not been resolved as to the effects of 
continuing unionism. Therefore, it appears that one should 
expect that the compensation advantages offered by 
faculty unions may turn out to be of short duration. Of course, as the 
salary and benefit issues stabilize, future contracts may enlarge the 
scope of bargaining to other areas of concern.
Another factor which comes into play is the influence that the 
broader economic conditions have on faculty unionism and compensation.
As our analysis in this chapter was cross-sectional, the forces operating 
within the larger economy were deemed to equally affect the dependent 
variables. However, the period from 1968 to 1975 was one of rather un­
common economic dimensions, with wildly varying years of stable prices 
and low unemployment, rapidly rising prices and low unemployment, and 
more recently, a heretofore unknown period combining rising prices, 
high unemployment, and economic recession. Instititutions of higher 
education are caught up in these larger forces. Currently, for instance, 
higher education is experiencing a considerable lessening in the demand 
for its product. Public institutions, especially, find themselves 
increasingly in competition for scarce monies. Even the more prestigious
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private schools are having a harder time raising needed revenues to keep 
pace with fast-rising costs. All of these things, particularly the effects 
of inflation, point to the reasons why faculty salaries have not continued 
to rise at the rate experienced in the early and mid-1960's.^^
Such economic conditions, if they continue, are likely to make 
unions look even more attactive to many professors, since there is con­
siderable agreement that unions can and do protect their membership more 
effectively in times of recession than in times of rapid inflation and 
higher employment. Indeed, as Kemerer and Baldridge (1975: 28-32) point 
out, faculty organize when they feel threatened by economic conditions.
More specific economic causes of faculty unionism, according to these 
authors, are compensation issues, the fear of budget cuts, and teacher 
surplus— all factors currently extant in higher education. After citing 
the role of these unfavorable economic conditions in contributing to 
faculty approval of collective bargaining agents at the University of 
Hawaii and at three institutions in Rhode Island, Ladd and Lipset 
(1973: 100) conclude that "what immediate success faculty unionism has 
at academically stronger colleges and universities will be determined 
significantly by the short-run economic positions in which these 
institutions find themselves."
Thus, it is evident that most faculties organize primarily for 
defensive reasons. As long as the financial condition of higher educa­
tion remains perilous in the United States, faculty members in "poor" 
colleges and universities will feel threatened economically and therefore 
be tempted to organize themselves into bargaining units. In institutions 
which are financially better off, the organizing impulse may still arise
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froTn sourr.es other than the economic, although the defensive nature of 
unionism remains. Some faculties have voted in bargaining agents in 
response to a perceived threat to their "rights" from the school adminis­
trators. For example, St. John's University unionized primarily because 
of a series of arbitrary administrative actions (see Garbarino, 1975: 136). 
Collective bargaining has come rather infrequently to those institutions 
where faculty influence and faculty rights have remained secure.
Despite fluctuations in the rate of acceptance of union bargaining 
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agents, collective bargaining among faculty is almost certain to increase 
in the years ahead. As state collective bargaining legislation becomes 
more advantageous, faculty unionism will receive continued impetus. It 
appears to be only a matter of time, for instance, before "the sleeping 
giant of faculty unionism”— California— unionizes (see Sernas, 1976: 5;
"Faculty Unionism in the West", 1974).^^
What will be the consequences of the growth in faculty unionism?
From the analysis presented in this chapter, it is apparent that there
will be an impact on the amount of salary and benefits paid by colleges
and universities to their faculty members. In many cases, faculty
unionism may exercise an equalizing effect on salaries throughout state
systems of higher education, improving those of professors in community
colleges and state colleges relative to faculty at universities
(Garbarino, 1975: 258). This "levelling" effect may also be found within
individual faculties, as the compensation gap between assistant and
Full professor diminishes. Finally, seniority may replace merit in
determining the primary basis for salary i n c r e a s e s a n d  an atmosphere
of egalitarianism may become the substitute for professiorial professionalism.
NOTES
1. An abbreviated version of this analysis appears in Morgan and Kearney 
(1977).
2. For a good discussion of the environmental and institutional forces 
behind faculty unionism see Kemerer and Baldridge (1975: 42-69).
3. The term "union" will be used synonymously with collective bargaining 
to designate those faculties that have been certified for collective 
bargaining. It is recognized, of course, that a large number of 
institutions have collective bargaining agreements with Che AAUP, 
which is obviously not a union.
4. Garbarino (1975: 61) reports that one-third of all organized institu­
tions and one-half of the organized faculties are located in New York 
state. CUNY and SUNY alone account for almost 40 percent of all 
faculty included in bargaining units. He attributes this, in part, 
to that states' public employee bargaining statute and the generally 
favorable union climate within the state.
5. In 1972, Che NLRB established a jurisdictional standard of control 
over any private Institution with annua] gross revenues greater than 
SI million.
6. Schramm (1975) attempts to account for the dearth of collectivization 
of private sector faculties, attributing their hesicance to such 
factors as (1) their stronger professional image, which may be
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threatened by collective bargaining; (2) private institution faculty 
perceive themselves as having greater participation in the administra­
tion of higher education, Garbarino (1975: 72) concurs in the latter 
proposition.
7. The NEA and AFT were at one time affiliated in New York state in 
representing campuses of the CUNY and SUNY systems (see Ladd and 
Lipset, 1973: 56). AFT, however, has become sole representative at 
SUNY, ending that merger. Also, AAUP/NEA affiliates recently were 
chosen to represent the faculties at Kent State and the University of 
Northern Iowa.
8. For instance, CUNY institutions operate under a principle of pay 
parity between the community colleges and senior institutions in the 
system. Also, the very high cost of living in New York City could 
bias the results of any analysis in which data from New York City 
institutions were included.
9. Utilization of a matching procedure in order to obtain the sample of 
institutions presents some interesting methodological issues. Matching 
was necessary, of course, because of the small number of schools with 
unionized faculties. Random sampling of all four-year institutions 
would h.ivo been unlikely to result in more than one or two union 
selections. Furthermore, as most of the union faculties arc located
in the northeastern section of the United States, matching helped 
insure that other similarly-situated institutions could be included in 
the sample. Random sampling for nonunion schools would quite possibly 
include institutions not comparable with the union schools on many 
dimensions.
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In effect, use of the matching procedure produces a 
quasi-experimental research design. Implications of the design are 
not fully explored in this research, as the quasi-experimental nature 
of the matched pairs is not directly employed except to compare com­
pensation rates over the five-year period for paired institutions.
I'/hen this is done, results show that 32 of the union faculties had 
greater salary and benefit increases than nonunion faculties.
10. Most of the other excluded institutions were quite small or of a very 
specialized nature such as Loretto Heights College (CO), Moore College 
of Art (PA), San Francisco University Law Faculty, and Detroit College 
of Business. All of the union schools in the analysis were certified 
as having an exclusive agent for the purpose of faculty collective 
bargaining as of 1974. Since it often takes as much as a year to 
negotiate the initial contract, it is quite likely that this negotiating 
period will, in itself, create an upward push on faculty salaries. 
Administrators, regents, or state legislators may attempt to ward off 
the move toward faculty collectivization or to minimize later union 
gains by awarding larger increases prior to the actual date of contract. 
Furthermore, many faculty salary and benefit Increases are awarded 
retroactively. Therefore, those institutions were included which 
first bargained collectively in 1974. In order to test this assump­
tion, however, those eight schools which were first collectively 
represented in 1974 were removed from the sample and another regression 
analysis was performed. Although the explanatory power of the 
union/nonunion variable increased by a slight amount, there was no 
significant change in the nature of the findings.
143
11. Luttbeg (1971) employed 118 political, economic, and policy variables 
to measure cultural similarity among the American states. His Q 
factor analysis aggregated the states by four categories: Industrial, 
Southern, Sparsely Populated, and Frontier. The extra-state matching 
procedure employed in the present study involved matching institutions 
located within states essentially congruent in terms of their highest 
factor loadings. Thus, for example, the New York and California state 
college and university systems were matched as each state loaded high 
in the Industrial category.
12. Southeastern Massachusetts University was organized in 1967. The other 
three faculties became collectivized in 1969. Because these four 
campuses were organized either just prior to or during the base period 
of the research, it is believed that they would not exercise a con­
founding influence on the findings.
13. To partially confirm the random effects of faculty rank, the total 
number of faculty members was added for each rank listed in the June, 
1971 issue of the AAUP Bulletin (the first issue for which this break­
down was available) for the institutions included in the analysis. 
Dividing by N, the following percentages were obtained:
Professor Assoc. Prof. Asst. Prof.
Union 26% 29% 45%
Nonunion 28% 29% 43%
This division indicates that at the beginning of the analysis there: 
were no essential differences by rank between union and nonunion 
schools. No such calculations were made for the later periods on 
grounds that if differences did appear by rank, this might be a legit­
imate effect of unionization.
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14. Comparing the average faculty compensation for the 92 institutions in 
this study with the average compensation for all faculties with pro­
fessorial ranks included in the AAUP Bulletin (1970 and 1975) produces 
the following results:
92 Institutions All Institutions
1969-70 $13,042 $13,974
1974-75 $18,191 $18,709
Percent Increase 39.7 33.9
The slightly lower averages for the group of schools in this analysis
suggest primarily one thing— most of those institutions that were
providing high faculty salaries and benefits (e.g., large prestigious
universities) did not undergo collective bargaining during this period.
Also, the CUNY system, which is unionized, has not been included in
this study for Che reasons given above.
15. This is to be expected,of course, because only four of the faculties
were unionized during this initial time period. It would be illogical
to believe that unionization could make a difference If it were, in 
effect, not present. Nonetheless, the insignificance of the union 
dummy at time one does provide some indication that the variable is 
measuring what it is intended to measure— the impact of unionization 
on faculty compensation. If the union/nonunion dummy showed even a 
moderate simple correlation coefficient for salaries and benefits, 
the validity of the measure would have been called into question.
16. The addition of any new variables to the regression equation is likely
2 ~1
to increase the amount of unexplained variance (R"). R , which
9
adjusts R“ in accordance with the number of variables and number of 
cases in the equation, is more appropriate for assessing the incremental 
addition to explained variance accounted for by the addition of a new
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independent variable. The formula is R A R -  ---(1 - R ),
(Roa and Miller, 1971: 20-21). By adding the union/nonunion variable
to the regression equations, the amount of explained variance for the
1974 average faculty compensation is increased by .059, or about six
percent, and the explained variance for percent compensation increase
1969-70 to 1974-75 is enhanced by .136, or about 14 percent, as follows:
1970-75 Increase: = .159 without union/nonunion
~2
R = .295 with union/nonunion 
~2
1974-75 Av. Fac. Comp.: R = .671 without union/nonunion
~2
R = .730 with union/nonunion
17. For example, using a diffusion innovation model with a lagged depen­
dent variable on the right-hand side of the regression equation. Gray
2
(1973) reports a series of R ranging from .938 to .988 where 12 
state laws representing innovation are subjected to analyses.
18. In general, faculty salaries at all institutions of higher education 
enjoyed real gains (in constant dollars) in the early and mid-1960's.
The rate of change lessened from 1967 to 1969, and was negative, in 
real dollars, from 1969-1973 (see Freeman, 1975: 116).
19. Several factors work to keep faculty unionism at a relatively low
level of increase including: (1) the absence of state enabling legis­
lation; (2) the continued embrace of a "professional image" by many 
faculty; (3) the diverse characters and locations of the more than 
2,800 American colleges and universities (see Schramm, 1976: 43-44; 
Garbarino, 1975; 20-29).
20. Widespread support for collective bargaining in the California insti­
tutions of higher education was revealed in 1969 and 1973 surveys.
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Some major reasons for union sympathy were: (1) highly variable
budgetary support from the governor and legislature; (2) issues of 
teacher loads and salary parity within the system; (3) threats to tenure; 
(4) the desire for better grievance procedures and increased fringe 
benefits (see Walker, 1974). So far, resistance from the Trustees and 
Chancellor and the absence of explicit state enabling legislation have 
been effective in holding off unionism in the largest system of higher 
education in the United States.
21. Faculty unions, with the exception of the AAUI’, have generally opposed 
merit increases, preferring the criterion of seniority (see hadd and 
Lipset, 1973: 69-70). Two of the few contracts which have provided 
for merit increases are those which were negotiated at CUNY and SUNY.
The CUNY situation is especially interesting, in that the contract 
provides for a modified "star" system where 50 "Distinguished 
Professors" receive higher salaries, lighter teaching loads, and other 
special support (see Ladd and Lipset, 1973: 97).
14/
APPENDIX
The Sample of Matched Pairs
Union Non-Union
Regis College 
University of Bridgeport 
University of Delaware 
University of Hawaii 
Kansas State College (Pittsburg)
Towson State College
Boston State College
Fitchburg State College
Lowell State College
North Adams State College
Southeastern Mass. Tech. Institute
Salem State University
Westfield State University
Worchester State University
Central Michigan State University
Eastern Michigan State University
Oakland University
Wayne State University
Kearney State University
New England College
Rider College
Rutgers University
Monmouth College
Trenton State University
Wagner College
Cooper Union
Long Island University
Pratt Institute
Mercy College
Adelphi University
Bard College
Hofstra University
New York Institute of Technology
St. John's University
Jamestown College
Ashland College
Cincinnati University
Lincoln University
Temple University
Millersville State College
University of Rhode Island
Rhode Island College
Johnson State College
State University of N.Y. (category I)
State University of N.Y. (Arts & Sciences) 
Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn
Portland State University
University of Hartford
University of Maryland
University of Nevada
Fort Hays Kansas State College
Morgan State College
Chicago State College
Framingham State College
Lowell Technical Institute
Western Washington State College
Western Connecticut State College
Bridgewater State College
Eastern Washington State College
Central Washington State College
Illinois State University
Western Illinois University
Eastern Illinois University
Ohio State University
Eastern Montana College
William Penn College
Drew University
University of Connecticut
Fairfield University
Central Connecticut State College
Manhattanville College
Manhattan College
Iona College
Union College
Marist College
Rochester University
Hartwick College
Pace College
Canisius College
Loyola University (Chicago)
Dakota Wesleyan University
Hiram College
Akron University
Marietta College
University of Pittsburg
Eastern Connecticut State College
University of Massachusetts
Southern Connecticut State College
Northern Montana College
University of California (category I)
California State Colleges
Stevens Institute
CHAPTER 4
THE IMPACT OF UNIONIZATION ON STATE EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION
Responding to the dual pressures of inflation and recession, 
state government spending has expanded at an unprecedented rate in 
recent years. A large part of this growth in expenditures has been 
forced upon the states, it is sometimes alleged, fay public employee 
unionism. While the fact goes unchallenged that employee compensation 
constitutes by far the single largest expenditure in state government 
operating budgets, empirical research regarding the impact of collec­
tive bargaining on state government employee salaries and benefits is 
scarce. Published research findings concerned with the issue are non­
existent. The purpose of this chapter is to help alleviate the 
research lacuna in this vital area through the application of a model 
of state employee compensation determination. As in the previous 
chapter, multivariate analysis will be employed in order to isolate the 
impact of collective bargaining on public employee compensation.
Background
In Chapter One, the rise of unions in state and local government 
employment over the past 11 years was described in some detail. It 
was noted that the growtli period in public employee unionism began 
after the issuance of Executive Order 10988 by President Kennedy in 1962. 
Once bargaining rights had been established for federal workers,
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individual states began the process of enacting legislation governing 
public employee unionism at the state and local levels.
The American states occupy a pivotal position in public employee 
labor relations, as they serve both as major public employers and as the 
primary source of rules and procedures governing the relations between 
public unions, state and local governmental units, and the general public. 
Whereas the state's legislative initiatives regarding public employee unions 
came partly in response to the federal impetus of 1962, increased state 
government employee activism during the late 1960's also played an impor­
tant role in encouraging positive state reaction. Over the 25 year 
period from 1942 to 1967 there were only 42 work stoppages in state 
government. During the next two years alone, that figure was surpassed 
quite dramatically by the occurence of 53 strikes by state government 
employees (see U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1972: 3).^ Unionization 
was the handmaiden of this political activism— by October 1975, almost 
40 percent of all full-time state government workers belonged to an 
employee organization, ranging from a high of 89.7 percent in Hawaii to 
a low of 0.6 percent in Florida (U.S. Department of l.ahor, 1976: Table 2). 
State Highways employees were particularly energetic in organizational 
activity, evidencing a 59 percent membership figure for all states, 
while state education employees showed the least degree of organization, 
28.6 percent (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976: 1).
Although Wisconsin passed the first comprehensive legislation 
concerning public employee collective bargaining in 1959, the statute 
did not cover state employees until it was amended in 1966. Other 
states soon followed; by the end of 1976, 33 states had acted to grant
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Choir employees some form of bargaining rights, either through statutes, 
court orders, or executive orders (U.S. Department of Labor, 1976). Only 
four states legally prohibit collective bargaining for state employees: 
Utah, Texas, Tennessee, and North Carolina. When bargaining is neither 
officially permitted nor prohibited, federal constitutional protection of 
the right of association has been relied upon by state courts in pro­
tecting union activity. However, "the legal propriety of a public 
employer to engage in collective bargaining with a union in the absence 
of a statute h.as continued to be a matter of debate, despite the general 
acceptance of such relationships ... and the general presence of de facto 
arrangements where no statutory system exists" (Council of State 
Governments, 1975: 6).
State legislation which does exist with regard to collective
bargaining by state workers basically can be divided into two categories—
2
the meet and confer approach and the mandatory bargaining approach.
The major distinction between the two is that under the former option 
the employer retains final authority in all decision-making, while 
under the latter approach decisions on various issues are decided 
bilaterally. "In practice, however, there is little actual difference 
between the collective bargaining and 'meet and confer* arrangements ... 
I'oth approaches normally end in a binding contract or agreement."
(I'ublic Affairs Research Council, 1975: 10).
The organizations which represent state government employees 
vary from state employee associations, such as the Hawaii Government 
Employees Association, to full-fledged unions such as the AFSCME. Most 
state associations are loosely affiliated with the Assembly of Govern­
ment Employees (AGE). In the analysis which follows, associations and
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unions will be treated alike in the way they represent their members 
in state government labor relations. As with faculty unions, it will 
be assumed that all act similarly when seated at the bargaining table.
The Impact of Collective Bargaining on State 
Employee Compensation: A Model
The model of public employee wage determination which will be 
applied to state government workers will approximate more closely the 
general model of Chapter Two than did the research on faculty collective 
bargaining. Again, the major purpose of the model is to help isolate 
the impact of unionization on public employee compensation outcome. The 
model is specified as follows:
Socioeconomic
Environment
Political/legal
Environment
Unionization
^  State Government! 
! Employee
Compensation 
! Outcome
I. The terminal element in the model, state government employee 
compensation outcome, is estimated using the 50 states as 
units of analysis. Seven dependent variables are employed. 
First, average overall state employee salaries were 
calculated for October, 1974^ by dividing total state govern­
ment payrolls by full-time equivalent employment. Then, 
monthly salaries were computed similarly for state 
employees in four functional categories: highways, public
welfare, hospitals, and police. These functional areas
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were included in an effort to discover if the same 
influences are operative in determining salaries within 
different occupational categories, and also to assist 
interpretation and analysis of the aggregate state data.
Since it is important to consider the influence of collec­
tive bargaining on nonwage compensation as well as salaries, 
one of the most substantial fringe benefits of government 
employment— state contributions to employee retirement 
systems— was allocated on a monthly basis and included as the 
sixth dependent variable. The final variable, average 
monthly salary plus retirement, was determined by adding 
monthly per employee retirement contributions by state 
governments with the previously obtained monthly salary figures.
II. Factors within the socioeconomic environment include:
A. Nature of the state labor force, measured by the 
percentage of adult state residents possessing a high 
school degree in 1970.
B. Cost-of-living, approximated through 1972 state per 
capita personal income.
C. Ability to pay of the state government, measured by
1972 per capita state revenues from all sources.
All three of the socioeconomic factors listed above are expected 
to vary positively with state employee salary and retirement benefits, 
with a highly-educated work force, high cost-of-living, and large per 
capita state revenues associated positively with the amount of compensa­
tion states award to their employees.
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The two remaining socioeconomic factors in the general model 
are not directly included in this particular study. Since the compara­
tive wage standards/opportunity wage variable would be quite difficult 
to operationalize satisfactorily at the state level, and the cost-of-living 
measure already included in the model has been found in previous research 
to correlate highly with proxies for the opportunity wage, it was 
decided not to proceed further with this factor. The other missing 
socioeconomic element is population level/population density. This 
variable was dropped from the analysis because of problems of multi- 
collinearity (r = .68 with per capita personal income) and its nonessential 
theoretical position in a study using statewide data.
TIT. Factors within the political/legal environment of the states 
include :
A. The legal structure of collective bargaining, as 
embodied in the existence of state public sector labor 
relations policies which permit collective bargaining 
by state employees. This was operationalized through 
a dummy variable coded in accordance with the pre­
vailing state statutes, court orders, or attorney 
general opinions at the beginning of 1974.
B. State government political environment, measured by 
the state rankings on legislative capability/profess­
ionalism developed under the auspices of the Citizens 
Conference on State Legislatures. The ordinal level 
ratings are based on the combined performance of the 
state legislatures in five categories: functional, 
accountable, informed, independent, and representative.
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C. Union political power within the respective states 
is accounted for through the percentage of union 
membership in state nonagricultural employment, 1972.
The union political power variable is expected to be positively 
related to state employee compensation. The presence of a labor rela­
tions policy expressly permitting collective bargaining for state 
employees also is anticipated to vary directly with the amount of salaries 
and benefits. Finally, it is expected that the more "capable" state 
legislatures will pay state workers relatively less than those legis­
latures ranking lower on the scale. This latter hypothesis requires 
further elaboration.
Ultimately, expenditure decisions on state employee compensation 
reside with these legislative bodies. The legislature establishes the 
statutory framework for collective bargaining, monitors the bargaining 
process, and exercises final approval over the outcome. It is also 
the target of "end-runs" by employee representatives and unions who may 
attempt to gain on a direct, political level what has been denied at the 
agency office or at the bargaining table. Many employee organizations 
prefer to deal directly with the legislative body because of their 
potential political influence (Public Affairs Research Council, 1975: 13).
It would seem that the more capable, professionalized legisla­
tures would have the resources and expertise to resist end-runs^ and 
confine their role in the bargaining process to one of appropriate over­
sight on the issue of state employee salary and benefits, thereby 
withstanding requests for unwarranted increases. Perry (1976: 261) 
concurs in this viewpoint, asserting that "The general effect of
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legislative professionalism is to encourage 'hard' bargaining and reduce 
the likelihood of compromises that might be viewed as favoring employee 
groups ...." Thus, it is expected that those states ranked in the 
upper-tier in legislative capability/professionalism will award lower 
compensation in the presence of organized employee activity than 
lower-ranked states.
The only other political/legal environment factor specified in 
the general model of public sector wage determination which is not 
included in the state government employee model is geographical location. 
Although this variable is undoubtedly of importance in its influence on 
public employee compensation, it is highly correlated with three of the 
other independent variables in the model (r = .73 for education; r = .61 
for per capita personal income; r = .58 for labor relations policy). It 
is believed that these three measures will at least partly account for 
the influence of geography.
IV. Two unionization measures originally were employed in the
analysis: a union/nonunion dummy, and the percent of state
government workers belonging to an employee organization 
in October, 1974. Regression results using the two variables 
were quite similar, as the general statistical relationships 
remained approximately the same and total explained variance 
was almost identical. The findings which are reported 
later in this chapter are predicated almost exclusively on 
the percent unionization measure.^ It was anticipated that 
the extent of unionization would vary positively with 
state employee compensation.
156
Refore turning to the results of the multivariate analysis, it 
might prove instructive to construct a union/nonunion dichotomy of the 
American states in order to examine the overt differences in employee 
salary and benefits. Table 15 pictures the 1974 differentials for Che 
15 states in which at least 50 percent of the state employees belong to 
an employee organization and the 35 states in which less than 50 percent 
are organized. From Table 15, it is apparent that the October 1974 average 
salary is about $185, or 25 percent, higher for employees in the highly 
organized states. Furthermore, these workers enjoy an average advan­
tage in monthly state contributions for employee retirement benefits of 
over $33, a difference of almost 49 percent. Together, the employees 
of unionized states receive over $219 more per month in salary and 
retirement benefits than those who work for less unionized states.
Measured In this way, it would seem that unions do, in fact, result in 
higher compensation for their members in state government employment 
than what is obtained under nonunion conditions.
However, as in the earlier case of faculty members, many forces 
may affect the compensation of state government employees. Perhaps, 
for example, those "union" states just happen also to be the wealthier 
states with more highly-trained work forces than the "nonunion" states.
If this is true, then one should expect that employee salary and benefits 
ordinarily would be higher in these states regardless of the presence 
or absence of collective bargaining. What, then, is the Impact of 
unionism?
In order to account for as much variation as possible in 
monthly state government employee compensation while isolating any specific
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TABLE 15. AVERAGE MONTHLY COMPENSATION FOR STATE 
EMPLOYEES IN UNION AND NONUNION STATES, 1974*
Union Nonunion
Differ­
ence
%
Difference
Oct. 1974 average 
monthly salary
$ 930.87 $744.60 $186.27 25.0
1974 average 
monthly state con­
tribution for 
employee retirement 
benefits $ 102.46 S 68.82 $ 33.64 48.9
Total $1033.33 
N = 15
$813.42 
N = 35**
$219.91 27.0
*Union states are those in which 50 percent of more of the state 
workforce is unionized.
**N 34 for nonunion retirement contributions due to missing data.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor (1976), Labor-Management Relations
in State and Local Governments: 1974. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office; U.S. Department of Commerce (1975), 
Public Employment in 1974. Washington, I). C . : Government
Printing Office.
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Impact of unionization, multiple regression analysis was employed using 
the data and variables described earlier in this section.
Findings
Before considering the multiple regression results, it 
is helpful to examine certain zero-order relationships among 
some of the measures employed in the analysis. Table 16 displays the simple
correlation coefficients along with means and standard deviations for 
all variables.
One might first note that average monthly overall state employee 
salary is closely associated with salaries in the functional employ­
ment categories, although public welfare and state police salaries vary 
somewhat less strongly with the overall salary variable. This could 
indicate that different forces operate to determine salaries within 
these two categories. It seems rather surprising that the relationships 
between the five state salary dependent variables and the state retire­
ment contributions variable are not any stronger than indicated in the 
correlation matrix (r = .33, .21, .36, .47, .23). Apparently the 
forces that determine the magnitude of state retirement contributions 
and state salaries are not as similar as one might expect, especially 
with regard to highways and police.
Six of the dependent variables are highly correlated with state 
per capita personal income (r = .74, .68, .58, .68, .73, .75). The 
notable exception is state retirement contributions which is more 
strongly associated with percent union membership in nonagricultural 
employment (r = .44). However, more significant for the purposes of 
the present analysis is the relatively high positive correlation between
TABLE 16. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR ALL VARIABLES
X S.D. ■'l '2 ''s ’6 ^ *1 *2 *3 Xj Xj Xj Xj Xg Xju X,J
State Salary 821 122 -
"2
Highways Salary 862 150 .90 -
'■3 Pub. Wei. Salary 783 118 .82 .71 -
''4 Hospitals Salary 699 129 .90 .72 .78 -
’'s
Police Salary .971 160 .80 .64 .66 .74 -
’'6 State Retire. Concrib. 974 616 .33 .21 .36 .47 .23 -
Salary 6 Retirement 902 147 .94 .82 .80 .91 .74 .62 -
=‘1 X State Efflp. In Org. 37 22.4 .72 .62 .56 .69 .66 .30 .70 -
*2 X Housing Eop. in Org. 57 28.7 .67 .64 .50 .59 .51 .16 .61 ,78 -
"3 X Pub. Wei. Eop. In Org. 47 31.7 .53 .49 .45 .50 .45 .26 .53 .79 .58 -
\ X Hospitals Eop. In Org. 46 28.1 .63 .54 .47 .62 .52 .29 .63 .88 .73 .64 -
h X Police Emp. in Org. 39 35.6 .56 .54 .54 .49 .58 .24 .55 .58 .53 .52 .50 -
h Type Labor Rel. Policy 0.5 0.5 .46 .46 .30 .45 .52 .14 .43 .57 .46 .33 .56 .35 -
h Per Capita Per. Income 4235 594 .74 .68 .58 .68 .73 .40 .75 .57 .49 .42 .47 .46 .44 -
h X Union Hem. liunag. Eop. 23 8.9 .46 .44 .42 .52 .44 .44 .55 .49 .32 .40 .39 .32 .44 .56 -
S Legls. Capability 25 15 -.51 -.52 -.43 -.42 -.38 -.12 -.47 -.21 -.24 —. 04 -.16 -.21 —.26 — 43 -.40 -
Per Capita State Rev. 504 149 .52 .48 .32 .34 .56 -.04 .42 .52 .42 .41 .50 .37 .27 32 .20 -.21
X H.S. Degree 53 8.1 .60 .72 .41 .37 .45 -.12 .45 .46 .59 .35 .42 .44 .38 56 .27 -.46 .42 -
Sources: Bureau of the Census (1975a) Bureau of the Census (1975b) Y.-Y.; Department of Labor (1976b) X.-X,; Bureau of the Census (1973)
V » Af »Ka A A., A I V V V ■ Tk A » . AAAA /^AA^AAaSaA AA CaaAa , AA. A % A & ..AAA /1Q?t\ V ^ ^Xa ! Bureau of the Census (1976) X_, X
8 ' ^ 1 0 ’ * 1 1 "
The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures (1971)
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the compensation variables and the measures representing percentages of 
various categories of state employees in organizations (r = .72 for all 
state employees; .64 for highways; .45 for public welfare; .62 for hospitals; 
.58 for police; .70 for the combination salary/retirement variable). In 
most cases these represent the strongest simple r's in the matrix.
Once again, however, the retirement variable exhibits markedly diverse 
characteristics.
Other independent variables also show potentially significant 
relationships with the compensation measures. The education measure and 
legislative capability are highly correlated with overall state salary 
(r = .60, r = -.51) and highways salary (r = .72, -.52). Per capita 
state revenue is most closely associated with state salary (r = .52) and 
police salary (r = .56). The nonagricultural union membership measure 
shows a relatively strong relationship with hospital salary (r = .52)
and the combined salary/retirement variable (r = .55).
Labor relations policy is most closely related to police salary 
(r = .52). State retirement contributions appear to be influenced by
only two independent variables: per capita personal income (r = .40) and
nonagricultural union membership (r = .44)
In examining the matrix for possible multicollinearity within the 
realm of the independent variables, one discovers only a few potential 
difficulties. Some evidence of possible covariance lies in the associa­
tion between the measures of percentage of employees belonging to an 
organization and the ocher independent variables, which range as high as 
r = .59. Per capita personal income also presents potential problems 
owing to its moderately high simple correlations with nonagricultural 
union membership (r = .56) and percentage of high school degrees (r = .56).
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Nonetheless, possible multicollinearity is not of such magnitude that one 
should be unduly concerned. The primary purpose of this investigation 
is to uncover the impact that unionization exercises on the compensation 
of state employees when other salient factors also are taken into consi­
deration. The best way to accomplish this goal is to examine the seven 
multiple regression equations.
When the salary and compensation variables are regressed on the
seven independent variables for the 50 states, a fairly high level of
explained variance is achieved for all but two equations (see Table 17).
The largest multiple correlation coefficient is found in the overall 
2
state salary equation (R = .76), and the lowest are for the public
2 2 
welfare salary (R = .45) and retirement (R = .42) equations. It would
appear that the model is a reasonably good predictor of state government
employee compensation.
All of the independent variables attain statistical significance^ 
in at least one equation, with the exception of percentage of union 
members in nonagricultural employment. As would be expected from the 
examination of the correlation matrix, the most consistently important 
predictors of state employee compensation are the unionization and per 
capita personal income measures.
The prominence of per capita personal income reflects the impor­
tance of cost-of-living and, to a lesser extent, opportunity wage in 
determining the amount of salary and benefits paid hy state governments 
to their workers. This variable achieves statistical significance at 
the .05 level in all equations, with beta values varying from B = .26 
(Highways) to S = .53 (Police). It serves as the most powerful predictor 
of public welfare, hospitals, and police salaries and overall salary/re­
tirement.
TABLE 17. PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND T-RATIOS
FOR STATE EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, 1974
State Salary Highways Salary Pub. Wei. Salary Hospital Salary
b 0
t-
ratio* b 6
t-
ratio* b 6
t-
ratio* b g
t-
ratio*
% State Emp. in Org. 2.20 .40 3.41
% Highways Emp. in Org. 1.18 .23 1.98
% Pub. Wei. Emp. in Org. 1.06 .28 1.97
% Hospital Emp. in Org. 1.98 .43 3.27
Per Capita Pers. Inc. .08 .37 3.31 .06 .26 2.13 .07 .34 2.05 .10 .46 3.40
% Union Mem. Non-Ag. -.67 -.05 .49 .56 .03 .30 .16 .01 .08 1.04 .07 .59
Legis. Capability -1.96 -.23 2.51 -1.72 -.17 1.66 -2.23 -.27 1.90 -1.82 -.21 1.81
Per Capita State Rev. .11 .13 1.41 .12 .12 1.30 .04 .05 .35 -.01 -.01 .06
% H.S. Degree 1.06 .07 .68 5.40 .29 2.38 -.26 -.02 .11 -2.89 -.18 1,43
Type Labor Rel. Policy -9.50 -.04 .40 12.35 .04 .41 -5.02 -.02 .16 -1.38 .00 .04
r2 .76 .71 .45 .63
F-Ratio 18.5 14.5 4.9 10.4
Standard Error 65.3 87.5 94.9 84.2
T-Ratio of 2.01 would be significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test)
TABLE 17(cont.) PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND T-RATIOS
FOR STATE EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, 1974
Police Salary Retirement Salary/Retirement
b B
t-
ratio* b B
t-
ratio* b B
t-
ratio*
% State Emp. in Org. 8.10 .29 1.63 2.87 .44 3.45
% Police Emp. in Org. 1.06 .24 2.43
Per Capita Pers. Inc. .14 .53 4.57 .46 .44 2.57 .11 .46 3.84
% Union Mem. Non-Ag. -1.26 -.07 .67 16.23 .24 1.51 .67 .04 .38
Legis. Capability -1.06 -.10 1.00 -2.80 -.07 .46 -2.20 -.22 2.17
Per Capita State Rev. .35 .33 3.59 -. 66 -.16 1.12 .05 .05 .53
% H.S. Degree -3.76 -.19 1.71 -37.29 -.49 3.07 -2.04 -.11 1.00
Type Labor Rel. Policy 63.28 .20 2.08 -140.98 -.12 .77 -21.19 -.07 .70
r 2 .73 .42 .72
F-Ratio 16.3 4.45 15.4
Standard Error 90.0 504.7 84.4
T-Ratio of 2.01 would be significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test).
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Other independent variables (except for percent of state employees 
in organizations) do not evidence such consistent relationships. Rather, 
the factors are of diverse consequence depending on the functional cate­
gory serving as dependent variable. For instance, state labor relations 
policy and per capita state revenues are of substantial importance only in 
determining police salary (B = .20, .33), and the education variable reaches 
statistical significance only in the cases of highways (B = .29) and retire­
ment contributions (6 = -.49)
The only instance of an independent variable deviating in a uni­
form fashion from its hypothesized relationship with employee compensation 
involves the measure of legislative capability/professtonalism. It was 
expected that the more "capable" state legislatures would have the resources 
and expertise to counteract requests for unwarranted compensation increases 
and to avoid adverse consequences of the legislative "end-run". Thus, it 
was anticipated that legislatures ranking high in capability and pro­
fessionalism would, other things being equal, pay their workers less than 
their lower-ranking counterparts even in the presence of unions. However, 
the negative standardized regression coefficients found in Table 17 point 
to the opposite conclusion: that legislative capability and employee
compensation are positively associated.^ It would seem that the more 
"capable" a legislature is, when measured by a comprehensive index, the 
higher the salary and benefits it awards state employees. Perhaps this 
finding is related to the broader issue of professionalism, with "pro­
fessional" legislatures perceiving their state bureaucracies to be 
professionalized and therefore deserving of high compensation.
The model of state employee compensation determination may also 
be criticized on the basis of the relatively low amounts of explained
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variance achieved in the public welfare salary and retirement contributions 
(R^ = .45, .42). The reason for the modest multiple correlation coeffi­
cient in the former instance may be attributed, in part, to the nature of 
the work function performed by public welfare employees. This category of 
state workers is composed predominantly of white-collar, professional wel­
fare assistance case workers. As Haramermesh (1971) has shown, white-collar 
and blue-collar workers operate in accordance with different work aims 
and respond to diverse occupational stimuli. Perhaps compensation increases 
are not as important to welfare employees as other job-related goals.
Turning to the state retirement system contributions equation, it 
is apparent that different forces account for the variation in this depen­
dent variables when it is compared with the others. Although per capita 
personal income is salient, the most important predictor of retirement con­
tributions is the proxy for nature of the state labor force. From the 
direction of the partial regression coefficient (B = -.49), it appears Chat 
states with less-educated work forces contribute more generously to their 
employees' retirement funds than other states. The reason for this phe­
nomenon is not readily forthcoming. Also, for similarly obscure reasons, 
percent union membership in nonagricultural employment achieves its strongest 
partial coefficient in this equation (g = .24). Perhaps these enigmas 
partly owe their existence to the fact that many states have statewide 
retirement systems equally applicable to all state workers (Public Affairs 
Research Council, 1975: 17). Thus, all employees, regardless of the nature 
of their jobs, would receive the same retirement contributions.
Despite the incongruities and inconsistencies outlined above, 
the overwhelming preponderance of observed relationships are in the 
hypothesized direction and sufficiently constant to uphold the overall 
validity of the model. Furthermore, of singular import from the vantage
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point of this analysis is the unionization measure, percent of state 
employees belonging to an employee organization. This variable shows 
statistically significant associations with state employee salary and 
retirement benefits in all but three equations.
Percent unionization displays statistically significant standard­
ized partial regression coefficients for overall state salary (3 = .40), 
hospital salary (3 = .43), police salary (6 = .24), and salary/retirement
(6 = .44). Even in the three instances where the union variable is not
9
significant at the .05 level, it continues to exert a moderately strong 
positive impact on the respective dependent variables (B = .29, .28, .23). 
Clearly, unionism is associated with increased salary and benefits for 
state government employees.
Just how much does employee organization mean in dollars and 
cents to the average state employee? The dollar benefit can be deter­
mined by examining the unstandardized regression coefficient for the 
percentage of employees belonging to organizations with the dependent 
variable salary/retirement contributions. The b value of 2.87 
indicates that for every one percent increase in organizational member­
ship, a corresponding increase of $2.87 in combined monthly salary and 
benefits should result. On a yearly basis the one percent union mem­
bership advantage will become $34.44.
Another way of assessing the dollar advantage of unionization 
is to replace the percent union variable with a 0/1 dummy (union/nonunion) 
in the same equation, dichotomized on the basis of organizational member­
ship above or below 50 percent. When this is done, the general 
statistical relationships remain approximately the same, and total 
explained variance is quite comparable to that obtained previously. An
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examination of the union dummy reveals that, all other variables 
considered, a state government employee in a "union" state could expect 
$109.80 more in monthly salary and retirement benefits than his counter­
part in a "nonunion" state. This results in a $1317.60 advantage over a 
12-month period— about 13 percent when compared to the annualized mean 
compensation figure for nonunion state employees which can be derived 
from Table 15.
Conclusion
The model of state government employee compensation determination 
held up well under testing, explaining 72 percent of the total variance 
in salary and retirement benefits in a multivariate analysis. The model 
also was a reasonably good predictor of monthly salary for state employees 
in all occupational categories and in the more limited police, highways, 
and hospital functions. Less success was realized for employees' salary 
in the public welfare function and for the state retirement contributions 
variable.
It is evident from the high beta weights found for the socio­
economic measures in the various regression equations that a state's 
socioeconomic environment is quite important in determining the compen­
sation of state workers. Nature of the labor force, cost-of-living, 
and ability to pay all were found to influence state employee compen­
sation, although the labor force variable sometimes showed the opposite 
relationship with the dependent variables from what was hypothesized 
in the model. Factors within a state's political/legal environment also 
were determined to be of considerable importance in their effect on 
employee compensation. Although the union political power surrogate—
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percent union membership in nonagricultural employment— did not attain 
statistical significance in any of the equations (casting doubt on the 
existence of a union "threat effect"), the proxies for state legal struc­
ture and political environment showed fairly strong associations with the 
dependent variables. The labor relations policy of a state was of partic­
ular consequence in determining police salaries. The legislative 
capability/professionalism measure evidenced substantial standardized 
partial regression coefficients in almost all of the salary equations, 
although in the opposite direction from what had been expected. It 
therefore appears likely that state employees are able to win relatively 
higher salary and retirement benefits in those states with more 
capable/professional legislative bodies.
As anticipated, the unionization variable— percent of workers 
belonging to an employee organization— was one of the most important 
predictors of the level of state employee salary and benefits. The 
union measure achieved statistical significance in four of the equations 
and showed fairly high standardized partial regression coefficients in 
the other three. Multiple regression analysis reveals that where state 
employees are organized, increased salaries and retirement benefits 
should result in a dollar advantage of $1,317.60 per year, or about 13 
percent more than their counterparts in nonunion states.
These compensation figures present a somewhat different picture 
from what the simple comparison of union and nonunion state employee 
salary and benefits (Table 15) showed before the multivariate analysis 
was performed. In fact, when elements of a state's socioeconomic and 
political/legal environments are accounted for, the apparent compensa­
tion advantage of union state workers is halved.
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Still, the compensation advantage which appears to accrue to 
state employees who join an employee organization is of no small conse­
quence to those states which are suffering a fiscal crisis. As the 
unionization of public employees spreads across the states (which it is 
almost certain to do) increased pressure will be applied by employee 
groups on the executive and legislative branches of government in order 
to gain larger salaries and benefits. And in the short run at least, 
increasing unionization should exert an upward push on levels of state 
employee compensation. It is therefore quite likely that a growing pro­
portion of state operating budgets will be devoted to paying employee 
salaries and benefits. As approximately three-fourths of the typical 
state budget is already swallowed up by expenditures for employee compen­
sation, the implications of large collective bargaining settlements 
should be obvious.
As mentioned in the chapter on faculty collective bargaining, 
these pressures, while certain to be with us during the remainder of 
this decade, may operate only in the short-term, relatively speaking.
For as the process of collective bargaining in the public sector becomes 
more rationalized and its direct participants more experienced, one 
should expect that the initial, powerful influences of unions on compen­
sation se tlements will begin to taper off (see Foran, 1973). In this 
regard, the era of labor peace and relative cooperation that has 
generally existed in the private sector in recent decades will most likely 
he duplicated in the public sector, after this initial period of rapid 
growth in public employee unionism subsides. Now, this study will turn 
to an examination of public employee union influence on compensation at 
the municipal level.
NOTES
1. Since 1969, the yearly number of strikes by state government 
employees has levelled off, fluctuating from 23 to 40. State govern­
ment workers generally have lagged behind other public and private 
sector employees in all measures of strike activity (see Perry,
1976: 257-262). The massive 1975 strike in Pennsylvania would
seem to provide an exception to the normal reticence of state 
government workers to engage in large job actions. In this instance, 
about 55,000 AFSCME and SEIU-represented employees went out on 
strike over the amount of future pay increases (sec Sharp, 1976: 
263-267).
2. For a comparative examination of the nature and scope of employee 
coverage in each state, see Chauhan (1976: 19-30).
3. A similar analysis was undertaken using October 1972 data. The 
results were nearly identical to those reported for October 1974.
4. Highways includes state workers involved with the provision, main­
tenance, and repair of streets, roads, and highway facilities; public 
welfare covers those employees who participate in the administration 
of various assistance programs; hospitals includes employees of 
government-operated inpatient health care facilities; police in­
volves all persons engaged in state law enforcement operations (see 
U.S. Department of Labor, 1976: 130).
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5. A 1974 Oregon statute takes a unique approach in discouraging the
legislative end-run. The law makes it an unfair labor practice
for the exclusive employee representative to "communicate directly 
or indirectly during the period of negotiation with officials 
other than those designated to represent the employer regarding 
employment relations". (Council of State Governments, 1976: 15).
6. The use of percentage of employees belonging to a union or employee 
organization as a variable measuring union influence on wages has 
been criticized fay some economists (see Lewis, 1963: Ch. 2). As
a substitute in private sector analyses, an arbitrary decision is 
sometimes made whereby a firm in which over half of the employees 
belong to a union is considered "union" and firms in which less 
than half of the production workers belong to a union are labelled 
"nonunion" in order to construct a dummy variable. This latter 
technique sacrifices interval level data and seems to be rather 
subjective in nature. For example, is firm A, with 49 percent 
of its employees belonging to a union any less of a "union" firm 
than firm B, in which 51 percent of the employees are organized? 
Recently, however, Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975) have shown that 
the percentage of the organized work force and collective bargaining
dummy variable appear to measure the same phenomenon.
7. Since the universe of states is included in the analysis, tests
of significance are not truly applicable. However, it is rather 
common to use significance tests in this type of research in order 
to provide an indication of relationships that are "sizable".
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8. The negative relationship reported in the tables reflects the rankings 
of states on legislative capability. Thus, those states ranking 
highest are assigned ordinal values, so that the lower the assigned 
value, the higher the degree of legislative capability.
9. See footnote 7, above.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
ON THE COMPENSATION OF POLICEMEN 
Like some state governments and Institutions of higher education, 
many American cities currently are in the throes of a fiscal crisis. 
Diverse forces have contributed to the adverse financial conditions pre­
vailing in these municipalities, including (1) the need for new and 
expanded services to meet the rising demands of citizens; (2) the require­
ment for the modernization of city physical facilities; (3) the erosion 
of the local tax base as a result of suburban flight by affluent workers 
and some Industries; and (4) the severe economic conditions issuing from 
inflation and recession in the wider economy. It has been difficult for 
many cities to cope with these forces, as they seem to be beyond the 
control of local government officials. For example, the revenue-raising 
capacity of municipalities is rather inflexible, as a large proportion of 
the income of most cities is tied to property taxes and earmarked federal 
and state grants-in-aid (Spero and Capozzola, 1973: 216-17). As a result, 
municipal revenues generally do not increase nearly as rapidly as rising 
demands for expenditures.
As in the cases of higher education and state government, a large 
percentage of the funds spent by municipal governments is dedicated to 
personnel costs. From Table 18, the tremendous increase in municipal
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TABLE 18. MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLLS 
OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS, 1952 TO 1975
Municipal Employment (ETE) Municipal Payroll (Total)
Year (Thousands) (Millions)
1952 1,175 345
1953 1,200 368
1954 1,234 396
1955 1,252 414
1956 1,292 450
1957 1,297 461
1958 1,372 511
1959 1,406 54 8
I960 1,447 583
1961 1 ,491 630
1962 1,486 662
1963 1,549 708
1964 1,584 760
1965 1,638 818
1966 1,701 892
1967 1,715 972
1968 1,813 1097
1969 1,858 1196
1970 1,922 1361
1971 1,960 1482
1972 2,029 1654
1973 2,109 1855
1974 2,127 1985
1975 2,158 2150
S Increase 1952-75 84% 523%
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1976) Public Employment in 1975
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
175
payroll expenditures ran be compared with the rise in municipal employment 
From 1952 to 1975. As one can see, payroll costs have risen foster 
than the increase in municipal employment would seem to justify. While 
the total full-time equivalent employment over the 24-year period has 
increased 84 percent, municipal payrolls have risen by 525 percent.
Much of the ostensible gain in payroll expenditures undoubtedly 
would be reduced if the figures were adjusted in terms of real (1975) 
dollars. It is also apparent, however, that inflation alone cannot account 
for all of the rising differential. Some observers have alleged that 
municipal unions may be responsible for rising payroll expenses, at least 
since the late I960's. According to Spero and Capozzola (1973: 220):
The influence of unions, whether utilizing formal 
or informal bargaining or relying on the older forms 
of political operation, drives wages up faster and 
higher than they would rise if left to the normal 
pressures of supply and demand and other factors deter­
mining the labor market. Elements other than collective 
bargaining have played a role in the setting of municipal 
salaries and wages. Collective bargaining has, however, 
created a different configuration than would otherwise 
have developed.
Recent evidence would seem to support this assertion. Before the 
decade of the 1960's, public employee unionism was a negligible factor 
in the personnel costs of American cities, primarily because few workers 
were represented by organizations, either formally or informally, in 
negotiations concerning salaries and benefits. Within the past 15 years, 
however, collective representation has become commonplace in municipalities 
throughout the United States. In October 1975, almost 54 percent of all 
local government employees belonged to a union or association (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1977). In cities of 10,000 population and above,
60 percent of the public workers were members of employee organizations;
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the figure approached 100 percent in large municipalities such as New
1 2 
York, Cleveland, and Detroit.
Zagoria (1972: 2) has stated that the labor contracts negotiated 
by those organizations that engage in formal collective bargaining have, 
indeed, resulted in increased personnel costs and a marked shift away 
from capital expenditures to operating budgets. This does appear to have 
been the case in the three large cities mentioned above, all of which have 
negotiated costly labor agreements that precipitated large operating 
budget deficits (Maier, 1971: 58). If such has happened elsewhere, then 
one might be convinced of the validity of the Wellington and Winter thesis 
that extensive municipal unionization has led to excessive union political 
power. According to Wellington and Winter (1971: 169), "the very unioni­
zation of public employees creates a powerful interest group, at least in 
large urban centers, that seems able to compete very well with other 
groups in the political decision-making process ...." Public employee 
unions "serve as lobbying agents, wielding political power quite dispro­
portionate to the size of their membership."
In this chapter the analysis concerning the impact of collective 
bargaining on public employee compensation will turn to the municipal 
arena. The subject of the investigation to follow will be one particular 
occupational group— police service employees.
Police Employee Unionism
Municipal policemen are the second most highly-organized of all 
local government employees, with over 50 percent of their ranks belonging
to employee organizations as of October, Î975 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1977: 2).^ During the same year, it has been reported that local 
police departments received the largest municipal government outlay of all
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urban functions ($4.7 billion)— a sum almost 200 percent hij’her than what 
was spent on the police function 10 years earlier (Workers World, December 
12, 1975). Since about 85 percent of the typical police budget is devoted 
to salaries and fringe benefits (Mandish and Frankel, 1976: 1), it would 
appear that police employees themselves have been the recipients of a 
substantial proportion of these funds.
The situation has not always been so favorable for municipal 
police employees, as historically they have suffered from low pay and 
benefits, long hours, and hazardous working conditions. Tn partial con­
sequence of these factors, police were among the earliest municipal 
workers to form organizations. Most big city departments had active police 
organizations by the turn of this century, many of which have endured to 
the present time (Juris and Feuille, 1973: 15).
By 1919, wages and working conditions became matters of major con­
cern to many of these organizations. During that year the American 
Federation of Labor dropped its ban on police membership and granted 
charters to 33 associations. Shortly thereafter, the disasterous Boston
police strike occurred— an incident which set back police unionism by 
4
three decades.
Although police organizational activity resumed during the late 
1930's, the contemporary police labor movement began in the mid-1960's, 
accompanying the general public employee union activism. Soon, police 
reached the forefront of the public sector union movement; by the late 
1960's, collective bargaining for police employees had become institu­
tionalized throughout much of the United States (see Maddox, 1975: 13-14).
Police militancy reached new heights during the early part 
of the 1970's. Work stoppages, walkouts, and other joh actions have
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become commonplace. As one news magazine has noted, "Tn almost every 
large city across the country, police are in an angry, embattled, sometimes 
dangerously rebellious mood" (Time, 1976: 43). Juris and Feuille (1973: 
19-20) attribute the widespread police discontent to several general 
factors: (1) increased public hostility to the police; (2) the rising
demand for "law and order"; (3) low pay and poor personnel practices; 
and (5) the successes of other organized public employees. The authors 
further state that the major product of this dissatisfaction has been 
increased unionization by policemen throughout the United States.
Police unionism is characterized by autonomous local c h a p ­
ters operating within a context of loose national affiliation. 
The leading national police organization, in terms of number of chapters, 
is the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), which was established in 1915.
It has locals in almost every state and claims over 125,000 members (see 
Chapter One, Table 4). The largest national police organization , in 
terras of total membership, is the International Conference of Police 
Associations (ICPA). Basically a confederation of independent police 
associations, the ICPA was founded in 1953. Its primary strength lies 
in large cities of the Northeast (Stieber, 1973: 7). In 1972, it claimed
158,000 members in 100 state and local police organizations. Other local 
policemen are affiliated to a much lesser extent with AFSCME, the Inter­
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Service Employees International 
Union, and the Meatcutter's Union (see Burpo, 1971: 8-9)
Oespite their size, the national police unions normally do not 
play a major part in police labor relations or collective bargaining. 
Rather, their primary role is to provide legal, financial, and informa­
tional assistance to their locals. Police locals, however, are alleged
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to be some of the strongest public employee groups in terms of the effective 
application of political power in order to win improved wages, benefits,
and working conditions (Moskow, Loewenberg, and Koziara, 1970: 201).
In P olice Unionism, Juris and Feuille (1973) present a 
lucid and informative discussion on the political tactics of police 
unions in the United States. They state that while the police organizations 
may engage in formal collective bargaining, they also are quite competent , 
in political activities designed to achieve what may be denied them at the 
bargaining table. Juris and Feuille (1973: 49-51) describe police relations 
with such "third parties" to the bargaining process as the voting public, 
civil service commissions, the state legislature, the police 
commission and the governor. They note that what distinguishes 
police unions and other public employee organizations from 
their private sector counterparts is the fact that 
"... the union's bargaining power in the public sector consists of its 
ability primarily to manipulate the political costs of agreement and dis­
agreement of the various managers rather than the economic cost manipulation 
that characterizes union power in the private sector," a point which was 
stressed in Chapter Two of this study. Juris and Feuille (1973: 56) 
illustrate their thesis with an example from one of the cities they 
studied, where the local police union:
" ... aided the leading mayoral candidate by endorsing 
him, giving him a small campaign contribution, and having 
the articulate union leader campaign for him. Very soon 
after he was elected, the new mayor signed a generous 
two-year police contract.
Juris and Feuille (1973: 68-70) speculate that because of the 
police unions' almost extreme group cohesion, the legal use of force and 
coercion by police and their potential capitalization on "law and order"
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policies, they may exert the greatest impact on city governments 
of all public employee unions. If so, then one would expect that "police 
power" would be evidenced in the level of wages and benefits won by police 
organizations in negotiations with city governments. The purpose of the 
remainder of this chapter is to determine if police unionism does, indeed, 
result in higher salaries and benefits for its members.
Police Unions and Wages |
According to Burpo (1971: 21), "The attainment of improved economic 
benefits is the most significant goal of police employee organizations."
Three recent studies have attempted to gauge the degree of success enjoyed 
by police unions.
Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975) employ nine independent variables 
in testing a model of public sector wage determination for 10 categories 
of municipal employees in 4 78 cities. Five variables were statistically 
significant for the police salaries equation; population density, popu­
lation level, median family income, median family housing value, and 
average monthly earnings of private sector manufacturing workers. Although 
average police monthly salaries were seven percent higher in cities whose 
police employees engaged in formal collective bargaining procedures over 
wages, the authors report that this differential is not statistically 
significant. Ehrenberg and Goldstein's model is not exceptionally
auspicious, as it accounts for less than 50 percent of the total variance 
2
in police earnings (R = .4 7).
Lewin and Keith (1976) achieve a slightly higher level of 
explained variance (R^ = .53-.63) in their effort to ascertain the deter­
minants of police salaries in cities of 250,000 population and above for 
1971 and 1972. The independent variables found to be most strongly
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associated with minimum and maximum police salary levels for the two years 
were average hourly earnings of manufacturing workers, population density, 
and income inequality (as measured by the ratio of families with annual 
incomes exceeding $15,000 to those earning less than $5,000). A fourth 
variable, the existence of a wage parity arrangement between police and 
firefighters, was inversely related to the minimum salary level in both 
years at a statistically significant degree. The union measure, a dummy 
based on the presence of a police union affiliated with a national organi­
zation, was negatively related to salaries in three of the four equ.ition.s, 
and significantly so at the 1972 maximum salary level. The authors spec­
ulate that this rather surprising finding may be because: (1) unions may
increase the supply of police labor, thus lowering salaries; (2) unions 
may be more concerned with benefits than salaries in bargaining activity; 
and (3) the data may not reflect retroactive salary increases resulting 
from negotiations. The union findings may also result from the fact that 
the union variable is lagged three and four years behind the salary data, 
and because the influence of local nonafflliated police unions is not 
.accounted for.
The third study related to police unions and salaries was con­
ducted by Hall and Vanderporten (1977). Predicated on a traditional 
economic supply and demand model, the research utilizes eight independent 
variables in determining the influences on 1973 minimum, maximum, and 
mean annual police salaries in 141 cities of 50,000 population and 
above. All of the variables— crime rate per 1,000 population; median 
family income; number of business establishments per 1,000 population; 
median income of male craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers; police/ 
firefighter wage parity; population level; monopsony power; and
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unionization— were statistically significant in at least one of the three
2
equations. Multiple correlation coefficients ranged from R = .48 for 
2
mean salaries to R = .65 for maximum salary levels. The union measure, 
dummied on the basis of whether or not the police conducted formal collec­
tive bargaining with the city, indicated that bargaining added $185.75 
to the minimum salary, $378.71 to the maximum salary, and $599.88 to the 
mean salary. However, the relationship was statistically significant 
at the .05 level only in the average salary equation.
Taken together, two of the studies reported above would seem to 
show that police unionism has some positive influence on the salaries 
received by policemen. The deviant findings of Lewin and Keith are subject 
to substantial methodological and statistical criticism and therefore 
should be discounted. Problems also exist with regard to the research 
of Ehrenberg/Goldstein and Hall/Vanderporten as both (1) neglect 
to comment on possible multicollinearity among the independent variables 
employed in the analyses, and (2) fail to include fringe benefits in the 
compensation data. These shortcomings will be surmounted in the study 
reported below.
The Determinants of Police Employee 
Compensation: A Model
As in the case of state government employee compensation, the 
model applied to municipal police service employees will approximate 
closely the general model of public employee compensation presented in 
Chapter Two. The major purpose of the model, of course, is to isolate 
the impact of unionization on public employee compensation outcome when 
other determinants of compensation are taken into consideration.
The model is specified as follows:
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Socioeconomic
F.nvironmenr
Political/Legal 
Environment
Unionization
Municipal Police 
Services Employee 
Compensation 
Outcome
I. The final element in the model, municipal police services 
employee compensation outcome, is estimated for 147 cities 
of 10,000 population and above in five states: Arkansas,
Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. Three dependent 
variables are utilized in the multivariate analysis :
(1) uniformed patrolmen's 1976 entrance salary, (2) 1976 
maximum salary, and (3) city contributions to police 
employees' retirement and insurance programs. The first 
two were taken from the 1977 Municipal Year Book and the 
1976 FOP wage survey; the latter variable was obtained from 
the 1977 Year Book. Salary figures were standardized to a 
40-hour work week. The benefits variable included muni­
cipal payments for federal, state, and local retirement 
systems and health, disability, and life insurance programs. 
Salary and benefit data were not added together because of 
the "floor and ceiling" nature of the salary variables 
and the fact that the benefits data reflect retirement and 
insurance contributions for all (i.e., uniformed and 
civilian) police personnel.
II. Factors within the socioeconomic environment include:
A. Nature of the local labor force, measured by median years
of education of city residents aged 25 years and older, 1970.
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B. Cost-of-living, approximated through 1972 estimates
of per capita personal income within the municipalities.
C. Ability to pay of the city government, measured by 
1971-72 per capita general revenue from all sources.
D. Population level in 1973.
E. Population density per square mile in 1973.
F. Number of FBI "crime index" violations reported per
1,000 population in 1975.
All six of the socioeconomic factors are expected to vary positively 
with police employee salary and benefits. It is hypothesized that a city 
with a highly-educated work force, high cost-of-living, large per capita 
general revenue, high population level and density, and a large number of 
crimes will pay its police patrolmen relatively more than a city ranking 
lower on the six socioeconomic measures.
As in the earlier chapter on state employee compensation, no 
direct measure of opportunity wage is employed. Although others (for 
example, Gustely, 1974; Lewin and Keith, 1976) have operationalized muni­
cipal employee opportunity wages through the average earnings of various 
categories of private sector employees, the variable has been found to be 
highly correlated with per capita personal income. In effect, it is 
expected that the income variable will serve as a good proxy for oppor­
tunity wage. Furthermore, there seems to be no objective way to determine 
private sector work comparable to the service performed by policemen (see 
Fogel and Lewin, 1974: 413), unless it would be that of private security 
personnel such as Pinkerton employees. In any case, these data are not 
collected at the municipal level, with the exception of the Area Wage 
Surveys periodically issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics which apply
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exclusively to Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's). Only a 
small proportion of the total geographical area encompassed by the five 
states in this analysis would be covered by Area Wage Surveys.
III. Factors within the municipal political/legal environment
included in the model are the following:
A. The existence of a civil service system for policemen, 
operationalized through a dichotomous dummy variable. ^
B. City government structure, represented by a dummy 
variable with a value of zero for council/manager 
government form and one for mayor/council. Commission 
form of government was coded as missing data because 
only five of the cities reported having this type of 
government in 1976.
C. Municipal elections— at-large, ward, or mixed— were 
included as a dummy variable with ward and mixed elec­
tions coded as zero and at-large given a value of one.
D. The existence of a formal practice of salary parity 
between police and firefighters was also represented 
by a 0/1 variable.
E. The state legal environment surrounding police employee 
collective bargaining was included as a dummy variable 
dichotomized on the basis of whether or not policemen 
are granted some form of bargaining rights. Oklahoma 
and Kansas, which grant such rights, were given a value 
of one, and the other three states were coded with zeros.
Geographical location was not specifically entered into the model 
as a variable because each of the five states are contiguous within the
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south central section of the United States. In addition, the states 
evidence reasonable proximity in their factor loadings on 118 political, 
economic, and policy variables developed by Luttbeg (1971).
The presence of a civil service system which covers police employees 
is expected to depress the amount of salaries and benefits obtained by 
policemen. It is believed that a civil service commission, which typically 
is involved in the regulation of municipal employee wages and benefits, 
would operate in a fashion contrary to union compensation goals for 
several reasons, including its restriction of public employee political 
activities and its operation as a check on the authority of elected offi­
cials (see Crouch, 1968: 108-11; Burton, 1972: 125). According to Stieber 
(1973: 122-23), civil service commissions are, indeed, perceived by unions 
to be management oriented and controlled.^
City government structure, as it relates tn public employee bar­
gaining outcome, was discussed briefly in Chapter Two. It was noted that 
some scholars (Banfield and Wilson, 1967; Ehrenberg and Goldstein, 1975) 
contend that the influence of city employees tends to be strongest in 
council-manager cities, while others (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967; Gerhart, 
1976; Saltzstein, 1974)^ believe that municipal employee influence is 
less in council-manager cities. Empirical research findings, unfortunately, 
have not resolved the issue. As Juris and Feuille (1973: 63) state,
"it has not been possible to discern any distinct union advantages or dis­
advantages that unambigiously are a function of the form of city 
government. "
The findings in Chapter Four regarding the enhanced compensation 
gains of public employee organizations in states with more capable and 
professional legislative bodies, might lead one to expect that cities
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with a more "professional" form of government (i.e., a council-manager 
form) would also compensate their municipal employees more highly than 
cities with less professional governmental forms. Nonetheless, the hypo­
thesis to be tested in this chapter will conform to the expectations of 
the general model of public employee compensation outcome: other things
being equal, council-manager cities will pay their workers less than 
mayor-council cities. While the same should hold true for commission forms 
of government when compared to the mayor-council form (see UCLA haw Review , 
1972: 1015), this latter relationship cannot be sub.iected 
to statistical testing in the research that follows as only five commission 
cities are included in the sample.
The impact of different types of municipal elections on urban 
policy outputs has been the topic of considerable discussion by political 
scientists.^ Generally, the view has been that at-large, nonpartisan 
elections should, like the council-manager form of government, result in 
a broader and more "professional" outlook by municipal leaders (see Shank 
and Conant, 1975: 84). If so, one might expect that public employee 
organizations in these "reformed" cities would not be as successful, 
oalerio panhuo, as their counterparts in cities with unreformed institu­
tions. In the analysis which follows, the narrower hypothesis to be tested 
is that at-large elections (one aspect of a "reformed" city government struc­
ture) will result in a lessened influence of police employees.
The existence of a formal practice of wage parity for policemen 
and firefighters was hypothesized to exert a depressing effect on police 
salaries and benefits. Wage parity between these two groups of municipal 
employees existed in over 60 percent of all U.S. cities in 1969 (Fogel 
and Lewin, 1974: 426). According to a study by Lewin (1973b), the
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practice contributes to a shortage of police manpower and the relatiui- 
inflation of firefighter salaries at the expense of police wages.^
Finally, it was hypothesized that, other things being equal, police­
men within the two states which authorize collective bargaining for police 
employees— Kansas and Oklahoma— would receive relatively higher compensa­
tion than their counterparts in the other three states. This variable 
should, at least in part, account for the prevailing labor environment
S
within the states and a potential threat effect within those two states
9
which authorize police employee collective bargaining. This view 
is attested to by Juris and Feuille (1973: 60), who assert that the
existence of a state bargaining statute tends to strengthen the position
of police unions and insure them of greater visibility. In effect, 
this measure will be used in place of the union power variables employed 
in the faculty and state employee analysis.
IV. Two measures of police employee unionization initially
were used in the analysis: (I) the percentage of policemen
represented by a union or employee organization in formal 
or informal bargaining with the city, and (2) a union/nonunion 
dummy based on whether or not a formal contract existed 
between the police organization and the city in 1976.
However, only 26 cities in the sample of 147 reported 
formal contracts, which was deemed to be an insufficient 
number of cases in the union category to include this
variable in the multivariate analysis. Thus, it was
expected that the remaining union measure— the percentage 
of policemen belonging to employee organizations— would
12
be directly correlated with police salaries and benefits.
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Although data were collected on the different police
13
organizations active in the sample cities, it was 
expected that they would act similarly in their activities 
designed to influence the amount of police compensation 
(see Stieber, 1973: 58).
The Data
Data on police union membership, labor contracts, and parity pro­
visions were obtained through a mail questionnaire sent to city managers 
and administrative officers in Arkansas, New Mexico, Kansas, Oklahoma, and 
Texas (see Appendix). All cities with a population of 10,000 or over were 
included in the survey.
In general, the methodology recommended by Dillman (1972;
Dillraan, et. al, 1974) was followed in administering the mail questionnaires. 
A questionnaire and original cover letter were sent to 187 potential 
respondents along with self-addressed, stamped, letterhead envelopes (see 
Appendix). Ten days later a follow-up letter was posted as a reminder 
to those who had not yet responded. A third letter and a replacement 
questionnaire were fowarded three weeks after the original mailing.
The response rate was excellent. The original questionnaire was 
completed and returned by 68 percent of the total possible respondents.
The final response rate was 91 percent (170 questionnaires). Because of 
a lack of data on the dependent variables for some cities, only 147 of 
the responses were used in the analysis, which is described below.
Before considering the results of the multivariate analysis, it 
might prove useful to divide the data on the dependent variables into 
union and nonunion categories, as was done in the previous two chapters.
Of the 147 cities included in the analysis, 54 (37 percent) reported
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soae extent of police organizational membership. From Table 19, it is 
apparent that these "union" cities awarded their policemen higher entrance 
and maximum salaries and retirement/insurance benefits than did the 
"nonunion" cities. Average annual entrance salaries were 7.7 percent 
higher in union cities, maximum salaries were 4.5 percent larger, and the 
retirement/insurance benefits of unionized police exceeded those of non­
organized police by over 18 percent. Although these differentials are 
somewhat smaller than those calculated for faculty and state government 
employees, it would appear that police organizations benefit their members 
in terms of the amount of salary and benefits received. In the multi­
variate analysis presented below, other factors potentially associated 
with police employee compensation will be accounted for in order to help 
isolate any particular impact of unionization.
Findings
Table 20 displays the simple correlation coefficients, means, and 
standard deviations for the three compensation measures and the 12 inde­
pendent variables used in the multivariate analysis. Looking at the 
zero-order relationships between the entrance and maximum patrolmen's 
salary levels and the benefits variable (r = .32, .40), it is apparent 
that as in the case of state government employees, salary and benefit 
levels are no I: closely linked.
Socioeconomic factors appear to exert the strongest influences on 
the two salary variables. Both entrance and maximum salary are most 
closely related to per capita personal income (r = .51). The second 
strongest simple correlation for entrance salary is population level 
(r = .36); for maximum salary it is crimes per 1,000 population (r = .41).
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TABLE 19. AVERAGE ANNUAL COMPENSATION FOR POLICE 
EMPLOYEES IN UNION AND NONUNION CITIES, 1976
Union
Non­
union
Diff­
erence
% Diff­
erence
Average Entrance Salary $8664.19 
(N = 53)*
$8046.61 
(N = 93)*
$617.58 7.7
Average Maximum Salary $9968.91 
(N = 54)
$9538.70 
(N = 92)
$430.21 4.5
Average Benefits $ 144.48 
(N = 40)
$ 121.96 
(N = 86)
$ 22.52 18.5
*Sample size varies because of missing data.
Source: ICMA (1977). The Municipal Year Book. Washington, D.C.:
ICMA; Fraternal Order of Police (1976) A Survey of 1976 
Salaries and Working Conditions of the Police Departments 
in the U.S. Flint, Michigan: Fraternal Order of Police.
TABLE 20. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND CORRELATION COEFFIClEIffS FOR ALL VARIABLES 
FOR ANALYSIS OF POLICE COMPENSATION
X S.D. S’] '>2 '3 »1 *2 «3 -5 *6 »3 *9 *10 *11 *12
Entrance Salary 8271 1367 -
'2 Maximum Salary 9772 1616 .76 -
^3
Benefits 128 72 .32 .40 -
*1 % Police Emp. In Org. 31 42 .21 . 17 .13 -
2^ Median Years Education 11.8 1.1 .26 .35 .15 -.01 -
*3
Per Capita Pers. Income 3382 634 .51 .51 .28 -.02 .69 -
*4 Per (Zaplta Gen. Rev. 118 56 .07 .27 .17 .21 .06 .04 -
*5
Population LeveKthous.) 69 152 .36 .37 .20 .35 .06 .19 .20 -
*6 Population Density 22 11 .05 .08 .10 .00 -.10 -.01 -.08 .04 -
*7 Crimes per 1,000 Pop. 56 22 .32 .41 .10 .18 .03 .14 .33 .37 -.02 -
*8 Civil Service System .5 .5 .30 .22 .03 .22 .04 .12 .05 .26 -.15 .31 -
*9
Munlc. Govt, Structure .2 .4 .05 .01 .02 .10 -.07 -.08 -. 14 .14 .07 -.03 .19 -
*10 Election Type .7 .4 .01 -.03 -.04 -.07 -.21 -.29 .16 -.14 .06 .05 -.09 -.20
*11 Parity .1 .3 -.02 -.07 -.06 .22 -.02 -.09 -.02 .00 .01 -.03 -.04 .09
*12 State Collec. Barg. Law .3 .5 -. 15 .03 .27 .16 .31 .20 .12 -.10 .04 -.11 -.21 -.14
- .0 2
-.23
Sources: ICMA (1977) and POP (1976
Qf the Census (1976) x,:
yj-yjS mall survey Xj, '8 ' *11 : Bureau of the Census (1973) x^: ICMA (1976) x^, x^^; Bureau
q: Department of Justice (1975) Department of Labor (1976) x
193
Other socioeconomic factors exhibiting notable associations with the salary 
measures are median years education (r = .28 for entrance, r = .35 for 
maximum) and per capita general revenue (r = .27 for maximum). Population 
level represents the third highest correlation with maximum salary (r = .37), 
while crimes per 1,000 population is in a similar position in its relation­
ship with entrance salary level (r = .32).
The only factor within the political/legal environment that shows ÿ 
even a moderately strong association with both salary variables is the 
civil service system dummy (r = .30, .22); it is in a direction opposite 
to that which was hypothesized. Other political/legal environmental mea­
sures evidence weak relationships with the salary variables.
State collective bargaining law shows a moderate positive 
association with benefits (r = .27). The only other factors which appear to 
have potentially significant associations with benefit contributions are per 
capita personal income (r = .28) and population level (r = .20); other 
socioeconomic measures show weaker relationships.
Of primary importance for the purpose of this analysis, of course, 
is the salience of the unionization measure. From the matrix it is evi­
dent that the police organization variable is only weakly related to the 
three dependent variables (r = .21, .17, .13). This stands in marked 
contrast to the situation indicated in the earlier analyses of faculty 
and state government employees, where unionization/compensation simple 
correlations were substantially stronger.
Tn searching the matrix for evidence of possible multicollinearity 
between the 12 independent variables, one finds only a single instance of 
possible difficulty— the simple correlation between per capita personal 
income and median years education (r = .69). However, the correlation
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is not of sufficient size to cause the elimination of either variable.
When the salary and compensation measures are regressed on the
12 independent variables (Table 21), the levels of explained variance
which emerge are somewhat disappointing. The highest multiple correlation
2
coefficient is found in the entrance salary equation (R = .52).
2
Explained variance for maximum salary is a bit lower (R = .45); for the
benefits equation, the multiple correlation coefficient is quite small 
2
(R = .21). In short, the general model of public employee compensation 
determination is not as good a predictor of municipal police salary 
and benefits as it is of faculty and state government employee compensa­
tion.
The most important variable for the purposes of this investigation 
is the measure of unionization— the percentage of uniformed police employees 
belonging to an organization which bargains, formally or informally, 
with city officials over wages and benefits. Police unionization dis­
plays a statistically significant''^ standardized partial regression 
coefficient in only one equation— entrance salary (g = .16). While 
police organization is positively associated with the other two depen­
dent variables (6 = .08, 3 = .03), the relationship is not of sufficient 
strength to attain statistical significance.
The dollar benefit of police employee unionization for salaries 
can be determined from an examination of the unstandardized partial 
regression coefficient for the union measure in the salary equations. The 
b values of 5.30 and 3.30 indicate that for every one percent increase in 
police organizational membership, a corresponding increase of $5.30 in the 
annual entrance salary level and $3.30 in the annual maximum salary should result.
TABLE 21. PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND T-RATIOS
FOR POLICE EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, 1976
Variable
Entrance Salary Maximum Salary Benefits
b B
t-
ratio* b B
t-
ratlo* b B
t-
ratlo*
% Police Emps. in Org. 5.30 .16 2.29 3.30 .08 1.01 .40 .03 .30
Median Yrs. Ed. -2.61 -.02 .25 10.51 .07 .71 -.93 -.15 1.31
Per Capita Pers. Inc. 1.21 .56 6.29 1.25 .44 4.58 .04 .33 2.85
Per Capita Gen. Rev. -1.85 -.08 1.12 4.04 .12 1.72 .12 .09 1.03
Pop. Level (thous.) 2.36 .26 3.65 1.73 .14 1.88 .07 .15 1.64
Pop. Density 4.86 .04 . 66 15.51 .10 1.48 .39 . 06 .78
Crimes Per 1000 Pop. 5.48 .09 1.24 18.09 .22 2.90 -.02 -.01 .07
Civil Svc. Sys. 225.58 .08 1.20 170.72 .05 .64 1.34 .01 .10
Mun. Govt. Struct. 94.29 .02 .38 244.75 .05 .70 17.78 .09 1.07
Election Type 588.36 .19 2.76 422.77 .10 1.46 19.68 .12 1.36
Parity 69.15 .01 .22 -270.80 - .04 .61 -19.80 -.08 .94
State C.B. Law -544.15 -.19 2.66 -85.40 .02 .29 44.88 .30 3.24
.52 .45 .21
F Ratio 12.1 9.3 2.92
Standard Error 988.0 1400.0 66.8
*T-ratio of 1.98 would be significant at the .05 level (two-tailed test)
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Extrapolating a bit, it could be predicted that, ceteris paribus, a local 
police force in which 100 percent of the uniformed policemen are organized 
for formal or informal negotiation purposes should see their entering 
patrolmen starting at an annual salary $530.00 greater than identical 
employees in a city with no reported unionization ; maximum salaries should 
be $330.00 higher. Although this is no small amount, the lack of statis­
tical significance for the police organization measure in the maximum 
salary and the benefits equations casts some doubt on the efficacy of police 
unionization with regard to its success in the area of salary and benefit gains.
Since police unionization in the five state area is more prevalent 
in larger cities, and because only 37 percent of all sample cities reported 
any degree of police organizational input into the wage and benefit-setting 
process, it is conceivable that one or both of these factors might exert 
confounding effects on the unionization measure. In order to test for 
this possibility, cities with populations of less than 20,000 were elim­
inated from the data set. Out of the 55 cases dropped from the analysis, 
only 11 were considered "union" cities. As a consequence, 47 percent of 
the municipalities remaining in the data set reported unionization— al­
most one-half.
Multiple regression procedures were repeated for the sample of 
92 cases. Explained variance Increased slightly in each of the three 
equations (two to four percent). The standardized partial regression 
coefficients for the union variable remained unchanged in the maximum 
salary equation (B - .08), and increased somewhat for entrance salary 
(B = .25) and benefits (B ” .08). Significance testing, however, achieved 
results similar to those previously obtained, with police organizational 
membership attaining significance only for entrance salaries.
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Turning to the other elements in the model, the only independent 
variable which consistently achieves statistical significance throughout 
all three compensation equations is the surrogate for cost-of-living and 
opportunity wage— per capita personal income. Standardized partial re­
gression coefficients for this variable range from B = .54 for entrance 
salary, to B = .44 for maximum salary and B = .33 for benefits. Clearly, 
the local economic climate is quite important in determining the amount of 
salary and benefits received by policemen.
While only one other independent variable attains statistical sig­
nificance for maximum salary (crimes per 1,000 population, B = .22), four 
additional measures are of substantial importance in the entrance salary 
equation. Population level (B = .26), percentage of police employees 
belonging to an employee organization (B = .16), election type (B = -19), 
and state collective bargaining law (B = .19). The latter measure also is 
statistically significant in the benefits equation (B = .30).
In general, the socioeconomic factors included within the model 
are associated with salary and benefits in the predicted positive direction. 
There are no statistically significant deviations, although median years 
education is negatively related to entrance salary (B = -.02) and benefits 
(B = -.15), and per capita general revenue is inversely associated with 
entrance salary (B - -.08).
A different picture is presented when the political/legal variables 
are examined. Only municipal government structure is consistently related 
to the dependent variables in the hypothesized direction. It would appear 
that there is a slight tendency for mayor-council cities to pay their police 
employees more than council-manager cities, other things being equal.
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As expected, the existence of wage parity provisions for police 
and firefighters appeared to have a mild depressing effect on police 
salaries and benefits. However, the three remaining political/legal fac­
tors are somewhat surprising in their dependent variable relationships.
The presence of a civil service system shows a slight, positive 
association with police compensation in all three equations. Apparently, 
civil service commissions may be beneficial to policemen in terms of the 
amount of salaries and benefits they receive. Also contrary to the pre­
dictions of the model is the association between election types and 
compensation. Police employees in cities having at-large elections appar­
ently receive higher compensation than their counterparts in cities holding 
ward or mixed elections, other things being equal. The advantage is 
statistically significant in the case of entrance salaries, as the model 
predicts that a $583.36 annual entrance salary benefit accrues to policemen 
in at-large election cities. Despite assertions that cities with "reformed" 
political institutions should operate in a "businesslike" manner and eschew 
politics, this finding is not entirely unexpected. In fact, a reasonable 
assumption might be that municipal employees, including policemen, would 
enjoy more political leverage in cities with at-large elections. Ward-based 
municipal elections might force employee groups to lobby with a number of 
potential officeholders with widely varying constitutiences and diverse 
personal orientations who might not be particularly amenable to the 
desires of the public worker. In effect, the bloc voting power of employee 
organizations would be divided and blunted. On the other hand, with 
city-wide elections, public employees could vote as a bloc for all candi­
dates they considered to be favorable to their viewpoint, making them 
potentially one- of the most powerful interest groups in the city.
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The state collective bargaining law dummy variable contributes 
some interesting results. The measure, coded zero for cities located 
within the states of Arkansas, New Mexico, and Texas and coded with a value 
of one for cities in Oklahoma and Kansas, shows only a very slight associa­
tion with maximum policemen's salary (B = -.02). State bargaining law, 
however, displays statistically significant relationships with each of the 
other two dependent variables, but these relationships are in opposite 
directions (B = -.19 for entrance salary; B = . 30 for benefits). Thus, it 
appears that state legal authorization of collective bargaining by police 
employees exerts a very slight negative effect on police entrance salaries and 
a positive influence on the insurance and retirement contributions received by 
these public employees. While the latter relationship conforms to the 
expectations of the model, the reasons underlying the inverse association 
between policemen's entrance salary and state collective bargaining 
enabling legislation are not readily apparent.
Conclusion
The model of public employee compensation determination tested in 
this chapter was not as successful as in the previous two analyses. The 
total amounts of variance in the police compensation dependent variables 
explained by the elements of the model were considerably less than that
5
obtained for faculty and state government employees. Multiple corre-
2 2 
lation coefficients were R = .52 for police entrance salary, R = .45
2
for maximum salary, and R = .21 for municipal contributions to police 
retirement and insurance plans.
These relatively low multiple correlation coefficients correspond 
to those obtained in the other police salary studies cited earlier in this
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chapter (see Ehrenberg and Goldstein, 1975; Lewin and Keith, 1976; Hall 
and Vanderporten, 1977). In part, the low amounts of explained variance 
may be a function of using entrance and maximum salary levels as dependent 
variables rather than mean salaries.
Although a substantial amount of the variance in police compensa­
tion remains unexplained, it appears that for police employees in a 
contiguous five-state area in the Southwestern United States during 1976, f
public employee unions did not exercise the disproportionate political 
power that Wellington and Winter (1971: 169), among others, have alluded 
to, at least when political success is measured in terms of salary and 
benefit gains. While all three compensation variables were positively asso­
ciated with unionization, only police entrance salaries were substantially 
higher as a result of organizational membership— maximum salaries and muni­
cipal benefit contributions were not as strongly affected by police iinionizar ion. 
Other forces, operating within the socioeconomic and political/legal environ­
ment of the cities, were of greater importance in determining police compensation.
Perhaps the police organizations in this area of the country have 
not yet gathered their forces for an assault on salary and benefit levels, 
choosing to concentrate on noncompensation issues instead. Indeed,
Maddox (1975: 24) refers to several police rank and file attitudinal sur­
veys during recent years which have shown that economic factors do not g
rank as high as job security, job protection, and other variables on 
issues which are of major concern to policemen.
As in the cases of faculty and state government employees, it is 
apparent that socioeconomic factors are the strongest determinants of 
police employees' salaries and benefits. Per capita personal income 
within the city is particularly salient, reflecting the important influence
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of cost-of-living and the overall local economic climate on the compensation 
levels granted to police service employees. Other socioeconomic influences 
substantially affecting police compensation are population level (entrance 
salary) and the local crime rate per capita (maximum salary). Nature-of-the 
labor force (as measured through median years education), ability to pay 
(per capita general revenues), and population density were of lesser con­
sequence in their impact on police salaries and benefits.
Only two of the political/legal environmental variables were of 
much consequence in their relationship with compensation: at-large muni­
cipal elections had a favorable influence on entrance salaries, while the 
presence of facilitating state collective bargaining legislation showed a 
strong direct association with benefits, but a statistically significant 
inverse relationship with entrance salary. Evidently, police employees are 
able to obtain salary advantage in cities with at-large municipal elections, 
compared to mixed or ward elections. This finding confirms the suggestion 
of Banfield and Wilson (1967: 214). Interpretation of the state bargaining 
law variable awaits further study.
Contrary to what was hypothesized in the model, the existence of 
a civil service system for police employees does not appear to depress 
salaries and benefits. In fact, there seems to be a slight positive asso­
ciation between the variables, although not a strong one. The absence of 
a significant relationship between municipal civil service commissions and 
police employee compensation might have been anticipated from a study by 
Crouch (1968: 108-11), whose analysis could not confirm any difference in 
administrative policies and decisions resulting from the presence of a 
civil service commission.
The association predicted for formal police/firefighter wage and 
benefit parity and police compensation was not in the direction hypothesized.
2 0 2
as parity agreements were slightly correlated with high salaries and 
benefits. Little confidence should be placed in this finding, however, as 
none of the standardized partial regression coefficients were very high 
and, furthermore, only 12 of the cities in the analysis reported 
the existence of a formal police/firefighter parity arrangement, an in­
sufficient number of cases for valid analysis.
Although the data indicate that council-manager cities pay their ^
policemen less than mayor-council cities when other influences are accounted 
for, the relationship is not strong enough to achieve statistical signi­
ficance. This is, however, a most promising area for future research. 
Various studies have documented the expanding policy role of city managers 
in American cities (see Wright, 1959; Almy, 1977). Conclusive findings 
on whether or not the typical city manager actually affects expenditure 
decisions, such as in the amount of compensation paid to municipal 
employees, awaits further empirical research .
In conclusion, it must be stated that the relationship between 
municipal police unionism and police compensation has not been established 
satisfactorily. Although common sense would dictate that police organi­
zations— like faculty and state government employee unions— have a positive 
influence on salaries and benefits, the data presented here do not warrant 
great confidence in this position. Perhaps if a similar study were 
extended nationwide, one could be more certain of the nature of the findings.
NOTES
1. New York City constitutes the ultimate in public employee union
i
influence on municipal government. The city's civil servants are some 
of the most highly compensated in the United States in terms of both 
wages and fringe benefits. For a critical assessment of the public 
employee labor relations experience in New York City, see R.D. Horton 
(1973).
2. Stieber (1973: 228) has speculated that the lower union membership
figures in smaller municipalities may be because they present
less cost-efficient organizing targets, similar to small
firms in the private sector. Stieber goes on to submit that a "critical 
size" of 50,000 population exists at which (I) public employees are 
likely to foresee the potential benefits of organizational membership, 
and (2) unions become interested in organizing the municipal workers. 
Police and firefighters, Stieber notes, are an exception to this 
proposition.
3. Highway workers are the most highly-organized of all municipal employees;
4. The 3oston Social Club was one of the 33 AFL police locals. Boston
police in 1919 worked 80 hours per week for pay amounting to less than
that received by streetcar conductors. When the police commissioner 
ordered them to discard their AFL charter, they refused. Charges 
were brought against the policemen, who retaliated with a mass strike.
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Looting and violence became rampant throughout Boston. Public opinion 
turned against the police, as epitimozed in Massachusetts Governor 
Calvin Coolidge's statement, "There is no right to strike against the 
public safety by anyone, anywhere, anytime." Eventually, all police 
employees were fired and the AFL revoked the charters of all 33 police 
locals. See Maddox (1975: 9-11); Juris and Feuille (1973: 16).
5. See Wellington and Winter (1971: 143-45) for a discussion on the con­
flict between civil service systems and collective bargaining.
6. Saltzstein (1974) asserts that city managers assume a management per­
spective in dealing with employee organizations, resisting the labor 
organizations and defending the interests of taxpayers. He attributes 
this management role to their socioeconomic backgrounds, training, and 
peer group influence. Saltzstein (1974: 338) foresees city managers
as presenting a "potent force" in opposing employee organizations, 
with the "professional" values of managers and council members sub­
stituting for the role of the profit motive in limiting private 
sector bargaining compensation outcomes. Based on his own research 
findings. Wells (1967) supports Saltzstein's argument with regard to 
the tendency of a city manager to oppose employee organizations.
7. For one of the first empirical efforts in this area, see Lineberry
and Fowler (1967).
8. Out of the 147 sample cities, only 12 reported a formal parity arrange­
ment. See Burpo (1971: 97-100) for a discussion of the parity issue,
which is complicated by different work hours, training, and hazards 
within the police and firefighter occupations.
9. All Kansas public employees, excluding teachers, have enjoyed meet
and confer bargaining rights since 1971. Oklahoma police, fire, and
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municipal employees have had mandatory bargaining rights since the 
passage of relevant legislation, also in 1971. Municipal workers in 
Arkansas and New Mexico do not have statutory bargaining rights. The 
situation in Texas is unique: in accordance with a 1973 law, police
and firefighters are granted mandatory bargaining rights, but only 
upon the passage of appropriate legislation through a local referendum  ^
(see U.S. Department of Labor, 1976). To date, 25 referenda have been 
held. Eleven cities have decided to permit police and firefighters 
collective bargaining: Texas City, Corsicana, Beaumont, Laredo,
Brownsville, El Paso, Sherman, Corpus Christi, San Antonio, Kingsville, 
and Bryan.
10. The relationship between collective bargaining law enactment and the
strength of public employee organizations is not, however, unidirectional, 
as states with substantial public employee union organizations have 
been among the first to pass such legislation (see Stieber, 1973: 23).
11. Data on the percentage of union membership in the private sector 
workforce are not aggregated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics at the 
city or county levels. Therefore, this variable was not included in 
the analysis in this chapter.
12. Lewin'R (1974a) finding that organized public employees influence wage 
decisions even in the absence of formal collective bargaining supports 
this methodological decision.
13. Police organization affiliation was reported as follows:
POP - 34 Local (non-affiliated) organization - 25
ICPA - 1 Other national organizations - 4
IBPO - 2
14. Much of the union membership
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is concentrated in the larger municipalities
Population and organizational membership figures are as follows:
City Size N
% Reporting organizational 
membership
500,00 and above 3 100%
250,000 - 499,999 6 100
100,000 - 249,999 10 60
50,000 - 99,999 20 55
25,000 - 49,999 33 36
10,000 - 24,999 75 21
Total 147 37%
Clearly, the formal and informal bargaining role of police unions is
directly related to city size in the five states.
15. As in the previous analysis of state government employees, tests of
statistical significance are not truly applicable when the sample con­
stitutes a universe of cases. Nonetheless, the use of such tests does
provide some indication of the strength of various relationships.
APPENDIX
The
’Tjniversity'of Oklahoma 455 w es t Lindsey, Room 304 Norman, O klahom a 73069 . 
Bureau of Governm ent Research
Enclosed is a brief questionnaire prepared by the Bureau of Government 
Research for a project we are conducting on collective bargaining in the 
police services. We realize that city officials like yourself are bombarded 
with questionnaires these days and regret that we find it necessary to use 
this means for gathering information for our project. However, the project 
is concerned with an area of vital interest to city officials— public employee 
unionism in the municipal service.
The questionnaire should take less than five minutes to complete. With 
the exception of the first question, it is simply a matter of checking blanks.
If you so indicate, we shall be happy to send you the results of the 
questionnaire, so that you can become apprised of what the police "union" 
situation is in other municipalities within the five-state area of Oklahoma, 
Texas, Arkansas, New Mexico, and Kansas.
Your assistance with our project is greatly appreciated. Thank you for 
your valuable time.
Sincerely,
David R. Morgan 
Associate Director and 
Associate Professor of 
Political Science
DRM/ps
Enc.
207
208
BUREAU OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH 
University of Oklahoma 
Norman, Oklahoma 73019
SURVEY ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN POLICE SERVICE
Please enter the appropriate figures indicating the number of full-time, sworn 
employees in the police protection function and the number represented by unions 
or employee organizations in dealing with the city, either formally or informally, 
on wage and benefit matters: )
No. of Employees No. of Employees 
Represented by Not Represented
Unions or By Unions Or
Total No. of Employees Associations Associations
Police protection ________  ________  ________
2. If in question 1 you have shown any police employees as represented by unions 
or employee associations, please identify the organizations to which they 
belong with a check ( /  ).
  FOP   SEIÜ  Local organization
ICPA LIU affiliated with
    any national organi-
  AFSCME   IBT zation
  Other (specify)
3. Do your city's police employees come under a civil service system?
 Yes
  No
If so, since what year? ____________
4. If your city bargains with police employees over wages and benefits, either
formally or informally, who has the primary bargaining responsibility for the city?
Chief Executive Personnel or Civil Service Director
City Manager _____ Budget Director
Assistant City Manager _____  Other (specify)
  Not applicable
THE QUESTIONS ON THE SECOND PAGE SHOULD BE ANSWERED ONLY IF YOUR CITY CONDUCTS 
FORMAL OR INFORMAL BARGAINING PROCEDURES WITH POLICE PROTECTION PERSONNEL.
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5. Does a formal, written contract exist between the city and a police organization?
 Yes
 No
If so, what was the first year in which a formal contract was negotiated? _______
6. Does the police organization receive a dues check-off for police employees?
 Yes
 No
7. Are police-city negotiations "open" to the public?
 Yes
 No
Do you think they should be? ________Yes  No
8. Does a formal parity arrangement exist among police and firefighters with regard 
to salary and benefits?
 Yes
No
if so, since what year?
IF YOU DESIRE A COPY OF THE RESULTS OF THIS SURVEY, PLEASE COMPLETE BELOW:
Name __________________________ ______
Address __________
'V n m ts ity o f Oklahoma
Bureau of Government Research
May 2, 1977
Recently we mailed you a questionnaire on collective 
bargaining in municipal police services, and asked for 
your participation in this important survey.
If you have already returned the questionnaire, 
please consider this note a "thank you" for your valuable 
assistance.
If you have not had a chance to do so yet, may we 
ask you to return the completed form now? Your partici­
pation is vital to the success of our study.
Sincerely,
David R. Morgan 
Associate Director & 
Associate Professor 
of Political Science
DRM/ps
455 West Lindsey, Room 304 Norman, O klahom a 73069
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The
U nivers ity 'o f Oklahoma 4SS w es t Lindsey, Room 304 Notman, Oklahom a 73069 7 . i r  '•'(
Bureau o f G overnm ent Research
Last month we mailed you a questionnaire requesting information on 
collective bargaining in the municipal police services for your city.
Our records indicate that you have not yet returned the questionnaire. 
Since your response is very important for our survey, we are enclosing 
another copy of the form for you to complete.
If you have any questions about the survey or the information 
contained in it, please contact us at the Bureau of Government Research 
(405) 325-6621.
We look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.
Sincerely,
David R. Morgan 
Associate Professor of 
Political Science
DRM/ps
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Organized groups of workers— unions— are a relatively old 
phenomenon in public employment in the United States, having been in 
existence since the early 1830's. But public employee unions have been 
significant social and economic forces only since World War II. As union 
membership began to decline in private sector employment, public employee 
unions started to register their first substantial gains. With the changing 
legal environment of public sector labor relations in the early I960's , 
public employee unionism became a major economic and political force to be 
contended with by American state and local governments.
An important goal of this research has been to serve as a bridge 
linking the study of private sector wage determination with the determina­
tion of salaries and benefits in public sector employment. Constructing 
this bridge has permitted the specification of social, economic, political, 
and legal factors which influence the amount of compensation received by 
various categories of public workers. Identification of these wage deter­
minants was necessary in order to pursue the primary purpose of this 
research— the isolation of any impact of unionization on the compensation 
of state and local government employees. Throughout this research, the 
focus ha.s been on one effect of public employee unionism— its influence
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on public employee compensation levels. Causes of unionization iiavo not 
been treated empirically.
A review of research findings of economists relating to the union 
impact on wage determination in the private sector reveals that scholars 
are in general agreement that new unionism has been a source of relative 
wage advantage during most years since 1890. Findings regarding the effects 
of continuing unionism have been conflicting, although continuing unionism 
does appear to generate some wage advantage during periods of economic 
recession.
Specific wage impacts of private sector unions averaged 15-20 
percent from the late 1930's through the early 1940's , 7-10 percent from 
1944 to 1945, less than five percent in the following two years, 10-15 
percent in the late 1950's, and 20-25 percent during the 1960's and early 
1970's. Other major determining factors in the wage levels received by 
workers in private employment were found to be geographical location, size 
of the work establishment, characteristics of the labor force, profit 
levels, cost-of-living, comparative wage standards, some noneconomic fac­
tors, and the wider economy.
Because of the differences extant between the public and private 
spheres in legal environment, economic environment, organizational relation­
ships, and political activity, it was necessary in developing a general 
model of public sector compensation determination to select only those 
determinants of wages in private employment which seemed appropriate to 
the public sector. The general model outlined in Chapter Two was also 
firmly grounded on research findings of economists concerning specific 
public employee wage determinants.
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In following chapters the model was tested on three categories of 
public workers: faculty at institutions of higher education, state govern­
ment employees, and municipal policemen. Varying results ensued. The 
model was a good predictor of faculty and state government employee compen­
sation, but it did not fare so well when applied to municipal policemen.
In Chapter Three it was discovered that collective bargaining in 
higher education within the United States has been associated with increased 
salaries and benefits for organized faculties. The matching of union and 
nonunion institutions in accordance with various criteria resulted in a 
$625 annual compensation differential in favor of unionized faculties.
When other influences were accounted for through the use of multiple 
regression techniques, the union faculties were found to benefit by more 
than $1,200 in 1974-75 annual compensation and by nine percent in average 
compensation increases over a five-year period.
When the sample was dichotomized by public and private institutional 
control, it was determined that unionization was associated with a $1,294 
salary and benefit advantage for private schools in 1974-75, compared with 
$1,135 for public institutions. The change measure indicated that while 
unionized private faculties received 14.3 percent more in compensation 
over a five-year period than their nonorganized counterparts, public 
faculties enjoyed an advantage of only 5.8 percent.
In Chapter Four, the analysis turned to the union impact on state 
government employee salary and benefits. Results showed that in 1974 the 
unionization measure was a significant determinant of overall state employee 
retirement benefits and salary as well as state hospitals and police 
employee compensation. In states where government workers were organized.
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a SI,318 salary and retirement benefits advantage resulted— about 13 percent 
more than unorganized state employees when other factors were also taken 
into consideration.
In the fifth chapter, municipal police employee pay and benefits 
became the subject of the research. Data gathered, in part, from a survey 
questionnaire mailed to city administrators in a contiguous five-state area
i
were subjected to multiple regression analysis in order to uncover the 
impact of police employee organizations on the compensation of policemen.
Police unionization was found to be significantly related to patrolmen's 
entrance salary, but only moderately associated with maximum salary and 
fringe benefits. The entrance and maximum salaries for police forces which 
were 100 percent organized were predicted to exceed those of nonunionized 
policemen by annual amounts of $530 and $330, respectively.
The findings of the analyses summarized above generally are in 
keeping with the public sector studies on the impact of employee unions on 
compensation reported in previous chapters. Earnings differentials favoring 
unionized public employees range from approximately six percent for muni­
cipal police entrance salaries and three percent for maximum salaries in five 
southwestern states, to 5.8 percent for mean faculty salaries in public in­
stitutions of higher education, and up to 13 percent for mean salaries in the 
case of state government workers. Based on this research and other studies the 
conclusions discussed below would appear to enjoy considerable empirical support.
Conclusions
1. The unionization of public employees is associated with 
increased salaries and benefits for organized workers, at least in the short 
run. The research findings reported in this study and the evidence presented 
by various economists clearly point out this relationship.
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2. While unionization exerts a positive influence on public 
employee compensation, the union effect is not as strong as in the case
of many private sector workers. The 20 to 25 percent increase in wages
associated with private sector unionization in the 1960's and early 1970's 
exceeds that found for various public sector occupational categories
during the same time period by 10 to 15 percent. It is important to ^
emphasize, however, that the union compensation effects may be of greater 
consequence for public employers than for private sector employers, par­
ticularly since it is much easier to pass along salary and benefit increases 
to the consumers of goods and services produced in the private sector.
To illustrate, it is considerably more practicable for General Motors to 
transfer the costs of a labor agreement to the public through price
increases on new model ca_ ■ than it is for the city of Dallas to obtain
voter approval of a new municipal tax increase.
3. Clearly, market constraints do operate in the public sector 
to limit public employee compensation gains. Although many of the tradi­
tional private sector market constraints identified by economists such as 
competition, profits, and product prices are absent from the public sphere, 
others are present. Budget considerations, tax levies, bond issues, a 
sense of "the public good" and other factors affect the outcomes of 
collective bargaining in public sector employment. It is especially the 
role of that "third party" which is located at the core of public sector 
labor relations— the public itself— that often proves to be of critical 
importance. Interested state or local public organizations and individuals 
may be able to act as countervailing powers in seeing that excessive and harm­
ful wage and benefit settlements are not negotiated by the major parties to the 
bargaining process. When a city, for example, suffers an operating budget
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shortfall, public employee layoffs and wage cuts must be considered. If 
public workers threaten to strike for compensation increases that are not 
reasonably affordable to a governmental entity, the strike should be viewed 
as a viable and possibly less expensive alternative to excessive wage and 
benefit settlements.^ In short, government employers, union representatives, 
and the general public all must develop a proper sense of perspective and 
responsibility in conducting the people's business.
There are indications of a shift in public opinion against those 
public employee organizations which have been particularly obstreperous 
in some states and cities in the United States. For example, the alterna­
tive of "farming out" government work to private concerns is being 
explored by the state of California, which is currently training a police 
force for the temporary replacement of striking local police. Voters in San 
Francisco— a city which has been responsible for extraordinarily high public 
employee wage settlements— have rebelled at the polls in expressing their
2
determination to avoid further abuse of the collective bargaining process . 
Finally, interviews by the Bureau of National Affairs with government and 
union officials and congressional sources find "a strong public opinion 
swing against government employee unions" (GERR, No. 626: 2-1 Special 
Report). In other words, there are special constraints which operate 
within the public sector to insure that wage and benefit settlements do 
not get entirely out of hand.
4. It necessarily follows that the Wellington and Winter hypothesis 
that the "nonmî.rket setting" of public employee labor relations will 
permit public workers to distort the political process, di s ­
advantage other interest groups, and gain a disproportionate 
share of governmental operating budgets has failed to
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gain either theoretical or empirical support from this study or others 
(Hammermesh, 1975; Freund, 1974). Although the evidence is rather clear 
that some large municipal unions have gained unusually high salary and 
benefit increases, this outcome appears to be the exception rather than the 
rule. However, it does appear likely that public employee unionism will 
continue to assist public workers in catching up with and sometimes sur­
passing similarly-situated employees in the private sector. To place the 
specific findings of this research in the Wellington and Winter context, 
it is not likely that faculty, state government workers, and municipal 
police employees have exercised a "disproportionate" influence on the 
operating budgets of their respective employers.
5. Socioeconomic environment is the primary determinant of the 
pay and benefit levels received by public employees. The measures employed 
in this research which were found to serve as important and consistently 
strong compensation determinants were cost-of-living and economic climate 
(per capita personal income), nature of the labor force (education levels), 
and previous compensation increase. Population level, municipal crime 
rate, and governmental or institutional revenue were also of significance 
in some cases. Factors within the political/legal environment which 
served as salient compensation determinants in at least one regression 
equation were union membership in nonagricultural employment, state labor 
relations law, state legislative capability/professionalism, and type of 
municipal election.
6. Although the causal factors associated with the growth of 
public employee unionism were not a matter of specific inquiry in this 
research, it is quite apparent that public employee union membership 
rolls will continue to swell during the next several years. As long as
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public workers feel that they are not receiving adequate pay and benefits 
or that satisfactory grievance channels are not available to them, unions 
will present a very appealing option. As more states enact permissive 
collective bargaining legislation, further union growth will 
ensue.
The growth of unionism in the public sector should not be looked 
upon with undue apprehension. In many ways, it is simply an extension to 
the public sector of employer-employee labor relations as they are con­
stituted in the private sector. There are probably more similarities than 
differences in labor relations within the two sectors. As American 
society becomes increasingly complex, the traditional public/private 
dichotomy loses relevance (see Spero and Cappozola, 1973: 312-22). The 
two sectors have developed more and more reciprocal relationships, 
especially in the exchange of goods and services. One consequence has 
been that many privately-provided goods and services are just as 
"essential" as those which are publicly-provided. Lockheed and American 
Telephone and Telegraph are examples which come quickly to mind.
Like their counterparts in private employment, state and local 
government employers must learn to accept and cope with collective bar­
gaining. Public officials and administrators should take the initiative 
in developing bargaining expertise as soon as collective bargaining becomes 
inevitable in their respective spheres of operation, if they are to pro­
tect the interests of the American public as a whole. Disasterous 
outcomes of public employee bargaining are not necessary. Perhaps Stanley 
and Cooper (1972: 144-45) have stated it best:
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In the bargaining process unions are necessarily 
constrained by prevailing practice in the private sector 
and in other governments, by fiscal realities, by the 
need to do business in the future with management, by 
managements' skill and resolution in bargaining, by 
impasse resolution procedures, and by managements' 
ultimate willingness to 'take a strike' and apply 
sanctions.
Lewin (1973a: 309-321) reports that whereas unions in public employ­
ment may contribute to some uneconomical practices on the job, they also 
"have spurred management into more efficient utilization of equipment, 
improved personnel practices, (modified) unfair hiring standards, and 
(reduced) waste through faulty production." In this sense, collective bar­
gaining has improved public management.
None of this discussion is meant to imply that there are no impor­
tant differences in the structure and processes of labor relations in the 
public and private sectors. The public sector i^ different because of many 
factors, especially the "third party" participants in all public sector 
negotiations, including legislative bodies, the actors within the executive 
and judicial branches, civil service commissions, and many others. Public 
sector labor relations are undergoing a period of change which requires a 
dynamic and mature approach on the part of both labor and management. 
Eventually, the kinks in the structures and processes of labor relations 
will be worked out. Until then, open minds and a spirit of pragmatism 
should prevail among all parties.
Future Areas for Research 
Because of the recency of the widespread movement among public 
workers to organize, the structure, processes, and consequences of collec­
tive bargaining in public employment largely remain unexplored. The field
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is ripe for theoretical and empirical research by those with either 
academic or applied interests. This study will conclude with some suggestions 
on the directions future research could take.
First of all, improvements can be made on the model of public 
employee compensation determination which was employed in this study, par­
ticularly as it was applied to municipal police employees. Compensation 
determinants could be better specified in order to increase the amount of 
explained variance in the dependent variables and enable a more satisfactory 
isolation of the union impact on the salaries and benefits of public 
employees. It would be especially helpful to develop a measure for opera­
tionalizing comparative wage standards at the municipal level. Those 
studies of compensation determination in larger cities which have utilized 
a comparative wage standard as an independent variable have found it to be 
a very strong determinant of employee salary levels (see Gusteley, 1974). 
Although the Bureau of Labor Statistics collects this information for 
large metropolitan areas through its area wage surveys, the data currently
are not available for smaller cities and towns.
If some improvements such as operationalization of comparative 
wage standards could be made, the model should be extended to police 
compensation determination in cities of 25,000 population and above 
throughout the 50 states. Although a regional study such as that presented 
in this research is of considerable interest, a national analysis would 
certainly provide a more comprehensive picture of police employee unioni­
zation's influence on salaries and benefits.
A related matter concerns the compensation measures employed as 
dependent variables in the foregoing analyses on faculty, state government
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employees, and police salary and benefits. With the exception of the 
faculty collective bargaining study, the total dollar value of fringe 
benefits was not available for analysis. As data collection improves in 
the area of public employment, more complete benefit figures should be 
forthcoming for utilization in future research. It is quite important 
that the dollar value of fringe benefits be included along with salary 
amount if researchers are to provide a comprehensive treatment of public 
employee compensation determinants and— more salient from the viewpoint 
of this study— any accompanying union influence.
Taking a broader, more theoretical perspective on the whole issue 
of unions, public workers, and compensation determination would constitute 
a further area for inquiry. More specifically, it would be helpful to 
construct a model encompassing both the causes and effects of public 
employee unionism in the United States. A very general outline of the 
model and hypothesized causal linkages might be as follows:
I
Socioeconomic
Environment
Political
Structures
4 Collec. Barg. 
Legal Environ.
■  :
 J Unionization ■__\1----------
Public
Employee
Compensa­
tion
Outcome
Thus, linkages could be explored between the social, economic, and 
political environments of a category of public employees and their impact 
on (1) the legal structure of collective bargaining; (2) extent of unioni­
zation; and (3) salary and benefits outcome. This approach would broaden 
considerably the scope of analysis. Empirical testing of various hypothe­
sized correlations among elements of the model could clarify the direction
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and order of important relationships in the wider area of public employee 
labor relations, and thereupon expand our knowledge of various critical 
interrelationships.
One of the major justifications for the research presented herein 
was to study the alleged impact of public employee unionism on state and 
local government financial problems. A preliminary conclusion of the study 
was that these organizations have not exercised an unduly harsh impact on 
the budgets of various governmental entities. However, this thesis was 
not tested directly. Future research might concentrate on the influences 
of public employee unions on overall governmental budgetary practices or, 
more specifically, on the makeup of capital and operating budgets.^ Employee 
salaries and benefits compose the largest portion of all state and local 
operating budget expenditures. If collective bargaining is causing a 
decrease in capital budget spending and a shift toward larger outlays for 
employee compensation, this could, among other things, lead to a deteriora­
tion of the governmental physical plant and an increase in long-range 
costs. It is especially important that pension costs be considered here, 
as the future contractual pension obligations of many state and local 
governments exceed 20 percent of total payroll costs (see Spero and 
Capozzola, 1973: 227-29).
On the other side of the coin, future research should confront the 
question of the impact of public employee collective bargaining on the 
revenue aspect of governmental budgeting. As Stanley and Cooper (1972:
131) have observed, management contentions that a government can't afford 
to grant certain compensation demands are increasingly viewed with 
considerable diffidence by employee spokesmen. Spero and Capozzola (1973: 
233) concur in this observation, noting that a city's professed inability
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to pay for employee demands has sometimes been discredited as the only 
criterion upon which to base the amount of wage increases. Government 
employers may be pressured to seek the necessary revenue to fund compensa­
tion demands from new sources or increase the intake from existing sources.
If this phenomenon could be confirmed with budgetary data from the states 
and cities, and a significant union impact could be isolated, then there 
would be some direct evidence that public employee unionism has been a 
major factor in state and local financial problems. In sum, this would 
constitute an alternative means of testing the Wellington and Winter thesis.
At the state government level, further empirical testing should be 
made of the relationship between state legislative capability/professionalism 
and the compensation received by state workers. The investigation then 
could be extended to encompass other aspects of the state political system, 
including gubernatorial powers and the role of the bureaucracy. Although 
some general work has been conducted in this area (see Sharkansky, 1969), 
much remains for scholarly inquiry.
Although a great deal of political science research has been 
directed toward the role of reformed urban governmental institutions 
(council-manager form of government, nonpartisan elections, at-large elec­
tions) in municipal politics (see Hawkins, 1971: 19-60), this work typically 
has not attempted to fit municipal unions into the picture. There are 
some exceptions to this statement, found principally in a few studies 
which have dealt tangentially with the role of the city manager in 
labor-monagement relations (see Saltzstein, 1974; Ehrenberg, 1973; Burton, 
1972; Kochan and Wheeler, 1975). As noted earlier, however, findings have 
been conflicting.
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Nonetheless, this constitutes an Important field for future research.
City managers are taking an expanding and assertive role in the politics and
administration of American municipalities. As one scholar (Almy, 1977: 20)
has stated, city managers "have become the major source of local policy."
City managers have assumed the responsibility for wage and benefit negotia-
4
tions in most council-manager cities, thus placing themselves at the heart 
of labor-management relations. As public employee unionism continues to 
spread throughout the municipal scene, it will be useful to monitor the 
success or failure of managers in dealing with unions at budget time, 
compared with the leading city negotiators in mayor-council cities.
It will also be interesting to observe the effects of collective 
bargaining on the organizational structure of city government. Evidence 
reported so far indicates that bargaining exercises a centralizing influ­
ence on managerial authority within the executive branch (see Burton, 1972). 
If this trend continues, one might anticipate a reduction in informal 
municipal multilateral bargaining, the legislative "end-run," and other 
union tactics intended to benefit from the political setting of public 
employee unionism. In effect, a more cohesive public "management" may be 
one result of collective bargaining in public employment.
Other "reformed" institutions— nonpartisan and at-large elections—  
have received very little attention in the literature on public employee 
unionism. Findings reported in Chapter Five of this research, however, 
indicate that at-large elections do have some impact on salary levels 
won by municipal policemen, with organized employees doing relatively 
better in at-large election systems. Future research should extend the 
investigation geographically and into more occupational categories in con­
sidering the role of election type in municipal employee bargaining outcome.
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Finally, more research is needed on the part public employee 
unions play in electoral politics. Since Scoble (1963) first pointed out 
this research lacuna, little progress has been made in discovering what 
role, if any, unions take in determining the outcome of an election. 
Specific foci within this area could include candidate recruitment, unions 
in party politics, vote mobilization, and voting outcome.
Obviously, the foregoing study has tapped only a small aspect of 
public employee unionism. Just as clearly, collective bargaining in state 
and local government is a ripe area for future study within the discipline 
of political science. It is hoped that this research has made some small 
contribution to the broader area of public sector labor relations.
NOTES
1. Some states have authorized the right to strike by some or all cate­
gories of public employees. Including Hawaii, Alaska, Minnesota,
Montana, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Thus, it 
appears that a general reappraisal Is being made of the relative costs 
Involved In maintaining labor peace In the public sector (see Lewin, 
1976: 154-55).
2. After a 39 day strike in April and May of 1976 by 1,800 municipal
craft workers In San Francisco In protest of a pay cut, city officials
and voters turned rather hostile toward the striking employees. City 
voters had forced the pay cuts by requiring the city to abandon pay 
parity between municipal craft workers and comparable private sector 
employees. After the strike, four union leaders and five labor 
organizations were found guilty of contempt of a court Injunction 
against the strike. Each organization was fined $4,000, and each 
union leader received a $500 fine and five days In jail (see Monthly 
Labor Review, 1976: 49). Other anti-labor measures were also enacted 
by San Francisco voters, including a provision for firing public 
employees.
3. For one effort which attempts to analyze the Influence of collective 
bargaining on the public budgetary process of a single state see 
Derber, et al (1973).
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4. Saltzstein (1974: 335) reports that 72 percent of council-manager 
cities have given city managers this responsibility.
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